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Enhancing the Research on Sophistry in the Renaissance 
 
Teodoro Katinis 
 
 
Abstract: This contribution introduces the proceedings of 
the international conference The Sophistic Renaissance: 
Authors, Texts, Interpretations held in Venice on Septem-
ber 26th, 2016 as part of my Marie Skłodowska-Curie pro-
ject Sperone Speroni (1500-1588) and the Rebirth of 
Sophistry in the Italian Renaissance at Ca’ Foscari Uni-
versity (2015-2016). This introduction briefly presents the 
status quaestionis and the essays collected herein, dis-
cusses the challenges scholars encounter while exploring 
the legacy of ancient sophists in early modern culture, and 
addresses some promising lines of research for deepening 
some aspects of the subject in the future. 
 
Keywords: Sophistry, Latin Renaissance, vernacular 
Renaissance. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The collection of essays we publish in this issue of Phi-
losophical Readings presents the results of the work done 
by scholars gathered for the conference The Sophistic 
Renaissance: Authors, Texts, Interpretations, which I or-
ganized in Venice. The meeting was held at Ca’ Foscari 
University in Venice, in the splendid Aula Baratto on 
September 26, 2016, with the support of the Department 
of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage. I intended to orga-
nize this conference as the closure event of the first year 
of my Marie Skłodowska-Curie project Sperone Speroni 
(1500-1588) and the Rebirth of Sophistry in the Italian 
Renaissance at Ca’ Foscari University.1 This was meant 
to be the first of two conferences. I scheduled the second 
one to be held in 2017, at the end of my research project, 
with the aim of summarizing the most important scholarly 
results in the exploration of sophistry in the Latin and 
vernacular Renaissance. I also intended to trace the pos-
siblities of research development in the field over the next 
years. This second conference was never realized since 
my current appointment at Ghent University brought my 
Marie Skłodowska-Curie project to an early end. 
According to my knowledge, there has never been a 
conference on such a subject. Indeed, although the soph-
ists have been the subject of important international meet-
ings, none of them have focused on the presence of an-
cient sophists in 15th and 16th-century European literature, 
which is paradoxical when one considers that the ancient 
sophists were reborn in this period - a time when other 
ancient traditions, such as Platonism, Aristotelianism and 
Skepticism, encountered great fortune as well.2 
The idea of two conferences was shaped on the structure 
of my two-year research project that aimed to analyze the 
works of Sperone Speroni degli Alvarotti (Padua 1500–
1588), his re-evaluation of ancient sophistic perspectives and 
their legacy in the early modern age. Speroni was one of the 
most important protagonists of the Renaissance debate on 
language and logic as well as civil and speculative philoso-
phy. Educated as an Aristotelian, he eventually developed a 
distinctive philosophy and was the first to challenge Plato’s 
condemnation of sophists. Starting with a focus on Speroni, 
the project proposed an analysis of the 15th-century Latin 
sources, such as Leonardo Bruni and Marsilio Ficino among 
others, and the exploration of the debate over sophistry in the 
Italian 16th-century authors, such as Torquato Tasso, Jacopo 
Mazzoni, and Gabriele Comanini.3 Considering that Latin lit-
erature was the first involved in the rebirth of sophistic tradi-
tions, I intended to focus the first conference more on Latin 
authors and texts and the second conference more on vernacu-
lar literatures. That said, I intended to put no strict boundary 
between the two kinds of literature, which was clearly the 
spirit of Eric MacPhail’s keynote address (Indiana University 
Bloomington), followed by Lodi Nauta (University of Gron-
ingen) – who preferred not to publish his contribution – Leo 
Catana (University of Copenhagen), and Marco Munarini 
(University of Padua). The keynote speaker for the second part 
of the conference was Marc van der Poel (Radboud Univer-
sity), followed by Stefano Gulizia (independent scholar), Jorge 
Ledo (University of Basel), and myself with some Closing 
Remarks. The conference ended with a Discussion Session in 
which the following discussants had the role of kindling the 
debate: Eugene Afonasin (Novosibirsk University), Christo-
pher Celenza (Johns Hopkins University), Glenn Most (SNS 
Pisa), Carlo Natali (Ca’ Foscari University Venice), and Luigi 
Perissinotto (Ca’ Foscari University Venice) – who unfortu-
nately could not attend the Conference. This collection of es-
says also includes the contribution of Elisa Bacchi (University 
of Pisa - Ghent University). 
The main aim of the Conference was to explore the in-
fluence and diffusion of ancient sophistic traditions in 
early-modern Europe, fostering an interdisciplinary dis-
cussion among scholars and enhancing a new network for 
future interdisciplinary collaboration. The participants ex-
amined the ancient sophists’ legacy, translations and in-
terpretations of their works in a span of time from the be-
ginning of the 15th century to the first part of the 17th cen-
tury, and crossing paths with philosophical traditions such 
as Platonism and Neo-Platonism, as well as major turns in 
European history, such as the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation. I believe the results published in this collec-
tion of essays are an important contribution towards fill-
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ing the gap in international scholarship and enhancing re-
search in the field. 
 
 
2. A brief status quaestionis 
 
The scholarship on ancient sophists in the Renaissance is 
relatively recent and, before presenting the papers in these 
proceedings, it might be useful to recall the studies that 
have focused on this subject or have been relevant for the 
development of current and future studies.  
One could be tempted to include the study or the so-
phistic legacy in the contiguous field of the history of 
rhetoric, but this would be misleading for our understand-
ing of the specificity of the transmission and reinterpreta-
tion of the sophists and their works throughout the West-
ern tradition, a specificity that Eric MacPhail’s pioneering 
monograph The Sophistic Renaissance (which clearly in-
spired this conference title) preserved very well. The first 
feature of the sophists is that they not only use speech as a 
means of persuasion, but they also imply powerful phi-
losophical approaches which are definitely rejected by the 
two main streams of Western tradition (i.e. Platonism and 
Aristotelianism), but embraced and used by other alterna-
tive philosophies (i.e. Skepticism).  
MacPhail’s book, published in 2011, has been the only 
extended study available on the rebirth of sophistry in 
early-modern European literature with a focus on Latin 
authors, in particular the humanists and Erasmus, and 
French literature, in particular Montaigne and Rabelais. 
Without summarizing MacPhail’s well-known mono-
graph, it is worth recalling that it not only collects and 
discusses the fortune of ancient sources in the Renais-
sance, but also explores their reinterpretation in new 
forms not always immediately recognizable, for example 
the use of rhetoric to destroy rhetoric in Michel de Mon-
taigne’s Essays, which is a topos that goes back to the 
conflict between Socrates and the sophists in Plato’s dia-
logues. In other terms, MacPhail’s study adopts an his-
torical approach, but also suggests research directions 
from a theoretical perspective.  
The presence of sophists in 15th and 16th century Latin 
literature has been the subject of other contributions, 
which have focused on the legacy of a specific sophist 
(for example the legacy of Protagoras of Abdera studied 
by Charles Trinkaus in his pioneering essay published in 
1976) and the presence of sophistry in authors and texts 
of the Renaissance.4   
The relevance of ancient sophists in understanding the 
vernacular literature of the Italian Renaissance is a grow-
ing line of research that has already had several contribu-
tions, although a complete exploration is still far from be-
ing achieved. Given his explicit defense of the sophists, 
Speroni Speroni degli Alvarotti, a Paduan philosopher 
and rhetorician usually labeled as an Aristotelian by histo-
riographers, has been the subject of a number of studies.5 
As a matter of fact, his “trattatelli” In difesa dei sofisti 
and Contra Socrate represent a unique case for the study 
of the rehabilitation of sophistry in the Renaissance, while 
other works of his discuss the topic, imitate sophistic 
rhetoric, or clearly refer to sophistic sources. The debate 
over sophistry in the works of Torquato Tasso and Jacopo 
Mazzoni has also been discussed in previous scholarship 
and we can count on several studies.6 Indeed, as it results 
also from these proceedings, the rebirth of sophistry and 
the debate over it seems to be particularly vivid and rich 
in the Italian environment, so that we can expect further 
discoveries on Italian authors and texts. Important 
achievements have been reached also for the Spanish lit-
erature thanks to Merkl’s studies on the reception of Pro-
tagoras of Abdera, through Marsilio Ficino’s translations 
and commentaries on Plato, in Miguel de Cervantes.7 But 
we still lack explorations of other vernacular contexts. 
Several scholars have warned not to consider sophis-
try as a uniform movement, or, in other words, they have 
suggested working on each specific sophist respecting his 
identity and the specificities of his work and thought. 
Since the 19th century, thanks to tools like the collection 
of sophistic fragments published by Diels and Kranz, this 
is not a difficult task anymore, and although we can still 
recognize some general common aspects in the authors of 
both the First and Second Sophistic (as the two major pe-
riods of the ancient sophistry are called) we also can 
clearly see the specificity of each source. For the authors 
of the Renaissance that was not an easy task, since some 
of their major sources for knowledge of the sophists, i.e. 
Plato and Aristotle, tend to identify the nature of sophistry 
(or the sophist as a kind, for example in Plato’s Sophist) 
rather than the specificity of each sophist. I think the Hy-
dra, as a metaphor of sophistry, as it is presented in 
Plato’s dialogue Euthydemus (297c–d), expresses quite 
well this ambivalent identity of sophistry, which is one of 
the reasons why I chose Antonio del Pollaiolo’s painting 
Hercules and the Hydra (c. 1475) as the icon of our con-
ference: sophists are many different individuals who share 
important features, for example the use of rhetoric as a 
powerful mean of persuasion, but also keep their own 
identity, which allows us, for example, to call both Pro-
tagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontini ‘sophists’ but 
with a full awareness of their deep differences. It is not 
my intention to deepen this aspect of the subject, which is 
a task for specialists of ancient sophistic literature consid-
ered by itself and before its impact on the Renaissance 
culture, but it is worth remarking that this ambivalence 
between the actual sophists, perceived as different from 
each other, and their belonging to the same kind, at least 
in the eyes of classical sources, also affected the Renais-
sance reception, as this also emerges from the papers here 
published. 
 
 
3. The collected papers 
 
MacPhail’s essay focuses on the study of religion as a 
human institution and argues that Niccolò Machiavelli 
and Michel de Montaigne followed the sophists’ approach 
in addressing religion from a social-thought perspective. 
Particularly interesting is Montaigne’s variation on the 
fragment of Protagoras of Abdera’s Peri theon. The essay 
explores, therefore, a possible use of sophistic perspective 
by vernacular authors as a response to important ques-
tions of their time. We should highlight that even when 
there is no sign of direct contact between the early mod-
ern authors and sophistic literature, the influence of the 
latter on the former is still worth investigating, as it is in 
any research of hidden textual sources, and even more. 
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One may argue, in fact, that because of the damnatio 
memoriae of the sophists, which caused the survival of 
only fragments and indirect sources and a stigma around 
them, we should not expect clear references to them as if 
they were classics of the Western philosophical canon. 
Even when they were reborn in the 15th and 16th centuries, 
the sophists were never treated like Plato, Aristotle and all 
the other well-accepted founders of Western civilization. 
The history of the sophists and their legacy over the cen-
turies is, so to speak, a telluric tradition, a hidden history, 
and somehow a “storia notturna” (to use the expression of 
the well-known Carlo Ginzburg’s book title on early 
modern witchcraft, which also deals with the difficulty of 
retracing a deceiving cultural phenomenon). One could 
say that the study of the sophists’ fortune requires quite a 
divergence from the traditional source-oriented approach. 
Traditionally (perhaps now less than before) students 
learn to look at the sources of a text to understand its 
identity and assess its originality against tradition, but 
with sophistic sources the historian often cannot proceed 
in this way. The presence of a sophist or a sophistic ap-
proach or argument in an early modern text rarely 
emerges clearly and very rarely is clearly stated by the 
author. The legacy of sophistry in literature is a deceiving 
presence and, for the most part, difficult to detect. Coher-
ently with its nature, sophistry appears in the Renaissance 
in the most paradoxical ways: for example, the “speaking 
against speech”, the use of rhetoric against itself to con-
firm its power (MacPhail 2011, II.3), or the rebirth of 
sophistry thanks to the rebirth of its worst enemy, i.e. 
Plato, as it was with the Latin translation of Plato’s entire 
work by the humanist and philosopher Marsilio Ficino 
who wanted to reestablish the authority of Plato but, quite 
ironically, also reintroduced sophistry to Western culture. 
To Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Gorgias is dedi-
cated Leo Catana’s contribution. Catana stresses the fact 
that, although sophistry had been known through Aris-
totle’s works before Ficino, the translation of Plato gave 
an identity to the ancient sophists as they act as actual 
characters in his dialogues and interact with Socrates and 
other interlocutors on an imaginary stage. Plato let us 
meet his enemies while he humanizes them – so to speak. 
Analysing Ficino’s commentary to the Gorgias, Catana 
highlights what we mentioned above: ancient sophists are 
treated as a homogeneous group, which contradicts the 
sources, as now scholars know very well. Furthermore, 
Catana points out that Ficino looked at the sophists, par-
ticularly Callicles, as he is depicted in Plato’s Gorgias, 
not only as a rhetorician but also as a thinker with politi-
cal and natural law theories, which confirms the necessity 
of studying the sophistic reception as a field different 
from the history of rhetoric. This brings the author to 
wonder about the possible impact of the sophistic rebirth 
in the Renaissance on political theories in the early mod-
ern period, which not only brings the reader back to 
MacPhail’s discussion on Machiavelli in these proceed-
ings, but also to an interesting association with sophistry 
by political thinkers. To mention only one example, 
Thomas Hobbes entitled the second part of his Art of 
rhetoric “the art of sophistry”, which witnesses an interest 
in the subject on the part of one of the most influential 
political thinkers in the Western tradition. How much 
does Hobbes rely on the Renaissance interpretative filter 
for his knowledge of the sophists? And, even more impor-
tantly, did sophistic theories and Renaissance interpreta-
tions of them play a role in his thought? 
The transmission of sophistic approaches and ideas to 
Renaissance authors did not happen only through Plato 
and Aristotle – to mention the major philosophers ad-
dressing sophistry – but also thanks to authors of late an-
tiquity who influenced the rhetoric and literature of the 
Renaissance. As argued by Marco Munarini’s work, Syn-
esius of Cyrene (4th century), a Neo-platonic rhetorician 
and philosopher belonging to the school of Hypatia, could 
have had an important part in the development of some 
aspects of the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino and Pico 
della Mirandola. The demiurge power of speech, the role 
of imagination, the divine conception of man, and other 
major aspects of humanist anthropology, in the way in 
which Ficino and Pico shaped and transmitted it to the 
following centuries, may have been shaped, or at least in-
spired by, sophistic rhetoric and philosophy of late an-
tiquity. 
The history of sophistry within the Latin literature of 
the Renaissance does not end in the 15th century and is not 
limited to Italy. As Marc van der Poel demonstrates in his 
paper, an interest for sophistry is documented in the work 
of the Frisian scholar Rudolph Agrippa, while the French 
Jesuit Louis de Cressolles establishes the first comprehen-
sive history of the Greek ancient sophists in his Theatrum, 
published in Paris in 1620. Interestingly, Agricola’s 
judgment about the sophists is entirely positive, whereas 
several parts of Cressolles’ work criticizes the art of an-
cient sophists from the Platonic point of view. Writing 
some fifty years after the Council of Trent, Cressolles es-
tablishes his survey of sophists to reinforce the doctrine of 
the Roman Church, as required at his time. Although rec-
ognizing the relevance of Fumaroli’s (1994) chapter on 
Cressolles and the related notion of “sophistique sacrée”, 
Van der Poel goes further and argues that the Theatrum is 
above all a broad collection of testimonies, the first of the 
early modern age and still useful to be consulted. It is 
worth mentioning that in so doing Cressolles shares with 
Ficino the ironic destiny of condemning sophistry while 
he contributes to its diffusion and legacy. Between Agri-
cola and Cressolles, other authors refer to the ancient 
sophists. Van der Poel addresses in particular the De in-
strumento probabilitatis of the humanist Juan Luis Vives, 
who explicitly refers to Agricola’s De inventione dialec-
tica. Van der Poel’s contribution opens the path for explo-
ration of the sophistic Renaissance of Europe’s Latin lit-
erature during the humanist era and beyond, following the 
variety of perspectives offered in different times and cul-
tural contexts.  
If Cressolles was the first early modern author to build 
a detailed inventory of ancient sophists, Aldus Manutius 
printed the first collection of ancient rhetoricians’ texts 
which also included sophistic pieces: the two volumes of 
the Greek Orators (1513). Gulizia’s contribution focuses 
on the insertion of the ancient sophist Alcidamas in the 
first volume as a case study for the analysis of the trans-
mission, management, and printing of the materials com-
ing from the Byzantine world to Venice, where printing 
activity at the time was one of the largest and most inten-
sive in Europe. Indeed, in Venice one detects a concentra-
tion of printing initiatives that marked the rebirth of soph-
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istry for the entire Western world. As a matter of fact, at 
the beginning of the 16th century, Manutius published Phi-
lostratus’ Lives of the Sophists in 1503, Gorgias’ Enco-
mium of Helen, along with other sophistic texts in 1513, 
and the whole of Plato’s works in the same year, to men-
tion only some of the publications that are directly related 
to the ancient sophists, which fostered their fortune.8 
Jorge Ledo’s broad project of mapping the Latin vo-
cabulary of sophistry in the Renaissance is a different way 
of looking at the inventory of activities developed at the 
time, although he does not focus on names, theories or 
works, but rather on linguistic terms related to sophistry. 
Indeed, after an extensive introduction to the subject, 
Ledo discusses different categories of words which rivals 
use to attack each other in several kinds of intellectual 
debates and on a variety of subjects. Ledo aims at recon-
structing the origin, evolution, and uses of this lexicon, 
which sheds light not only on the humanist critique of 
scholasticism but also and more widely on the sophistic 
sources of disputation in the early modern era. Indeed, the 
variety of terms analyzed in Ledo’s paper includes not 
only sophisma, sophista, and others which immediately 
refer to sophistry, but also terms less directly related to 
the subject and still overlapping its semantic area, such as 
altercationes and argutiae, which Ledo detects in several 
early modern logothecae – a term that he borrows from 
Guillaume Budé. The linguistic perspective adopted by 
Ledo’s paper suggests looking at the evolution of lan-
guage (in this case Latin, but future research projects 
should also address the vernaculars) as the major channel 
for the diffusion of sophistry. One may wonder how much 
of an impact the translation (not only literally but also 
culturally) of sophistic notions, ideas, arguments, and 
strategies had on the metamorphosis of sophistry, this 
strange creature (Hydra for Plato, “testuggine” for Sper-
oni, Proteo for others) that had survived all damnatio 
memoriae from ancient Greece to the Renaissance. But 
one may also wonder the opposite: how much the injec-
tion of sophistic elements, and the debate over them, had 
had an impact on the evolution and transformation of lan-
guage and culture in the early modern period. In other 
words, and without overestimating the role that sophistry 
played in Europe since the 15th century, the assessment of 
this aspect of the subject may contribute to the under-
standing of the conflict and debate that had such an im-
portant part in numerous aspects of European Renaissance 
culture.  
The use of the Second Sophistic – particularly Lucian 
of Samosata – for the exploitation of mythological and 
animal metaphors, and the conflictual climate of the Ref-
ormation are discussed in Elisa Bacchi’s contribution on 
Erasmus’ ethics and its rhetorical origin. Bacchi argues 
that Erasmus, influenced also by the Italian humanist 
Leon Battista Alberti, does not conceive of his aesthetic 
and rhetorical means as a mere external apparatus, but 
rather as a substantial part of his ethical discourse. The 
debate between Erasmus and Martin Luther along with 
his intellectual and friendly exchange with Thomas More, 
which are the relationships addressed by Bacchi, give the 
opportunity to see how Erasmus exploits the sophistic 
tradition and its allegories to face the urgent issues of his 
time. This essay demonstrated that MacPhail’s book, in 
which Erasmus plays a major role, has actually opened 
and inspired further promising research exploration in the 
field. 
 
 
4. Conclusion and future research 
 
We are aware that this collection of essays does not cover 
some important parts of the history of the Sophistic Ren-
aissance that could have a place here. We are also aware 
that important connections of sophistry with other tradi-
tions and fields are not mentioned. As mentioned above, 
this conference was meant as a first attempt to gather 
scholars to start enhancing the study of the subject. In the 
spirit of the Venetian meeting, I believe it is worth at least 
mentioning some directions we could take in the future to 
further our exploration.  
The relationship between sophistic sources and the re-
birth of skepticism in the Renaissance seems to be one of 
the most promising candidates. Indeed, the connection 
between skeptics and sophists appears several times and 
in several forms in the 16th century, for example in Mon-
taigne or even more clearly in Sextus Empiricus’ use of 
Gorgias and Protagoras, as already noted by MacPhail 
(2011), but also in some important Italian authors, such as 
Speroni and Jacopo Mazzoni.  
Another line of research is suggested by the metaphor 
of persuasive speech as a pharmacon, in fact, both poison 
and medicine, depending on the speaker’s use and inten-
tion, presented by Gorgias in his Encomium of Helen - 
that is, the relationship between the history of sophistic 
rhetoric and the history of medicine. This topic has al-
ready had attention regarding the ancient world, for ex-
ample in Gleason’s study (1995) on oratory in ancient 
Rome. Here, she refers to the relevance of the physiog-
nomical knowledge of time for the analysis of sophists’ 
self-presentation. Given the 15th and 16th-century rebirth 
of ancient sophistic and medical texts, it would be worth 
exploring if the connection established in the ancient 
world flourished again in the Renaissance, even in differ-
ent original forms, considering that both medicine and 
rhetoric plaid an important role in university as well as in 
public life at the time, as it did in the Venetian area.  
Furthermore, specific primary sources deserve further 
study – in particular Cressolles’ Theatrum (1620) and 
Dornavius’ Amphitheatrum sapientiae socraticae joco-
seriae (1619). Regarding the former, it would be interest-
ing to analyze which sources and scholars he uses. The 
latter is interesting for its traces of reception of the an-
cient sophists one might find given the tight connection 
between the paradoxical Encomia and sophistry in the 
Renaissance: for example, Erasmus’ Praise of Folly – 
among the most well-known works – and Speroni’s Dia-
logo della Discordia – whose relationship with sophistry 
is recently an object of scholarly interest (Katinis 2015). 
We already mentioned political thinkers and theory re-
lated to the Renaissance reception of sophistry (Machia-
velli and Hobbes) and we could add others, usually not 
considered political thinkers, who acknowledge the origi-
nality of sophistic fragments on ethics and politics. Sper-
oni, for example, supports an extreme form of relativism 
in assessing the value of laws in different republics on 
several occasions. How much of the intense connection 
between ancient sophists and the city (i.e. the ‘natural’ 
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environment of the sophist) was reflected in early modern 
interpretations? To what extent are Renaissance thinkers 
interested in sophistry because of the analogy they per-
ceived between their time and the ancient political envi-
ronment of Greece?  
Other directions of research are possible and it is not 
my intention to make a list of them, yet, in whichever 
manner the exploration continues, philological and trans-
lation enterprises (sometimes not very welcome in the 
current academic environment) should be considered pre-
cious allies of any further research activities.  
The contributions collected in these proceedings dem-
onstrate, among other things, that the Renaissance of 
sophistry and sophists began centuries before the modern 
philological, historical and theoretical enterprises of Diels 
and Kranz, Untersteiner, De Romilly, Cassin and others 
who have aimed at rediscovering this neglected part of 
Western tradition. The Sophistic Renaissance started in 
the Latin texts of Italian humanists and was transmitted, 
through translations and interpretations, over the centuries 
thanks to the interest of early modern scholars who saw in 
sophistic literature an ally or an enemy to destroy, a treas-
ure to preserve or a danger to avoid - in any case worthy 
of investigation.  
I do not dare to claim that a new field of study is open 
- and I would gladly avoid adding a new item to the over-
proliferation of categories and sub-categories of studies 
characterizing our time – but I hope this effort of reveal-
ing the hidden history of the Sophistic Renaissance will 
inspire and attract scholars from different disciplines to 
extend the exploration that started with MacPhail’s book 
in 2011 (aside from a few older and narrower contribu-
tions before it). 
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Abstract: This essay traces the legacy of the ancient 
Greek sophists in the European Renaissance with particu-
lar attention to the study of religion as a human institu-
tion. Vernacular writers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and 
Michel de Montaigne follow the lead of the sophists in 
their effort to bring religion into the field of social 
thought. Montaigne himself offers a particularly interest-
ing variation on the sole remaining fragment of Pro-
tagoras of Abdera’s Peri theon. In this way, these thinkers 
inscribe themselves in a genealogy of sophistic that con-
tinues from Classical Greece to the Enlightenment. 
 
Keywords: sophists, religion, atheism, enlightenment, 
Protagoras, Montaigne, Machiavelli. 
 
 
In The Greeks and the Irrational, E. R. Dodds explains 
that the Enlightenment did not begin with the sophists. 
“The Enlightenment is of course much older” (180). For 
students of European history, this chronology of enlight-
enment is hardly a matter of course. Yet within classical 
studies and the history of ancient thought, it is standard 
usage, more so in the Germanic languages than in the 
Romance languages,1 to designate the latter half of the 
fifth century as either the Greek Enlightenment, the Soph-
istic Enlightenment, or even, in at least one instance, the 
Euripidean Enlightenment. This usage developed in the 
wake of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in order to 
identify some trans-historical affinities between the lead-
ing thinkers of the Periclean Age and the modern Enlight-
enment philosophers. These affinities are broadly sub-
sumed under the headings of rationalism and atheism. As 
applied to the ancient world, Enlightenment involves a 
rationalist critique of traditional values in the context of 
some political crisis or revolution. Characteristic is the 
view of Friedrich Solmsen: “The Greek Enlightenment of 
the fifth century B.C., also known as the Rationalistic 
Movement or the Age of the Sophists, is generally associ-
ated with progressive or revolutionary ideas and even 
more, perhaps, with their negative correlate, the question-
ing of time-honored beliefs and values” (3). This para-
digm can apply to other times and places than ancient 
Greece and eighteenth-century Europe, and, at the limit, 
can serve to organize a comprehensive history of human 
civilization such as the East German scholar Hermann 
Ley’s multivolume study on Enlightenment and Atheism, 
whose title is meant to be redundant.  The protagonists of 
the Greek Enlightenment are the sophists, whose collec-
tive identity is professional rather than ideological, but 
whose fame and infamy spring from their corrosive chal-
lenge to traditional values and beliefs and from their ex-
clusive focus on human society and what we may call, in 
retrospect, the human sciences.  
It must be stressed at the outset, not only of this inter-
vention but also of our larger research project, that the 
unity of the sophists cannot derive from their coherence 
as a philosophical school or their adherence to any com-
mon doctrinal system. Moreover, it was Hermann Diels 
and Walther Kranz who defined the corpus of the sophists 
through the successive editions of their monumental an-
thology, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (DK), even 
though the sophists are not really presocratic in any mean-
ingful sense of the term. Therefore, the status of the soph-
ists as an object of inquiry meets with some resistance 
among historians of philosophy. Rather than form a dis-
tinct school of thought, sophistic can be understood as the 
natural expression of a new consciousness of the prob-
lems of social life in late fifth-century Greece. The 
scholar most closely associated with this approach is 
Mario Untersteiner, a leading editor and commentator of 
the sophists. Following in the same tradition, Giovanni 
Reale sees the sophists as the exponents of a new cultural 
paradigm that supplants the prior cultural paradigm of 
natural philosophy with a countervailing interest in an-
thropology (Reale, 17-19). My own point of emphasis is 
how the sophists, and their heirs and successors in subse-
quent eras, bring religion itself into the field of social 
thought. 
The paradigmatic figure in this regard is Protagoras of 
Abdera, who is credited with authoring the first treatise 
ever written on the gods or peri theon. Coming on the 
heels of a long tradition of natural philosophy represented 
by works entitled peri phuseos, Protagoras’ Peri theon 
marks a change of emphasis which is all the more re-
markable in so far as Protagoras does not really seem to 
be interested in theology. The Peri theon is a very con-
venient work to analyze since all that remains is the open-
ing sentence, and, as we know, the shorter the fragment, 
the longer the commentary. Diogenes Laertius and other 
doxographers conserve Protagoras’ opening words, with 
slight variations, as “regarding the gods, I do not know if 
they exist or if they do not exist or what form they have, 
for human life is short and the subject is obscure” (DK 
80B4).2 As many scholars have remarked, this is not a 
very promising beginning for a treatise on the gods, and 
some have even wondered if Protagoras really wrote a 
book on the gods that seems to disavow its subject matter 
from the outset (Fritz, 920). One hypothesis offered by 
historians of ancient philosophy is that Protagoras must 
have rehearsed arguments for and against theism or belief 
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in the gods in accordance with the spirit of his Antilogiai 
or opposing speeches, a work attested in Diogenes Laer-
tius’ Lives of the Philosophers (9.55).3 Some have even 
reconstructed these opposing arguments from the 
doxographic surveys in Cicero’s De natura deorum and 
Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus Mathematicos (Gigon). One 
weakness of this hypothesis is that Sextus classifies Pro-
tagoras among the dogmatic atheists, who argued on one 
side of the question, not both. I prefer to follow a different 
but no less authoritative conjecture, which was developed 
by Rodolfo Mondolfo on the basis of a suggestion by 
Werner Jaeger. 
In 1936 Jaeger delivered a series of lectures in Eng-
lish, which were later published under the title The Theol-
ogy of the Early Greek Philosophers, of which the last 
chapter or last lecture is on the sophists. Jaeger recognizes 
the sophists as, essentially, the first social scientists of re-
ligion. For the sophists, the study of religion belongs to 
the study of man, and so Jaeger declares, “But the real 
fathers of rational anthropology are the fifth-century 
Sophists. In this respect they resemble the philosophers of 
the modern Enlightenment, who perform a similar func-
tion and have many close points of contact with them” 
(175). This is the phrase that caught the eye of Frank 
Manuel and supposedly gave him the idea for his ground 
breaking study, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the 
Gods, to which my own title alludes. “The idea for the 
study first occurred to me while reading Werner Jaeger’s 
description of ancient rationalistic theory in The Theology 
of the Early Greek Philosophers. The affinity between 
Sophist and Enlightenment thought, to which Professor 
Jaeger there alludes in passing, challenged me” (Manuel, 
vii). Thus my essay situates itself in a genealogy of soph-
istic from Classical Greece to the Enlightenment via the 
Renaissance. Jaeger credits the sophists with reorienting 
the object of philosophical inquiry from objective know-
ledge of divine essence, such as the natural philosophers 
sought, to human subjectivity, by analyzing man himself. 
In particular, he highlights the role of Protagoras of Ab-
dera, who looks upon religion as an anthropological fact 
to be understood in the light of its origin and function in 
human society.4 
This is the viewpoint that Rodolfo Mondolfo seized 
upon in his magisterial study of the human subject in 
classical antiquity, first composed in Spanish and best 
known in its Italian version, La comprensione del sog-
getto umano nell’antichità classica. In a chapter on the 
subjectivization of religious representations, Mondolfo 
rehearses Jaeger’s argument and applies it more particu-
larly to Protagoras’ enigmatic treatise Peri theon, whose 
first and, for posterity, last sentence seems to foreclose 
any sequel or even any content. If Protagoras does not 
want to say whether the gods exist or not or in what form, 
what is left to talk about? The only thing left to discuss, 
Mondolfo insinuates, are the motives and the function of 
religious belief in human society (Mondolfo, 95-96). No 
more prudent than his fellow classicists, Mondolfo insists 
that Protagoras must have asked, why do people believe 
in the gods, and, following the utilitarian bent of sophistic 
thought, how can society use religion to its own advan-
tage?  Other sophists dealt with these same questions, in-
cluding Critias in the famous Sisyphus fragment con-
served by Sexus Empiricus in book nine of his Adversus 
Mathematicos (DK 88B25).5 To confirm Critias’s creden-
tials as an atheist, Sextus cites a dramatic poem (else-
where identified as the tragedy of Sisyphus by Euripides) 
where one of the characters, perhaps the protagonist 
Sisyphus, explains the invention of religion as a political 
expedient. In the beginning men lived a beastly and dis-
ordered life, with no reward for virtue or punishment of 
vice, until laws were passed to punish crime and secure 
justice. Since law deterred overt but not covert crime, 
some ingenious and prudent man first invented the fear of 
gods and persuaded others to believe in an eternal power 
that sees everything we do, hears everything we say, and 
even knows our secret thoughts so that no misdeed can 
escape detection. Moreover, this invention is explicitly 
acknowledged to be a lie, a ψεῦδος λόγος, or falsa ora-
tio for Gentian Hervet, the Renaissance translator. Thus 
the Sisyphus fragment, which enjoyed a fairly wide diffu-
sion in Greek, Latin, and, in condensed form, even in 
French in the late sixteenth century, represents religion as 
a surveillance system that supplements the law and limits 
the scope for undetected crime.6 God is assigned the role 
of the ἐπίσκοπός or inspector rerum whose all-
encompassing view keeps everyone in line at least until 
they realize that it’s all a hoax. This theory of religion ne-
cessarily seems irreligious, since to explain the instru-
mental value of religious belief is to undermine such be-
lief. 
Roman state religion seems to have been the heir to 
this legacy of sophistic thought, at least according to the 
testimony of Marcus Varro conserved in Saint Augus-
tine’s City of God. Augustine quotes Varro to the effect 
that, as there are some truths which it is not useful for the 
people to know, so there are some falsehoods which it is 
expedient to believe, including the belief that some men 
are born from the gods (Varro 23).7 Presumably, Varro 
would have counted his own understanding of religion as 
one of the truths best concealed from the people. Cicero 
largely endorses this understanding of the political expe-
diency of religion in the De natura deorum through the 
role of C. Aurelius Cotta, who, though a priest, allows 
himself to doubt in private conversation or in consessu 
what he affirms in public speech or in contione (1.61).8 
Apparently Cotta is the better able to perform his func-
tions as a priest because he does not really believe in the 
gods. Ironically, it is Cotta who denounces the Epicureans 
as atheists who eradicate religion from the minds of men 
(De natura deorum 1.121). What is the difference, he 
asks, between Epicurus and other atheists like Diagoras, 
Theodorus, Protagoras, or the author of the Sisyphus:  
 
Ii qui dixerunt totam de dis inmortalibus opinionem fictam esse 
ab hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut quos ratio non 
posset eos ad officium religio duceret, nonne omnem religionem 
funditus sustulerunt? (De natura deorum 1.118)  
 
Those who have said that the whole idea of the immortal gods 
was made up by wise men for the sake of the republic, so that 
those whom reason cannot guide to duty, religion would, have 
they not completely eradicated all religion? 
 
This is Cicero’s paraphrase of the Sisyphus fragment, 
which he denounces precisely because it is true, and some 
truths should never be acknowledged in public. Rather 
than writing a play for the theater, Critias would have 
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been better off writing a dialogue for his friends. All these 
figures from Critias to Cicero are precursors to our Soph-
istic Renaissance. 
Following this genealogy, we may ask the question, 
where in Renaissance literature, in Latin or the vernacu-
lar, can we hear an echo of Protagoras’ Peri theon? Who 
else, in the wake of Protagoras, thinks that life is too short 
for theology but just right for the sociology of religion?9 I 
propose to turn first to a figure who took an unseemly in-
terest in how religion was used in Republican Rome and 
misused in Renaissance Italy, namely Niccolò Machia-
velli, my first candidate for the invidious title of Renais-
sance sophist. In the first book of the Discorsi, Machia-
velli devotes a series of chapters to a scandalously con-
vincing appraisal of Roman religion as a triumph of state-
craft and a complete imposture (Discorsi I, 11-15).10 
Machiavelli admires the ancient Romans for using reli-
gion to promote civic order and military discipline, and he 
insinuates that Roman religion was successful because the 
people believed in it and the ruling class did not (Discorsi 
I, 12). In this way, ancient Rome and its class conflicts 
exemplify the crucial tension between belief and under-
standing: religious belief obscures understanding and 
understanding dissipates belief. In this dichotomy, the 
author of the Discorsi obviously identifies with the inter-
preters of religion, as John Najemy calls them, rather than 
with the believers. In short, with Machiavelli we witness 
the modern instauration of a resolutely non-theological 
approach to religion. 
Where else can we find in Renaissance literature a 
modern adaptation of the Peri theon? Who follows next in 
the wake of Protagoras? My main candidate for the dubi-
ous distinction of Renaissance sophist, and one who cer-
tainly knew Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers, 
is the French Renaissance prose writer and inventor of the 
essay form, Michel de Montaigne. The question of Mon-
taigne’s relationship to sophistic has already been raised 
and answered rather categorically by François Rigolot in 
an article on Montaigne and rhetoric. “La position de 
Montaigne vis-à-vis de la sophistique ne fait aucun 
doute,” he says. “Chez lui comme chez la plupart de ses 
contemporains--on pense surtout à Érasme--le terme est 
toujours pris dans un sens dépréciatif” (80). This is all the 
more true if we take the term “sophistic” to be a synonym 
of “scholastic,” which I do not.11 Rather, leaving aside the 
question of Montaigne and rhetoric, which as Rigolot ac-
knowledges is not simply a question of antagonism, I 
want to situate Montaigne in relation to sophistic social 
thought. I will begin with Montaigne’s essay on custom, 
“De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy reçue” 
(I, 23), which merits close attention for its contribution to 
the “functional analysis of religion”12 which extends 
throughout Montaigne’s essays. Ostensibly devoted to the 
tyranny of custom and the arbitrary authority of the law, 
while advocating the strictest adherence to law and cus-
tom, before recognizing in civil war an exception to its 
own rule, “De la coustume” revisits the prototypically 
sophistic distinction between nomos and physis or law 
and nature.13 Montaigne could have encountered this fa-
miliar topos in the dialogues of Xenophon and Plato if not 
in the less accessible, or in the case of Antiphon, inacces-
sible fragments of the sophists themselves. 
Following a long enumeration of diverse and, for a 
European audience, perverse customs illustrative of the 
relativity of cultural values, Montaigne argues that our 
very morality or the distinctions we draw between right 
and wrong are conventional rather than natural. “Les loix 
de la conscience, que nous disons naistre de nature, nais-
sent de la coustume: chacun ayant en veneration interne 
les opinions et moeurs approuvées et receuës autour de 
luy, ne s’en peut desprendre sans remors, ny s’y appliquer 
sans applaudissement” (I, 23, 115 C).14 This issue con-
tinued to preoccupy Montaigne as he revised his essay on 
the Exemplaire de Bordeaux until his death in 1592, add-
ing the concrete example of a virtue that is conventional 
rather than natural: “la pudicité” or pudicitia. Writing in 
the margins of his own copy of the 1588 edition of the 
Essais, after attributing to Plato himself the notion that 
sexual mores are conventional rather than natural, Mon-
taigne declares: “De vrai, la pudicité est une belle vertu, 
et de laquelle l’utilité est assez connue: mais de la traitter 
et faire valoir selon nature, il est autant malaysé, comme 
il est aisé de la faire valoir selon l’usage, les loix et les 
preceptes” (I, 23, 117 C). Here Montaigne renders the 
second term of the Physis / Nomos dichotomy with three 
vernacular terms: “l’usage, les loix et les preceptes.” Like 
the sophists, then, Montaigne classifies law and morality 
under the heading of nomos. However, as Aldo Magris 
reminds us in his article on Greek Enlightenment, to rec-
ognize that morality is conventional is not to minimize its 
importance, nor is it, by any means, subversive: “Anche 
la morale, dunque, è una costruzione umana, ed una con-
venzione, ma ciò non toglie per nulla la sua importanza, 
dato che questa importanza si misura sulla sua utilità 
sociale” (248). Jacqueline de Romilly makes very much 
the same point in her analysis of the sophistic critique of 
the law (93). For Montaigne, as a sophist, the law is valid 
because it is conventional; it is a convention entered into 
for the mutual benefit of society. This can explain, I be-
lieve, why such a caustic critique of custom yields such a 
classic expression of conservatism in “De la coustume”: 
“Car c’est la regle des regles, et generale loy des loix, que 
chacun observe celles du lieu où il est” (I, 23, 118 A).15 
The only general law he recognizes is the need to obey 
our own laws and to honor our own customs.  
Moreover, the convention that most appeals to Mon-
taigne, and that he most strongly urges his audience to 
respect, is the Catholic religion. The French are Catholic 
by convention, and they would do well to remain so, is 
the burden of his essay on custom. When he does speak of 
Christianity in this essay, he offers a very unorthodox en-
dorsement: “La religion Chrestienne a toutes les marques 
d’extreme justice et utilité; mais nulle plus apparente, que 
l’exacte recommendation de l’obéissance du Magistrat, et 
manutention des polices” (I, 23, 120 B). Here the criterion 
of utility completely displaces the question of truth.16 In 
that respect, Machiavelli and Montaigne invoke the same 
criterion but arrive at opposite conclusions in their evalu-
ation of Christianity. 
Montaigne further inscribes himself in the sophistic 
tradition through his very keen insight into what we may 
call the psychology of superstition, which is related to the 
faculty of the imagination. In his essay, from the first 
book, on the force of the imagination (I, 21), Montaigne 
compiles a leisurely sequence of anecdotes involving 
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what we might call psychosomatic ailments, illustrative of 
the power of the human imagination. The initial version 
of the essay includes a rather categorical statement of ra-
tionalism, the feature most emblematic of the sophistic 
enlightenment. “Il est vray semblable que le principal 
credit des miracles, des visions, des enchantemens et de 
tels effects extraordinaires, vienne de la puissance de 
l’imagination agissant principalement contre les ames du 
vulgaire, plus molles. On leur a si fort saisi la creance, 
qu’ils pensent voir ce qu’ils ne voyent pas” (I, 21, 99 A). 
It is most likely, Montaigne declares, that the credit we 
give to miracles, visions, enchantments, and other extra-
ordinary effects comes from the power of the imagination 
acting primarily on the minds of the common people, 
whose credulity is so far preoccupied, “si fort saisi,” that 
they think they see what they do not see. Therefore the 
category of the supernatural is a subjective representation 
rather than an objective reality. In revising his essay, 
Montaigne added a comic anecdote about a friend of his 
who suffered from sexual impotence on his wedding night 
and who was cured by a psychological ruse, which Mon-
taigne does not hesitate to call a “miracle” (I, 21, 100 C), 
that exploited the friend’s belief in sorcery and more par-
ticularly in the type of magic spell that the French call 
“les nouements d’aiguillettes.” It is clear that the essay on 
the imagination inscribes itself in a very specific ideo-
logical context, namely, the vogue of demonology and the 
persecution of witches in late Renaissance Europe (Na-
kam, 377-97). In this context, Montaigne’s aristocratic 
friend was no more able than the common people to resist 
the lure of superstition. 
The very same year that Montaigne published the first 
two books of Essays in 1580, Jean Bodin published his 
fanatical treatise De la démonomanie des sorciers where 
he strenuously rebuts the kind of rationalist arguments 
that Montaigne uses to explain belief in witches. Among 
other details, he adds juridical testimony to defend belief 
in “les nouements d’aiguillettes” that Montaigne demysti-
fies (Bodin, 182). Moreover, Bodin draws a very impru-
dent connection between religious orthodoxy and demo-
nology. In the appendix to his work that he calls “Réfuta-
tion des opinions de Jean Wier,” aimed at the physician 
Johann Weyer, whose treatise De praestigiis daemonum 
appeared in 1563, supplemented by the De Lamiis in 
1577, Bodin insists that to refute sorcery, as Weyer and 
Montaigne and some others do, is to refute religion. If 
sorcery isn’t real, then god isn’t real (Bodin, 469, 475). 
Bodin goes so far as to assert, against Weyer, that lycan-
thropy is just as certain as holy scripture: “Et en asseurant 
que le changement des Sorciers en loups, et autres bestes 
est fabuleux, et que c’est une illusion, il faict une conclu-
sion que l’histoire sacree est une fable et illusion, car s’il 
est fait en l’un, il se peut faire és autres, attendu que la 
puissance de Dieu n’est point diminuee” (475). This was 
immediately recognized as a dangerously inept approach 
to Christian apologetics, in fact so inept that it was open 
to suspicion of clandestine atheism.17 Whatever his secret 
motives may have been, Bodin does profess an absolute, 
literal belief in sorcery and witchcraft. For Bodin, who 
was primarily a jurist, what counts in this debate is the 
legal procedure used to prosecute witches. The guilty ver-
dict is the goal of his book. 
By contrast, Montaigne remains an agnostic on the objec-
tive question of guilt or innocence. Rather than render a 
verdict on the truth status of the examples he adduces, 
Montaigne prefers, in uncertain cases like the famous trial 
of Martin Guerre, to follow the model of the Areopagus, 
which, according to Valerius Maximus, deferred judge-
ment on a capital case for one hundred years in order to 
avoid an “inexplicabilem cunctationem” (8.1.2) or insol-
uble dilemma. In witch trials, Montaigne wishes the court 
could simply declare, “La court n’y entend rien” (III, 11, 
1030). In this way the essayist shuns what Andrea Frisch 
has called “the tribunal of history” and seeks instead to 
defuse the prosecutorial zeal of his contemporary French 
historians. 
In his essay on the force of the imagination, Mon-
taigne takes a rather casual attitude to the veracity of the 
anecdotes which he recounts, including the one about the 
falconer who made a bird fall from the sky merely by 
staring at it, “à ce qu’on dit” or according to hearsay (I, 
21, 105 A). In revising his essay, Montaigne magnified 
this aspect of hearsay, insisting that he does not care if his 
examples of the power of the imagination are true or 
false. Verification and falsification are not the purpose of 
his book, which he defines as follows, in a key passage 
for understanding the essays: “Aussi en l’estude que je 
traitte de noz moeurs et mouvemens, les tesmoignages 
fabuleux, pourveu qu’ils soient possibles, y servent 
comme les vrais. Advenu ou non advenu, à Paris ou à 
Rome, à Jean ou à Pierre, c’est tousjours un tour de 
l’humaine capacité, duquel je suis utilement advisé par ce 
recit” (I, 21, 105 C). First of all, the project of Mon-
taigne’s essays is anthropological: he studies human 
mores (nomoi we might say) and movements. Primary 
among these “moeurs et mouvemens” is human credulity, 
our impulse to believe in the supernatural and the divine. 
It is indifferent to this study whether our beliefs are true 
or false, as long as they are useful, and as long as we 
grasp the use to which they are put in society. Therefore, 
he dismisses the objective question: do witches exist, are 
they guilty or innocent, “advenu ou non advenu”? In this 
question, that Montaigne refuses to answer, that he leaves 
in suspense at the end of his essay on the force of the im-
agination, I propose to hear an echo of the question that 
Protagoras puts aside at the outset of his Peri theon: the 
question of whether the gods exist. We do not know what 
Protagoras said next, because his text has been lost and 
perhaps suppressed by subsequent orthodoxies. However, 
we do know what our Renaissance authors wrote, and 
through our collective efforts, we may be able to retrieve 
some of the fugitive legacy of the sophists from the sub-
stantial remains of the European Renaissance. 
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Notes 
 
1 The usage is not unknown in the Romance languages. See Saitta as 
well as Magris. 
2 The fragment is conserved in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philoso-
phers 9.52; Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio Evangelica 14.3.7; and 
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.56. 
3 This hypothesis was first proposed by Gomperz, 133-34. Untersteiner 
1, 55 considers Peri theon to be the first section of the Antilogiai. 
4 Summarizing Jaeger, 189, Babut says of Protagoras, “il est vraisem-
blable qu’il y appréciait positivement le fait religieux en tant que phé-
nomène social et élément important de la culture humaine” (56). 
5 See Davies for text, translation, commentary, and bibliography. 
 
 
6 Sextus’s Adversus Mathematicos, including the long version of the 
Sisyphus fragment, was first printed in Latin translation in Paris and 
Antwerp in 1569 while the shorter version of the fragment, attributed to 
Euripides, was found in the De placitis philosophorum included in Plu-
tarch’s Moralia and thus translated into French in 1572 by Jacques Am-
yot. The editio princeps of the Moralia was published by Aldo Manuzio 
in Venice in 1509. 
7 Montaigne paraphrases Varro’s opinion in the “Apologie de Raymond 
Sebond”: “Voicy l’excuse que nous donnent, sur la consideration de ce 
subject, Scevola, grant pontife, et Varro, grand theologien, en leur 
temps: Qu’il est besoin que le peuple ignore beaucoup de choses vrayes 
et en croye beaucoup de fausses” (II, 12, 535). 
8 On this point, see André. 
9 Magris paraphrases the end of DK 80B4 as follows: “la vita umana è 
troppo breve e troppo preziosa per sprecarla in tali questioni; meglio 
dunque impiegare il proprio tempo nella soluzione di problemi piú utili” 
(221). 
10 For an analysis of these chapters, see Sasso, 549-560. Sasso anticipa-
tes, in order to contradict, my thesis when he argues that Machiavelli’s 
concept of religion has only extrinsic connections with ancient sophistic: 
“E come il concetto che egli ne costruisce ha riscontri soltanto estrinseci 
con, poniamo, le antiche teorizzazioni sofistiche, così non ne ha alcuno 
con l’atteggiamento che predominò nel periodo della Controriforma” 
(553-554). 
11 For the use of the term sophist to designate the scholastic philosophers 
and professors of dialectic, see MacPhail 2011, 52-58. 
12 The term is taken from Machiavelli criticism, especially Preus. Before 
Preus, Tenenti focused his discussion of Machiavelli’s religion on “la 
sua analisi funzionale delle credenze religiose” (715). MacPhail 2014 
studies Montaigne’s functional analysis of religion with particular refe-
rence to the essay “De la gloire” (II, 16). 
13 For a general treatment of the theme, see Heinimann as well as Gu-
thrie, 55-134. 
14 The essays are cited by book, chapter, and page and also layer: A, B, 
or C for 1580, 1588, or the Exemplaire de Bordeaux. 
15 See Langer for the tension between conservatism and critique in I, 23. 
16 Similarly, Mathieu-Castellani: “l’utile se trouve privilégié par rapport 
à l’authentique” (10). 
17 The seventeenth-century libertine Guy Patin bears an interesting te-
stimony to Bodin’s posthumous reputation for atheism and religious 
hypocrisy in a letter dated November 16, 1643: “La Démonomanie des 
Sorciers de Bodin ne vaut rien du tout. Il ne fit ce livre qu’afin qu’on 
crût qu’il y croyait, d’autant que, pour quelques opinions un peu libres, 
il fut soupçonné d’athéisme, parce qu’il favorisa les huguenots” (304). 
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Marsilio Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Gorgias  
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Abstract: Plato’s Gorgias sets out to discuss the nature 
and aim of rhetoric. The dialogue was held in high esteem 
among late ancient Platonists and it resurfaced in Renais-
sance discussions about ethics. Olympiodorus (6th cen-
tury) produced an extensive commentary on the dialogue, 
emphasising its ethical content. In 1409, Leonardo Bruni 
(1369-1444) provided the first complete Latin translation 
of the Gorgias with preface and annotations. Later in the 
Renaissance we find direct and indirect commentaries by 
George of Trebizond (1395-1472/1473) and Marsilio Fi-
cino (1433-1499). I argue that Ficino’s translation of, and 
commentary to, Plato’s Gorgias was a significant, but 
perhaps also unintended, contribution to the dissemination 
of ancient sophists in the Italian Renaissance. Ficino’s 
commentary to the Gorgias defends a legitimate and 
philosophical use of rhetoric, including the one we find in 
Plato’s own writings. Furthermore, Ficino treats the char-
acter Callicles – together with several other sophists in 
Plato’s dialogues – as an enemy of the Platonic-
Pythagorean ethical ideal, maintaining that the sophists 
were wrong. Moreover, he treats ancient sophists as a 
fairly homogeneous group, unlike some of the ancient 
sources. 
 
Keywords: Plato’s Gorgias, sophists, Marsilio Ficino, 
rhetoric, philosophy. 
 
 
1. Ficino and Renaissance sophistry 
 
This article examines the Florentine humanist and phi-
losopher Marsilio Ficino and his contribution to Renais-
sance sophistry. At first sight this may appear as an un-
promising topic, since Ficino, an important Plato transla-
tor and Platonist, generally sided with Plato in his criti-
cism of ancient sophistry: How could Ficino possibly 
have made a contribution to Renaissance sophistry?  
 The writings of ancient Greek sophists were lost in 
antiquity, and their ideas were mainly known through re-
ports made by a variety of ancient authors. Plato was one 
of these authors, and he was the most important one, since 
he portrayed several sophists and their ideas in a series of 
his dialogues. As is well known, Plato did not do so in 
order to provide a detailed and objective account of the 
sophists’ ideas, but in order to refute their ideas. Hence 
we have good reasons for believing that his account was 
biased.  
 To the Medieval Latin tradition, Plato’s works were 
inaccessible with the exception of his Timaeus (up till 
53b), which was available in Latin throughout the Medi-
eval period. His Meno, Phaedo and his Parmenides were 
translated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but, 
apart from the Meno, none of the dialogues conveyed 
much about ancient sophists. In the Timaeus we find the 
speaker Critias, whose relation to the speaker with the 
same name in the Plato dialogue entitled Critias is dis-
puted, but the central point is that Critias in the Timaeus 
did not convey theories under the banner of sophistry.1 In 
Meno 93c, Meno had related that sophists (sophistai) 
promised to teach virtue (aretē), adding that he admired 
Gorgias (probably a reference to Gorgias of Leontini), for 
his refusal to make such a promise; all he did was to teach 
oratory. Gorgias of Leontini (485-380) was a historical 
figure, who went to Athens on a diplomatic mission in 
427, and Plato’s Gorgias was clearly a reaction to his in-
fluence on Athenian rhetoric and politics.2 In Meno 75e, 
Socrates had referred to Prodicus, but without linking his 
name to the sophists. In short, in the Medieval period 
there was no Plato dialogue available in Latin in which a 
sophist featured as a speaker, incarnating and articulating 
sophistic theories and arguments in a elaborate manner. 
This situation meant that little, apart from names and brief 
assertions, were known about the ancient Greek sophists 
in the Medieval period through the texts of Plato, the 
chief exponent of ancient Greek sophists.  
 It should be noted, however, that even though Plato’s 
dialogues offered the most elaborate (though biased) ac-
count of ancient sophists and sophistry available to pos-
terity, non-Platonic accounts of ancient sophists and soph-
istry existed in antiquity, and some of these were trans-
mitted to the Latin Medieval tradition well before Fi-
cino’s 1484 translation of Plato’s works. Notably, Aris-
totle had dealt with sophistry and sophisms in his logical 
as well as in his non-logical works, and these works had 
been available in Latin translation for several centuries 
before Ficino’s Plato translation came out.3 It should be 
observed, however, that Aristotle rarely referred to indi-
vidual sophists, so even though Medieval, Latin transla-
tions of Aristotle’s works proceeded Ficino’s Latin trans-
lation of Plato’s dialogues and letters, these translations of 
Aristotle’s works conveyed very little about the ancient 
sophists themselves, implying that to Medieval authors 
the ‘sophist’ was a virtually empty category, whereas 
‘sophistry’ and ‘sophism’ denoted fairly well-known 
logical categories. Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280), for 
instance, was familiar with the sophist name Gorgias 
through Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (183b37), 
where Aristotle had criticised Gorgias for not conveying 
the art (technē) of rhetoric itself to his pupils, only its re-
sults; Albert’s knowledge about Gorgias did not transcend 
these and other scattered notes found in Aristotle’s work.4 
 There is, however, another important source to an-
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cient sophists that pre-dated Ficino’s Latin translation of 
1484, namely ancient doxographer Diogenes Laertius. In 
1433, the Florentine humanist Ambrogio Traversari com-
pleted a Latin translation of Laertius’ Lives, which subse-
quently circulated in manuscript form before it was 
printed in Rome in 1472. In general, this work became a 
major source of information of ancient Greek philosophy 
in the Renaissance, but it was almost silent as regards the 
ancient sophists. In 9.50-56, Laertius presented a short 
entry on the life of one prominent ancient sophists, 
namely Protagoras. In  8.58, in the section on Empedo-
cles, he made a brief note on another ancient sophist, 
Gorgias of Leontini: Laertius claimed that Gorgias was a 
pupil (mathētēs) of Empedocles, an accomplished orator, 
and the author of a manual on the art of rhetoric.5  
 In 1484 Ficino published the collected works of Plato, 
containing a number of dialogues portraying some of the 
most influential ancient sophists. Given the restricted 
knowledge about sophists in the medieval period, this was 
a major event. We normally think of Ficino as the one 
who transmitted Plato’s ideas to the Latin tradition, but 
we should reckon that by doing so Ficino also played an 
important role in the transmission of ancient sophistry.  
Ficino did so by providing Latin translations of Plato’s 
dialogues discussing sophists and by writing commen-
taries to these dialogues — commentaries, that were 
printed together with the dialogues themselves in the 
1484 publication and in many subsequent publications of 
Plato’s collected works. Even though Ficino by and large 
sided with Plato in his rejection of the sophists, he inad-
vertently promoted their ideas in the Renaissance. For this 
reason I think Ficino’s translations of, and especially his 
commentaries to, Plato’s dialogues on the sophists is a 
promising topic, if we want to understand the uses of the 
ancient sophists in the Renaissance. It may be useful to 
clarify the historiographical concept of sophists before I 
examine Ficino’s discussion of ancient sophists. 
 
 
2. Who counted as sophists to Ficino? 
 
Who should be included in the group of ancient sophists, 
and can one legitimately speak of them as one unified 
group?6 This is an acute problem in modern scholarship 
dedicated to ancient Greek sophistry, but it is also a prob-
lem when dealing with Ficino’s stance towards the soph-
ists as they were presented in Plato’s dialogues. As re-
gards the first question — who should we count as soph-
ists — we may, at least for a start, consult the 1952 list in 
Diels-Kranz’ sixth edition of their Fragmente der Vorsok-
ratkier, section D, entitled Ältere Sophistik’.7 Their list 
includes the following early Greek sophists: Protagoras, 
Xeniades, Gorgias, Lykophron, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, 
Hippias, Antiphon, Critias and the anonymous Iam-
blichus. We should be aware, however, that Diels-Kranz’ 
list is premised on historiographical assumptions that can 
be debated, and that the identification of the group among 
ancient Greek and Latin authors was a contentious issue. 
Given this situation, combined with our limited know-
ledge about the reception and interpretation of ancient 
sophists in the Renaissance, I prefer to be cautious and to 
refrain from establishing a list of ancient thinkers per-
ceived as sophists in the Renaissance. To Renaissance 
authors, including Ficino, the tag ‘sophist’ denoted a bat-
tle field rather than a well-defined profession. For this 
reason my second question — were ancient sophists a 
unified group – becomes even harder to answer, and I 
shall leave it open.  
 The present article is on Ficino’s commentary on 
Plato’s Gorgias. Was the protagonist Gorgias regarded as 
a sophist by Plato and Ficino? Let me first turn to Plato. 
In his Gorgias, the character Gorgias presents himself not 
as a ‘sophist’ but as an orator (rhētōr) (449a6) mastering 
rhetoric (rhētorikē), whose status as a craft (technē) is 
subsequently contested by Socrates. The fact that Plato 
has Gorgias presenting himself as an “orator” (rhētōr) 
does not exclude, of course, that he is regarded as a soph-
ist in other of Plato’s dialogues. Besides, the orator and 
the sophist may well co-exist in one person. This possi-
bility is affirmed in some of Plato’s other dialogues. In 
the Apology 19e, Socrates groups Gorgias of Leontini to-
gether with other sophists (sophistai) like Prodicus of 
Ceos and Hippias of Elis: They were itinerant teachers of 
young people. In the Meno 95c, Meno asserts that Gorgias 
differs from (other) sophists by not promising his pupils 
that he can teach virtue; he only teaches rhetoric. In 
(pseudo-)Plato’s Greater Hippias 282b4-5, Gorgias of 
Leontini is spoken of as “Gorgias of Leontini, the famous 
sophist” (Gorgias te gar houtos ho Leontinos sophistēs). 
Now let me turn to Ficino: Did he regard Gorgias as a 
sophist? 
 Ficino, in his Gorgias commentary, describes soph-
ists as those who, under the guise of truth, divert men to-
wards what is false.8 Gorgias of Leontini, the portrayed 
speaker in Plato’s Gorgias, did not aim at truth and jus-
tice, but conformed with popular opinion, which prefers 
what has the appearance of truth and likelihood, Ficino 
says.9 In his Phaedrus, Ficino continues, Plato criticised 
Lysias, in the Gorgias he criticised Gorgias of Leontini.10 
Ficino affirms in his Protagoras commentary that Plato 
has Socrates criticising the “sophists” in the dialogue 
Gorgias, though in an elegant manner.11 The sophists re-
ferred to here probably includes Gorgias himself, but pos-
sibly also the two other speakers in the Gorgias, namely 
Polus and Callicles. Callicles, however, may simply have 
been a fictitious character and not a historical person.12 At 
any rate, Gorgias features as a sophist in Plato’s Apology 
19e, and Ficino perceived Gorgias in this manner. For this 
reason, Ficino’s Gorgias commentary is a contribution 
Renaissance debate over ancient sophists. 
 
 
3. The reception of Plato’s Gorgias  
 
I now pass on to the reception of Plato’s Gorgias. The 
dialogue was held in high esteem among late ancient Pla-
tonists, some of whom considered it as a work on political 
virtue.13 Olympiodorus, active in the 6th century, pro-
duced an extensive commentary on the dialogue, emphas-
ising its ethical content. In 1409, Leonardo Bruni (1369-
1444) provided the first complete Latin translation of the 
Gorgias with a preface and annotations.14 Later in the Re-
naissance, still in the fifteenth century, George of Tre-
bizond (1395-1472/1473) and Ficino made important uses 
of the dialogue. In his De laudibus eloquentiae, George of 
Trebizond cited approvingly Gorgias’ definition of rhet-
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oric in Plato’s Gorgias 456c-457c as part of his anti-
Platonism.15 Ficino composed a commentary on the Gor-
gias that took up six folio pages in his 1576 Opera.16 In 
the sixteenth century, Girolamo Cardano wrote a dialogue 
against Plato’s Gorgias, namely his Antigorgias dialogus 
sive de recta vivendi ratione (Anti-Gorgias, or On the 
Right Way to Live), published in 1566.17 Given this ma-
terial, the reception of Plato’s Gorgias in the Renaissance 
is a promising starting point for studying the reception of 
ancient sophistry in the Renaissance and early modern 
period.  
 Ficino, in his 1484 publication of Plato’s collected 
works, did not only write commentaries to Plato’s Gor-
gias, but also to a number of other Plato dialogues that 
were given sophist names, and which presented sophist 
speakers, for instance the dialogues Euthydemus, Pro-
tagoras, Hippias and Critias. In addition, Ficino wrote a 
commentary on Plato’s Sophist, and he dealt with several 
of the ancient sophists included in Diels-Kranz’ 20th-
century list of ancient sophists in these and other dia-
logues.  
 Ficino’s Gorgias commentary is mainly organised 
according to the characters in Plato’s dialogue and their 
respective discussions with Socrates as they unfold within 
the compositional structure. Ficino introduces his com-
mentary by a general distinction between good and bad 
uses of rhetoric and poetry, after which he largely follows 
the composition of the dialogue:18 He sets out reporting 
Socrates’ discussion with Gorgias and his follower Polus 
about the nature of rhetoric, that is, the first part of the 
Gorgias (Gorgias 447a1-481b5).19 It should be noted that 
Plato did not discuss rhetoric in conjunction with poetry 
in his Gorgias — it is Ficino who introduces poetry into 
Plato’s examination of rhetoric in his Gorigas. In the sec-
ond part of Plato’s dialogue (481b6-522e8), Ficino com-
ments on Socrates’ discussion with Callicles about tem-
perance. The final part of Ficino’s commentary is a rather 
independent interpretation of Socrates’ after-life myth, 
which we find in the third part of the Gorgias (523a1-
527e7).20 
 
 
4. Roadmap  
 
In the remaining part of this article I single out a few as-
pects in Ficino’s commentary, where he departs from a 
simple summary of the Gorgias and advances his own 
interpretation or views. In section five I summarise 
Socrates’ and Gorgias’ respective views on rhetoric and 
sophistry in the first part of Plato’s Gorgias (447a1-
481b5), which is discussed in the first and longest part of 
Ficino’s commentary.21 In section six I examine Ficino’s 
analysis of different uses of rhetoric, especially the rhet-
oric employed by Socrates in his refusal of orators and 
sophists. I point out that Ficino draws on Plato’s 
Phaedrus and its theory of rhetoric as a key to understand 
Plato’s own use of rhetoric in his Gorgias. In section 
seven I focus on Ficino’s explicit statements on sophists 
in his Gorgias commentary: Who and what are they, and 
how do Ficino’s identifications fit into his historical con-
text? In section eight I offer a brief account of what I see 
as the second part of Plato’s Gorgias (481b6-527e7), 
where Callicles introduces a new theme, ethics, and I ar-
gue that Socrates’ rejection of rhetoric entails an affirma-
tion of a certain way of living, which Callicles finds prob-
lematic, and a denial of another way of living, linked to 
the mastery of rhetoric, which Callicles defends. Socrates 
argued, against Callicles, that temperance (sōphrosynē) in 
the human soul should lead it to emulate the structure of 
the universe. In section nine I examine Ficino’s commen-
tary to this second part of the Gorgias, arguing that Ficino 
accommodates Plato’s ethico-cosmological agenda to his 
own astronomy and ethical ideas, and that Ficino thereby 
connects his discussion of Callicles to his De vita coelitus 
comparanda and to his Timaeus commentary. 
 
 
5. Plato on orators and sophists (Gorgias 447a1-481b5) 
 
Socrates asks what kind of craft rhetoric is, what it is able 
to accomplish and what it makes claims about and teaches 
(447c1-4). Gorgias defines rhetoric as the art of producing 
persuasion (peithein) by means of speeches (logoi) in the 
following contexts: “judges in a law court, councillors in 
a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in 
any other political gathering that might take place.” 
(452e14, trans. Zeyl.) Hence Gorgias divides rhetoric ac-
cording to its operative contexts, that is, forensic and po-
litical rhetoric. 
 Socrates argues that if rhetoric is to be regarded as a 
genuine craft (technē), it has to fulfil three requirements: 
(a) a technē must aim at what is best (beltiston) for the 
object processed by the technē. That is, technē is gov-
erned by some sort of teleology (464c3-d3, repeated 
503d5-e5); (b) the craftsman mastering a certain technē is 
able to provide an account or definition (logos) of the na-
ture (physis) of the object pertaining to the technē (465a2-
5). Socrates clarifies that this logos regards the nature and 
the cause of the object (500e4-501a3); (c) the craftsman 
mastering a technē is able to indicate the cause (aitia) de-
termining the state of the object falling under the technē 
in question (465a4-5). Rhetoric does not fulfil these three 
requirements, for which reason it does not qualify as a 
technē. If rhetoric is no craft, then what is rhetoric? It is in 
his answer to this question that Socrates defines the soph-
ist and distinguishes him from the rhetorician. 
 According to Socrates, the opposite to craft (technē) 
is a knack and routine (empeiria kai tribē), producing flat-
tery (kolakeia) and pleasure (hēdonē). Rhetoric and soph-
istry, Socrates continues, both belong to the category of 
flattery. His use of the Greek term kolakeia may allude to 
Eupolis’s comedy named Kolakes (The Flatterers), the 
plural from of the Greek word for a flatterer, kolax — a 
comedy that was staged in 421 BCE and which targeted 
sophists like Protagoras.22 In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates 
deploys an analogy to explain the difference between 
craft and flattery: In the case of the body, gymnastics 
(technē gymnastkē) and medicine (technē iatrikē) are 
technai for the body, since they provide what is best for 
the body. Reversely, cosmetics and pastry baking are 
forms of kolakeia for the body, since they do not provide 
what is best for the body, but only what gives pleasure. In 
the case of the soul, legislation and justice are technai 
providing what is best for the soul; legislation corres-
ponds to gymnastics, since they both procure what is best, 
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that is, they are prophylactic crafts; similarly, medicine 
corresponds to justice.  
 These two technai of the soul, legislation and justice, 
are opposed to two forms of kolakeia for the soul, namely 
sophistry and rhetoric: Just like the pastry chef, with his 
pleasing dishes, pretends to procure what is best for the 
body and hence to appear more attractive to common 
people than the doctor, who actually knows about medi-
cine and what is best for the body, likewise sophists and 
rhetoricians pretend to procure what is best for the soul 
without offering anything else but pleasure; in the realm 
of politics, sophistry pretends to do this in the context of 
legislation (nomothetikē), rhetoric in the context of justice 
(dikaiosynē). Hence, both sophistry and rhetoric are pleas-
ing, but deceptive. Socrates admits, however, that people 
tend to confuse sophists and rhetoricians, because they 
work in the same field (463a5-465c8).  
 Plato proposed different characterisations of sophists 
in different dialogues, depending on his philosophical ag-
enda, and it would be difficult to reduce his characterisa-
tions to one single formula, e.g. sophists professing false-
hood. In the Gorgias, Socrates’ depiction of sophistry is 
keyed to a forensic and political context, and his criticism 
of sophistry targets the sophists’ aim to flatter (i.e. to pro-
duce kolakeia) rather than to seek was is best for its ob-
ject, the citizens of the polis. What characterises Gorgias’ 
speeches, we are told at the beginning of the dialogue 
(447a-c), is epideixeis, that is, rhetorical show-pieces in-
tended to impress and dazzle his listeners.  Socrates wants 
nothing of it, but insists that Gorgias leaves behind his 
lengthy monologues and commits himself to a dialogue 
structured on questions and answers, that is, dialectics. 
 There is some subtlety involved on Plato’s part. He 
has not Socrates proclaiming that sophists are uttering 
statements which are false and which the sophists them-
selves know are false when they utter them: It may well 
be the case that the statements are false, but not necessa-
rily that the statement-making agents themselves, the 
sophist employing rhetoric at forensic and political con-
texts, know that the statements are false when they utter 
them. Instead, Socrates argues that the sophists’ desire to 
flatter and please an audience, combined with their ignor-
ance about the object of their discourse, enables them to 
affect the beliefs of the audience, but also that these be-
liefs, if put into practice, turn out to be false and poten-
tially disastrous to the audience itself. Of course, it may 
also be the case that the sophist knows that he is uttering 
false statements when he utters flattering and pleasing 
words, which would make the case even more problem-
atic, because of the moral purpose, but this is not the issue 
in the Gorgias: The issue is the desire to flatter and please 
an audience with words, without having real knowledge 
about the object in question. 
 
 
6. Ficino on good and bad uses of rhetoric 
 
In his commentary on the Gorgias, Ficino first summa-
rises Socrates’ position on rhetoric and sophistry, partly 
reported in the previous section.23 However, Ficino is 
eager to avoid what he sees as a potential misunderstand-
ing of Plato, namely that Plato downright rejected rhet-
oric. He did not do so, and Plato himself was very elo-
quent. In order to substantiate these points, Ficino takes 
recourse to Plato’s Phaedrus and its positive evaluation of 
rhetoric. Ficino says as follows in his Gorgias commen-
tary: 
 
But anyone who may think that Plato, by far the most eloquent 
of all, is comparing legitimate rhetoric [eloquentia] to pastry 
baking, must read the Phaedrus, in which he approves of it 
[rhetoric] and speaks of its aim, function and rules in a precise 
manner, claiming that it is similar to medicine [medicina].24 (My 
trans.) 
 
The important word in this quotation is “legitimate”. As 
explained in section one, in Plato’s Gorgias we find 
Socrates claiming that pastry baking is a form of flattery, 
kolakeia, for the body, representing the deceptive nature 
of rhetoric and sophistry. In the Gorgias, pastry baking is 
not regarded as a technē, but as an empeiria, a knack. In 
the above quotation from Ficino’s Gorgias commentary, 
however, Ficino juxtaposes this negative view of rhetoric 
with the positive view of rhetoric found in the Phaedrus, 
where, so Ficino points out, legitimate rhetoric is com-
pared not with pastry baking, but with medicine (medi-
cina). In Plato’s Gorgias, medicine, in Greek, technē 
iatrikē, is regarded as a genuine craft, namely a craft 
whose object is the body’s health and care. Clearly, Fi-
cino refers to this reverse evaluation of rhetoric in the 
Phaedrus, partly in order to give a fuller interpretation of 
Plato’s view on rhetoric, partly in order to justify the fact 
that Plato, though critical of rhetoric, valued rhetoric and 
was very eloquent himself.  
 What does Plato say about rhetoric in his Phaedrus, 
and can Plato’s eloquence be defended on this score, as 
Ficino thinks? I shall leave out the last question, since it is 
too broad, but I shall address the first. In his Phaedrus 
266b-272b, rhetoric is compared with medicine, and 
Socrates states explicitly in 270b1-2 that the craft of rhet-
oric is very much like that of medicine (technē iatrikē).25 
Compared with Plato’s Gorgias, this is a notable state-
ment, because in that dialogue Socrates had denied that 
rhetoric was anything but knack and routine (empeiria kai 
tribē) and he had denied that it was a technē.  
 Admittedly, in the Phaedrus, Socrates repeats the ac-
cusation that rhetoric is nothing but knack and routine 
(270b1-9), but he adds that rhetoric may qualify as a craft, 
if and only if, it fulfils three requirements. The good ora-
tor must: (1) possess knowledge about the nature (physis) 
of the object under discussion; (2) prescribe a certain ac-
tion to be carried out and towards what or whom it is di-
rected; (3) possess adequate taxonomies of the audience’s 
souls and of the different kinds of speeches. Besides, he 
will know when to deploy a certain kind of speech when 
facing a certain kind of audience in order to produce the 
desired effects (271a4-271b5). The overall function of 
rhetorical speeches, thus understood, is to lead souls to 
persuasion (psychagōgia), Socrates adds (271c10-d2).  
 These three requirements to rhetoric as a craft, stated 
in the Phaedrus, largely correspond to the requirements to 
any craft laid down by Socrates in the Gorgias, as re-
ported above. His second requirement in the Gorgias re-
gards the orator’s ability to provide an account of the na-
ture (physis) of the object considered; this requirement 
corresponds to the first requirement in the Phaedrus. His 
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third requirement in the Gorgias regards the orator’s 
knowledge about causal connections pertaining to the ob-
ject discussed; this requirement corresponds to the third 
requirement in the Phaedrus. Socrates’ comparison of 
rhetoric with medicine in the Phaedrus is premised on the 
assumption that the doctor too must know the nature of 
the body and the causes leading to health and disease 
(270c3-5). 
 An orator and politician like Pericles, Socrates con-
tinues in the Phaedrus, qualified as such a speaker, be-
cause he had knowledge about the nature, the physis, of 
his object, that is, the Athenians (270a3-8). The problem 
with those who now write treatises on rhetoric, Socrates 
continues, is that they conceal the nature of their object, 
the human soul, even though they know it well; until they 
bring out this knowledge in the open and conform with 
the requirements mentioned by Socrates, they do not 
comply with the precepts of a genuine craft (271c1-4). 
 When Ficino, in the above quotation from his Gor-
gias commentary, brings forth Plato’s claim in the 
Phaedrus that rhetoric may qualify as a craft, he does so 
in order to give a broader and more comprehensive ac-
count of Plato’s stance towards rhetoric, as mentioned al-
ready, but he also does so in order to justify Plato’s elo-
quence: Plato is eloquent, that is true, but his eloquence is 
supported by a solid knowledge of the nature of his ob-
ject, the human soul, and he discloses this knowledge in 
an open and truthful manner.  
 Relying on the Phaedrus as a key to understand the 
examination of rhetoric in the Gorgias, Ficino explains 
rhetoric and its parts as follows in his Gorgias commen-
tary: 
 
In order to understand clearly what follows, it should be noted 
that rhetoric may be considered either in its genus or in its spe-
cies. In its genus it is defined as a diligence that is indeed ready 
to produce persuasion in civic matters, either by means of a 
critical skill or by means of a high degree of eloquence. For this 
reason rhetoric has been founded as the craft of speaking and the 
craft of poetry. Considered so far, rhetoric is good for the intel-
lect [intellectus]; to the will [voluntas] however, it is neither 
good nor evil. 
 There are two species of rhetoric. One is philosophical, the 
other is agreeable to the common people [popularis] or flattering 
[adulatoria]; the first is good, the second bad. The aim of the 
first is to lead the audience to a common good by stating the rea-
sons of things, words and moral traditions. This species of rhet-
oric he praises as the highest in the Phaedrus, and it is derived 
from philosophy and serious poetry. The aim of the second spe-
cies of rhetoric is to succeed, in whatever way it fancies, in ob-
taining agreement through plausible conjectures and excitements 
of the souls in a crowd. We place this form of rhetoric between 
sophistry and popular poetry, since it is a mixture of these two, 
which he denounces in this dialogue.26 (My trans.) 
 
The division of rhetoric into two species in the second 
paragraph may well refer to Plato’s distinction in the 
Phaedrus between two kinds of rhetoric, one that fulfils 
Socrates’ requirements to rhetoric (dubbed the ‘philo-
sophical’ in the Gorgias commentary), and one that does 
not fulfil these requirements, but which may still be 
agreeable and flattering to the audience; the Latin adjec-
tive adulatoria picking up on the Greek noun kolakeia. 
 In the first paragraph of the above quotation, we find 
the following sentence: “rhetoric is good for the intellect 
[intellectus]; to the will [voluntas] however, it is neither 
good nor evil.” The dichotomy between the concepts 
‘will’ and ‘intellect’ is not advanced in Plato’s Gorgias or 
in his Phaedrus — it is Ficino’s own addition. It may feed 
into the late Medieval discussion of intellectualism and 
voluntarism, to which Ficino contributed by means of his 
Symposium commentary, Da amore: If the individual hu-
man soul is to have a unificative experience with the di-
vine, the human intellect is insufficient in itself, it needs 
the will as well. The will, in turn, is to be understood as 
the human soul’s amor, its love, which is moved by 
beauty. 
 
 
7. Ficino on sophists and philosophers 
 
In my last quotation we saw Ficino divide rhetoric into 
two, one philosophical and one “agreeable to the common 
people (popularis) or flattering (adulatoria)”.  The latter 
he placed between sophistry and popular poetry. This 
predominantly negative view of sophistry occurs else-
where in his Gorgias commentary. At the very beginning, 
Ficino proclaims that there are two great powers in the 
human soul, namely cognition (cognitio) and affection 
(affectus), of which the “sophists, under the guise of truth, 
turn [the crowd’s] cognition towards what is false.”27 
Hence Plato condemns sophists completely, Ficino 
notes.28 Poetry, which sophistry resembles, as we have 
just seen, is not condemned in the same absolute manner: 
Popular poetry agitates the affections and as such it may 
pose a danger to youngsters who are led by emotions and 
ignorant of the allegorical meaning in poetry. For this rea-
son, Ficino continues, Plato condemns popular poetry 
from the city (urbs), referring to the Republic for this 
view.29  
 In his Gorgias commentary, however, Ficino makes 
the following general statement about sophists and phi-
losophers: 
 
Understand that the [charges] which Callicles raises against phi-
losophers [i.e. Gorgias 484c-486d] do not target genuine philo-
sophes, but [a] partly the most sluggish of the sophists, and 
partly those [b] who misuse the study of philosophy when they 
pursue logic alone, thereby by-passing the other areas of specu-
lation; or [c] when they attach themselves to speculation alone, 
thus ignoring the philosophical precepts of tradition and the 
civic institutions.30 (My trans.) 
 
It is hard not to read this statement as Ficino’s comment 
on Plato’s Gorgias as well as on contemporary philoso-
phers, especially scholastic philosophers. In Plato’s Gori-
gas 484c-486d, which Ficino probably comments upon by 
these words, we find no explicit references to philoso-
phers pursing logic alone, i.e. [b], which would indeed be 
hard to find at that time, given that logic was only devel-
oped after Plato, namely by Aristotle. Those philosophers 
charged by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias 484c-486d are not 
boys or youngsters taking an interest in philosophy as part 
of their education, but those men who persevere and study 
philosophy well into their adulthood, and who loose the 
skill to make persuasive speeches in political assemblies 
and court rooms. Socrates is one case in point, and Calli-
cles scorns him and encourages him to abandon his inter-
est in philosophy. 
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To whom, then, may Ficino refer by the two groups [b] 
and [c]? Group [b] may refer to scholastic philosophers in 
general. In the fourteenth century, one of the founders of 
humanism, Petrarch, had identified dialecticians at the 
University of Oxford as sophists, and Ficino may allude 
to this wide-spread humanist criticism of scholastic phi-
losophers dedicating themselves to logic exclusively.31 
Group [c] may partly refer to the same group, but it may 
also refer to scholastic philosophers working within natu-
ral philosophy and metaphysics, thus ignoring ethics and 
political philosophy, areas that were part of and ancient 
philosophy and dear to Renaissance humanists. 
 
 
8. Plato’s Callicles: desire and greed (Gorgias 481b6-
527e7) 
 
In the second and third part of Plato’s Gorgias (i.e. 
481b6-527e7), Callicles enters the scene and changes the 
theme from rhetoric to ethics; Callicles objects that 
Socrates’ rejection of rhetoric entails an ethical ideal 
about a certain way of living, which Callicles contests.  
 According to Callicles’ theory of natural law, the 
stronger is allowed by nature (physis) to have a greater 
share than the weaker and to exert his power over the 
weaker (488b-491c). Callicles develops his ethical view 
by adding a theory of hedonism, supporting his theory of 
natural law. According to nature, happiness consists in the 
fulfilling of one’s desires (epithymiai). Self-control 
(sōphrosynē), on the other hand, is a hindrance to this 
aim. However, the majority of people is impotent and un-
able to pursue the kind of happiness prescribed by nature, 
for which reason they perversely praise self-control as an 
ideal. The truth is, Callicles triumphs, that a lack of self-
discipline (akolasia) is an ethical ideal according to na-
ture (491d-494a). Socrates disagrees with Callicles, and 
he argues that the soul able to experience happiness is a 
soul characterised by self-control, allowing it to curb its 
desires (epithymiai), and that this idea is reflected in the 
order of the universe. 
 
 
9. Ficino against Callicles: the ethical ideal of the self-
controlled soul 
 
Ficino, in his Gorgias commentary, seems to misrepresent 
Callicles’ theory of natural law, since he attributes to Cal-
licles, and to Thrasymachus (a noted sophist, depicted in 
Plato’s Republic) “and many others” the view that cus-
toms and laws are not based on the order of nature 
(naturae ordo), but on men’s opinion (opinio) and imagi-
nation (ficitio).32 This view was, perhaps, more typical of 
an early Greek sophist like Antiphon than of Plato’s char-
acter Callicles; Antiphon had stated a conflict between 
laws (nomoi) and nature (physis), whereas Callicles in 
Plato’s Gorgias claimed that laws ought to conform with 
nature, though he admitted that present-day democratic 
Athens did not do so.33 However, Callicles did in fact 
base his concept of justice on his notion of nature.34 It 
seems to me that this is one example of Ficino lumping 
together some early Greek thinkers into one single group 
entitled sophists, which was in fact a quite diverse group 
of thinkers. 
These are Ficino’s words on Socrates’ reply to Calli-
cles, who scorned the value of self-control: 
 
Socrates, however, girds up his loins to prove that self-control is 
not founded on human opinion, but on the order of nature. In 
fact, the natural order requires that the lower parts of the soul 
obey the higher parts and the whole soul is in harmony with it-
self in all respects, and that it is beautiful and does not act ran-
domly, but pursues the proper aim. This is the moral disposition 
and life of the self-controlled human being. In the human being 
lacking self-control, on the other hand, reason [ratio], the queen 
of the human being, caters for servile lust, and [such a human 
being, or its reason] is marked by disturbance and weakness, 
struggling in its endeavour to fulfil, always pursuing fleeting 
pleasure [voluptas], despite incomparable trouble. 
All this Socrates explains by means of the views of the Py-
thagoreans, especially Philolaus and Empedocles, using the two-
fold method of fable [fabula] and example [exemplum], in which 
it is being discussed whether the soul within the body is entirely 
dead: The soul lacking self-control being condemned to the 
lower [world], where it is miserably inflicted by vain and relent-
less toil, as it continuously struggles with the leaky jar, that is, 
depraved and false judgement, to refill the other jar, that is, insa-
tiable desire [concupiscentia], with the water of delights [oblec-
tamenti].35 (My trans.) 
 
In the first paragraph, Ficino argues that Socrates bases 
his argument on the value of self-control on the order of 
nature. In the Gorgias, Socrates does so in his rejection of 
Callicles — for instance, in his famous cosmological pas-
sage (507e3-508a8), where he argues that there is an an-
alogy between the parts of the human soul and the parts of 
the universe. At the end of his commentary, Ficino spells 
out a cosmological order, which does not appear in 
Plato’s Gorgias, but which introduces the familiar Fi-
cinian cosmology with the planets Saturn ruling over 
Jupiter, Nepturn and Pluto, thereby engrafting a universal 
law into the order of nature.36 Ficino’s elaboration of the 
cosmological element connects his Gorgias commentary 
to some of his other works on natural philosophy, in par-
ticular his De vita coelitus comparanda and his Timaeus 
commentary. Here too, the human soul is part of a cosmic 
order, and its ethical value is largely determined by its 
conformity with this order. 
 In the second paragraph of the last quotation, Ficino 
refers to the two images of the water carriers and the 
leaky jars in the Gorgias 492e-494a, illustrating Socrates’ 
theory of the undisciplined soul, illustrating Callicles’ 
ethical ideal.37 Plato himself did not reveal his sources to 
these images, but Ficino clearly hold that Plato is drawing 
on Pythagorean ideas, especially those advanced by 
Philolaus and Empedocles.38 In Diogenes Laertius’ Lives 
8.33, however, Pythagoras is attributed the following 
view, which may play a role in the first paragraph of the 
above quotation: “Virtue [aretēn] is harmony [har-
monian], and so are health [hygieian] and all good 
[agathon] and God himself; this is why they say that all 
things are constructed according to the laws of harmony 
[kath’ harmonian synestanai ta hola]. The love of friends 
is just concord [isotēta] and harmony [enarmonion].” 
This passage does not mention Philolaus and Empedocles, 
but it does affirm that the theory of the soul’s harmony 
was central to Pythagoreans. 
 The upshot is, however, that in the eyes of Ficino, 
sophists like Callicles, Thrasymachus and many others 
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were up against the Platonic-Pythagorean ethical ideal, 
and that the sophists were terribly wrong.  
 
 
Concluding remark 
 
There is no doubt that Ficino’s Gorgias commentary 
played a significant role in the reception of ancient soph-
istry. As my brief account of Ficino’s commentary on 
Plato’s Gorgias makes clear, sophists not only discussed 
the nature and legitimacy of rhetoric, they also discussed 
ethics and political theories, e.g. Callicles in the Gorgias. 
Ficino was sensitive to this dimension of sophistry and 
responded to it. I tend to think that he got Callicles’ po-
litical theory wrong, as mentioned earlier, but that is less 
important in this context: The important point is that an-
cient sophists were perceived by a Renaissance thinker 
like Ficino as having views outside the realm of rhetoric, 
in this case political theory, natural law theories in par-
ticular.  
 This opens up for another line of research: Did the 
Renaissance introduction of ancient sophistry have any 
impact on political theories in the early modern period? 
Perhaps the answer is a blunt ‘no’, partly because Aris-
totle’s account of sophistry (falseness presented as truth) 
was more influential than Plato’s intricate discussion in 
his sophist dialogues, partly because ancient sophists 
were perceived as having outrageous views that were not 
taken seriously by political thinkers in the early modern 
period. To me, however, it remains an open question. 
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Abstract: The present work aims to highlight the impact 
that Synesius of Cyrene had on Ficino and Pico della 
Mirandola in the formation process of the Renaissance 
concept of rhetoric and the anthropology connected 
thereto. Special attention will be drawn to the close link 
between rhetoric and phantasia, both imaginative and cre-
ative forces that are present in all three authors. The mas-
ter of these forces is the rhetorician, who assumes in this 
respect an exemplary anthropological function. In fact, if 
on the one hand he is an ambiguous manipulator of shady 
speeches, on the other hand he is able to fully express the 
variety of human nature. This makes him an alter deus, 
that is, a demonic being whose nature is superior to any 
other. It is no accident that the demigod Proteus is a 
theme in all three authors and is the symbol of a positive 
human nature, which reveals itself as amphibious, multi-
ple and, above all, highly characterised on the verbal level 
and the imaginative level. 
 
Keywords: Synesius of Cyrene, Pico della Mirandola, 
Ficino, Proteus, phantasia, rhetoric. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When thinking of Italian literature in the Renaissance, the 
first thought goes immediately to the extraordinary redis-
covery of the classics which characterised those centuries. 
However, it should not be forgotten that humanists medi-
ated the past using the cultural ‘lenses’ of Late Antiquity, 
especially in a first instance when many codices were not 
available nor Greek was as widespread. Late Antiquity is 
not only one last great moment of splendour for the pagan 
literary culture but also of elaboration of great classics 
which will influence their interpretation in the following 
centuries. When Plato is picked up again in the 15th cen-
tury, he is read via the eyes of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and 
Proclus, while Aristoteles is read via the eyes of Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias and Themistius.1 
Therefore, if we want to examine the renewed flour-
ishing of sophistry and ancient rhetoric in the Renais-
sance, focusing on Late Antiquity musings regarding 
these topics can unearth new interesting research. We ob-
serve a revival of sophistry in Late Antiquity: the debate 
between rhetoric and philosophy started by Plato and Is-
ocrates, taken up by the Second Sophistry between the 1st 
and 2nd century, thrives in the 4th century during the resto-
ration of paganism promoted by emperor Julian.2 
Among the intellectuals of the 4th century who influence 
the rhetoric and literature in the Renaissance, Synesius of 
Cyrene, a Neoplatonic rhetorician and philosopher be-
longing to school of Hypatia, could play a role which still 
has not been highlighted by modern studies. This contri-
bution aims to research if the originality of Synesius’ 
thought on rhetoric could have echoes on mainly a theo-
retical as well as textual level of Renaissance’s rhetoric 
and its anthropology, namely by analysing the thoughts of 
Marsilio Ficino and Pico Della Mirandola. After having 
briefly cleared Synesius’ position on the Late Antiquity 
debate on rhetoric, the paper will continue analysing dif-
ferent elements suggesting Synesius influenced the cho-
sen Renaissance authors by analysing the circulation of 
their texts, intertextuality, and the link between rhetoric 
and φαντασία/phantasia. As we will see, these authors 
share a specific sensibly towards the power of words and 
a deep faith towards its artifex: man.  
 
 
2. Synesius and the apology of rhetoric 
 
Synesius of Cyrene is known by Renaissance scholars 
mostly for his De insomnis, a treatise on oneiromancy, the 
interpretation and divination of dreams, a volume which 
was widespread in the Renaissance. The essay is import-
ant to Neoplatonism in the Renaissance as proved by the 
Latin translation prepared by Marsilio Ficino around 
1488:3 besides touching upon gnoseology and cosmology, 
he illustrates the traits and functions of φαντασία, man’s 
faculty of imagination which is also responsible for 
dreaming. However, Synesius is a philosopher, but first 
and foremost a rhetorician, as proved by some of his 
works: Cynegetica, lost to us but we know it had been 
criticised for its elegant language and playful nature (Ep. 
154.11-18);4 Calvitii encomium, an exercise in adoxogra-
phy and rhetoric virtuosity which mocks In Praise of Hair 
by Dio Chrysostom; and the Dion, a work where Synesius 
discusses the relation between philosophy and rhetoric 
and the epistemological nature of the latter. 
Dion is written around 405 AD to counteract e parte 
philosophorum criticisms to Synesius regarding his writ-
ing.5 He had been accused of being too rhetorically elabo-
rate compared to the severity demanded from philoso-
phers.6 Indeed, in Late Antiquity, a certain idea had 
spread identifying philosophy with silence, taking Plato’s 
condemnation of rhetoric in dialogues such as Euthyde-
mus, Gorgias, Sophist to an extreme: this had created an 
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overlap between the meaning of φιλόσοφος and 
μισόλογος (Ep. 154.6-7).7 In the Dion, Synesius however 
markedly takes his distance from those philosophers, 
“who despise rhetoric and poetry” (Οὗτοι καὶ 
ὑπερόπται ῥητορικῆς καὶ ποιήσεως; 5.3; Fitzgerald): 
 
Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὴν φύσιν ὑπερφρονήσουσι, καὶ πρὸς θεωρίαν 
ἀτρύτως ἔχειν ἐροῦσιν, ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι ποιούμενοι, θεοὶ 
σαρκία περικείμενοι· εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, ἴστων ἀντὶ θεῶν ἢ 
σοφῶν τε καὶ θείων ἀνδρῶν χαῦνοι καὶ ἀλαζόνες πόρρω 
γενόμενοι (6.6). 
 
They do not surpass in knowledge their nature, though they will 
also profess an untiring zeal for contemplation, making them-
selves out to be passionless gods although clothed in flesh. Nay, 
if they were to make such profession, let them know that so far 
from being gods or wise and divine men, they are empty-
headed, and boasters into the bargain (Fitzgerald with adapta-
tions).8 
 
Synesius opposes this behaviour by defending the value 
of rhetoric as the most ideal and natural tool for man to 
express his multiplicity: it should be embraced and not 
interpreted as a limitation.9 Demanding to stay uninter-
ruptedly in the silence of noetic contemplation is a mysti-
fication of what should be a philosophical and spiritual 
exercise10. This must occur by understanding the nature of 
man, his median status and his dual polarity: a sensible 
and intelligible being (8.1), successively trying to “make 
the multitude into one” (ἓν τὸ πλῆθος ποιήσαντα; 5.1; 
Fitzgerald). This, however, must occur by exercising and 
expressing said multiplicity and not by negating part of it. 
As Synesius explains, this does not mean to “go down 
towards matter, neither dip the mind in the lowest pow-
ers” (οὐ βαθύνεται πρὸς ὕλην, οὐδὲ ἐμβαπτίζει 
τὸν νοῦν ταῖς ἐσχάταις δυνάμεσιν; 6.5; Fitzgerald with 
adaptations), but means trying to live both sides, finding 
the middle ground (9.8, 10.6). What better way to express 
said multiplicity than the art of expressing oneself better, 
i.e. rhetoric? 
 
Ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὤν, καὶ οὔτε θεός, ἵνα δὴ καὶ 
ἀκλινὴς εἴην πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονήν, οὔτε θηρίον, ἵνα τὰς 
σώματος ἡδοίμην ἡδονάς. λείπεται δή τι τῶν ἐν μέσῳ, τί δ’ 
ἂν εἴη πρὸ τῆς ἐν λόγοις τε καὶ περὶ λόγους διατριβῆς; τίς 
ἡδονὴ καθαρωτέρα; τίς ἀπαθεστέρα προσπάθεια; τίς ἧττον 
ἐν ὕλῃ; τίς μᾶλλον ἀμόλυντος; (8.1). 
 
For I know that I am a man, and neither a god that I should be 
adamant in face of every pleasure, nor a brute that I should take 
delight in the pleasures of the body. There remains, however, 
something to seek between these, and what can surpass a life 
spent in literature and its concerns; what pleasure is purer, what 
passionate attachment is more free from passion? (Fitzgerald). 
 
Rhetoric thus multiplies the expressive possibilities and 
allows one to express multiplicity. Furthermore, to Syn-
esius, the ars rhetorica marries perfectly with man’s am-
phibious nature as it allows him to turn to the intelligible 
world and to live in the sensible world. By beautifying 
speeches, rhetoric starts an anagogical journey leading to 
the contemplation of the intelligible (a similar journey to 
that expressed by Plato in the Symposium upon seeing 
beautiful bodies);11 yet it is also fundamental for the ‘de-
scent’ as it conveys the objects of philosophical contem-
plation and gives them a beauty which is harbinger of joy. 
Rhetoric is also an intellectual divertissement which 
would make life unbearable if it were not there: 
 
Εἰ δὲ καὶ ποικίλον ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν, καμεῖται δήπου πρὸς τὴν 
ἐν θεωρίᾳ ζωήν· ὥστε ὑφήσει τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ 
καταβήσεται· οὐ γάρ ἐσμεν ὁ ἀκήρατος νοῦς, ἀλλὰ νοῦς ἐν 
ζῴου ψυχῇ. καὶ ἡμῶν οὖν αὐτῶν ἕνεκα μετιτέον τοὺς 
ἀνθρωπινωτέρους τῶν λόγων, ὑποδοχήν τινα 
μηχανωμένους κατιούσῃ τῇ φύσει·[…] ὁ γὰρ θεὸς τὴν 
ἡδονὴν περόνην ἐποίησε τῇ ψυχῇ, δι’ ἧς ἀνέχεται τὴν 
προσεδρείαν τοῦ σώματος. τοιοῦτον οὖν τὸ ἐν λόγοις 
κάλλος (6.4-5). 
 
If our human nature is a variable quality also, it will certainly 
weary of a life of contemplation, to the point of foregoing its 
greatness, and of descending; for we are not mind undefiled but 
mind in the soul of a living creature; and for our own sakes 
therefore we must seek after the more human forms of literature, 
providing a home for our nature when it descends. […] For God 
has made pleasure to be a fastening for the soul by which it sup-
ports the proximity of the body. Such then is the beauty of lit-
erature (Fitzgerald).12 
 
To Synesius, defending the cause of rhetoric does not 
only mean justifying a precise cultural model, but also 
emphasising a precise anthropological model: man is am-
phibious and multiple by nature. Exercising the art of 
words allows him to fully embody his multiple potential. 
This typically humanist sensibility by which Synesius ob-
serves man, his ontological status, as well as the creativity 
used to express himself, leads to the following question: 
in rediscovering rhetorical traditions, can his thoughts on 
rhetoric have influenced Marsilio Ficino and Pico della 
Mirandola, staunch Neoplatonist philosophers? Is it pos-
sible to determine the presence of formal correspondence, 
i.e. direct textual echoes, and/or substantial correspond-
ence, meaning the recurrence of concepts and precise 
musings?  
 
 
3. From Synesius to the Renaissance: texts and textual 
echoes 
 
Before addressing the question, we need to verify if the 
documentary witnesses confirm the circulation of Syn-
esius’ texts in 15th century Florence. We have to deter-
mine if rhetoric theories written by Synesius could be 
read by Marsilio and Pico. Therefore, it is necessary to 
focus on the circulation of the Dion as well as on the rest 
of the corpus because musings on the art of words are 
spread throughout it.13 The documentary research yields 
63 manuscripts containing the Dion: of these, 23 predate 
the 16th century and are held in Italian libraries and 7 of 
them were surely available in Florence in the 15th century. 
Out of them, 4 are Laurentian codices from the 11th-14th 
century;14 one of them, Laurentian 60.06 from the 14th 
century, contains Synesius’ essays, including the Dion, 
and 7 orations by Aelius Aristides, including the Pro 
rhetorica and the Pro quattuor viris as well as Plato’s 
Gorgias and Phaedo. The codex proves the interest of 
humanists for rhetoric as well as proving that Synesius 
was one of the authors behind this interest. The other 3 
Florentine codices are in other libraries today but, thanks 
to the annotations of the owners, we can rebuild their his-
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tory. Of these, one stands out: the Parisian codex 4453 
owned by Domenico Grimani, successively owned by 
none other than Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.15 The 
manuscripts prove the circulation of the opus in 15th cen-
tury Florence, and that it had been certainly read by Pico, 
and most probably by Marsilio, too. 
The paper will now analyse intertextuality. Pico ex-
plicitly refers to Synesius, mentioning him by name in a 
text on rhetoric, the De genere dicendi philosophorum 
epistle to Ermolao Barbaro:  
 
Profecto quod Synesius de adolescente, de oratione dici com-
mode potest, comatam orationem semper cinaedam. Quare nos 
nostram malumus, capillis hirtam, globosam, inexpeditam, quam 
cum impuritatis vel nota vel suspicione belle comatam (Garin 
1976, 810). 
 
Actually, what Synesius said about adolescence can be said 
quite fittingly of oratory: a long-haired speech is always shame-
less. That’s why we prefer ours to be shaggy, stuck together, and 
tangled rather than beautifully kempt, and either known to be or 
suspected of being filthy (Rebhorn, 60).16 
 
In this instance, Pico refers to a passage by Synesius 
(Calv. 23) which says it is inconvenient for young men to 
take care of their hair to demonstrate that it has also be-
come inconvenient for philosophers to beautify their 
speeches with rhetoric frills.17 There is one problem, 
however: Pico refers to Synesius to support exactly the 
opposite claimed by Synesius in the Dion regarding the 
relation between rhetoric and philosophy. Synesius sug-
gests a synthesis between the two, while Pico claims “the 
barbarians have had Mercury not on their tongue, but in 
their breast” (“Habuisse barbaros non in lingua sed in 
pectore Mercurium”; 808; Rebhorn, 59) and “it is praise-
worthy for us have the Muses in our minds, not on our 
lips” (“laudabile in nobis, habere Musas in animo et non 
in labris”; Garin 1976, 814; Rebhorn, 62). Pico puts forth 
the philosophos-misologos model that Synesius had tried 
to disprove.18 How does one solve this paradox?  
Pico suggests a solution in the conclusion of the letter 
and Ermolao proves he has understood the aim of his 
interlocutor when he replies.19 Indeed, Pico suggests that 
his condemnation of rhetoric is an extremely refined and 
elegant proof of eloquence (Bausi 1996, 16-20). Pico thus 
gives us an example of an antilogy, a speech which is a 
contradiction of terms and ideas. Pico thus relates to the 
Δισσοὶ λόγοι, the double speeches typical of Gorgia and 
Protagoras’ sophist tradition which prove that eloquence 
allows you to claim anything and the opposite of every-
thing: just like in this case, where eloquence has to be 
abandoned.20 Moreover, referring to Synesius represents a 
further demonstration of the very refined rhetoric game 
staged by Pico, who not only claims that in which he does 
not believe in, but to support his false condemnation uses 
models to say the exact opposite of what they normally 
say, creating a rhetorical game of diffractions and rever-
sals aiming to entertain the erudite reader. 
Despite being the only passage on explicit intertex-
tuality discussing rhetorical topics of our authors, it is 
possible to find other passages in which Synesius’ Late 
Antiquity text and the Renaissance ones by Ficino and 
Pico seem to implicitly refer to one another. One example 
is Pico’s epistle to Lorenzo the Magnificent in 1484 
which praises the form and content of Lorenzo’s compo-
sitions: Pico says he can “turn amorous lyrics into phi-
losophy and turn those lyrics which are by nature slightly 
austere into loveable moulding them into the shape of 
Venus” (“Philosophica facere quae sunt amatoria, et quae 
sunt sua severitate austerula, superinducta venere facere 
amabilia”; Garin 1976, 801; my trans.)21 To express the 
grandiosity of this marriage between eloquence and phi-
losophy, he claims that Lorenzo can soar just as Dante 
despite the fact the content and sweetness of his style, 
similar to Petrarca’s, tend to bring him down.22 Therefore, 
to Pico, Lorenzo possesses the nature of birds soaring in 
the sky and the nature of those which remain on the 
ground to sing. This image depicts the marriage between 
rhetoric and philosophy which could be reminiscent of a 
similar image used by Synesius in the Dion to talk of the 
same admirable marriage: 
 
Ἀετὸν δὲ ἅμα καὶ κύκνον γενέσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἀμφοῖν ἔχειν 
πλεονεκτήματα, ὄρνισι μὲν ἡ φύσις οὐ ξυνεχώρησεν· 
ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ἔδωκεν ὁ θεός, ὅτῳ καὶ ἔδωκε γλώττης τε εὖ 
ἥκειν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπήβολον εἶναι (11.5). 
 
To be an eagle and a swan at the same time, and to possess the 
advantages of both, nature has not granted to birds. But to man 
God has given it, granting him both success with his tongue and 
mastery over philosophy (Fitzgerald). 
 
Synesius uses this chimerical image to describe man’s ex-
ceptional nature, whose potential is fully released in the 
figure of the rhetorician-philosopher: he possesses both 
the sweet gift that are words like a swan as well as the 
skill of philosophical self-elevation like an eagle. 
 
 
4. Φαντασία and ars rhetorica: the demiurgic power 
of words 
 
To better understand the system of resonances and echoes 
of these authors it is essential to analyse theoretical mat-
ters which allow us to unveil substantial analogies, i.e. 
what connects these authors on an intimate level. The 
fundamental question is how does the ars rhetorica syn-
thesise the speculative and sensible dimension? What 
does it mean when we say that rhetoric unites man’s dif-
ferent natures and thus expresses the multiplicity of his 
nature?  
Rhetoric, besides being a spiritual exercise with an 
anagogical and catagogical function, according to Syn-
esius can also transform thoughts in images and images in 
thoughts, connecting the sensible and intelligible world. 
Rhetoric exploits sentences to create parallels and antithe-
ses, increases the expressive power of words until it trans-
forms them into verbal images. At the same time the sen-
sible world in which the rhetorician lives is elaborated 
and transformed into words: “finding words for every-
thing by his rhetorical power” (Τῇ ῥητορείᾳ παντὸς 
ἐξευρεῖν λόγους; Dion 3.8; Fitzgerald). Rhetoric is thus 
crucial insofar as it represents a creative bidirectional 
power. It is the expression of that faculty of imagination 
and lower-ranking rationality called φαντασία: 
 
Tί δ’ ἂν εἴη λόγου νῷ συγγενέστερον; τί δὲ πορθμεῖον ἐπὶ 
νοῦν οἰκειότερον; ὡς ὅπου λόγος, ἐκεῖ που καὶ νοῦς· εἰ δὲ 
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μή, πάντως τις εἴδησις, ἐν ὑστέροις νόησις οὖσα. Καὶ γὰρ 
ἐνθάδε καλοῦνταί τινες θεωρίαι καὶ θεωρήματα ἔργα 
ἐλάττονος νοῦ, ῥητορικά τε καὶ ποιητικά (Dion 8.3). 
 
Now what could be more allied to mind than speech, or what 
ferry is more suited to conduct us to mind? For wherever there is 
speech, there also, I assume, is mind and if not, a different ra-
tional knowledge of inferior order which implies intellectual 
perception. For in this connection certain processes of thinking 
and their objects get their name as works of a lesser mind, for 
example the rhetorical and poetical activity (Fitzgerald with ad-
aptations).23 
 
‘Lesser mind’ refers to φαντασία itself and the connec-
tion between φαντασία and rhetoric is the essential ele-
ment to understand the connection between Synesius and 
the Renaissance.  
Synesius describes φαντασία as the faculty allowing 
man to interact with the sensible world and, in turn, for it 
to stimulate the soul.24 Φαντασία looks towards the 
shadows of the bodies but has the function of capturing 
the original light of those very same shadows.25 How does 
φαντασία express itself? Certainly in dreams but also, as 
clearly written by Synesius, in rhetoric: 
 
Ἴδοι δ’ ἄν τις ὅσον τὸ ἔργον, ἐπιχειρήσας συμπαρατείνειν 
τὸν λόγον τοῖς φάσμασιν, ὑφ’ ὧν χωρίζεται μὲν τὰ φύσει 
συνόντα, συνάγεται δὲ τὰ φύσει κεχωρισμένα, καὶ δεῖ τῷ 
λόγῳ τὸν μὴ πεφαντασμένον φαντάσαι […] Ὅταν δὲ τῇ 
φαντασίᾳ ἐξωθῆται μὲν τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ἀντεισάγηται δὲ 
εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς μήτε ὄντα μήτε φύσιν 
ἔχοντα εἶναι, τίς μηχανὴ τοῖς οἴκοθεν ἀνεννοήτοις 
παραστῆσαι φύσιν ἀκατονόμαστον; […] ἐν οἷς ἅπασι καὶ 
τὸ διαγενέσθαι μὴ λίαν ἀσχημονοῦντα, τελειοτάτης ἂν εἴη 
ῥητορικῆς (Insomn.18.3-19.1). 
 
Anyone can see how great the work is, on attempting to fit lan-
guage to visions, visions of which those things which are united 
in nature are separated, and things separated in nature are united, 
and he is obliged to show in speech what has not been revealed. 
[…] for whenever by fantasy things which are expelled from the 
order of being, and things which never in any possible way ex-
isted, are brought into being […] what contrivance is there for 
presenting a nameless nature to things which are per se incon-
ceivable? […] To survive at all and without cutting a sorry fig-
ure amidst all this, would be proof of a masterly rhetoric (Fitz-
gerald). 
 
Synesius knows that reason has to understand what is not 
naturally discursive in the sensible and intelligible world, 
i.e. understand the limitations λόγος has in expressing 
what ἄ-λογος26 is. Therefore, rhetoric transforms that 
which does not belong to the world of words into words, 
i.e. transforms images φαντασία creates from the corpo-
ral world into words. Both processes reflect the images of 
the sensible world onto the world of logos, similarly to a 
mirror, regardless if λόγος is interpreted as ‘word’ or 
‘thought’.27 Rhetoric and φαντασία are two specular and 
corresponding cognitive processes. Rhetoric creates beau-
tiful speeches, φαντασία creates dreams. But what is a 
καλὸς λόγος, a beautiful speech, if nothing other than a 
speech with the semblance of a dream. In other words, 
rhetoric creates daydreams. 
The Stoic concept of φαντασία rather than the Pla-
tonic one is what defines φαντασία as a creative moment 
as well as its close tie to rhetoric. Plato generally treats 
imagination as a mixture of sensation and opinion that 
leads us away from the truth (Sph 260c-264a, Thaet 152a-
c); this mental capacity deals with the sensible world and 
this is the reason why it is not the more desirable form of 
cognition. Stoic philosophers, however, characterise 
φαντασία as a creative power. This capacity of the hu-
man mind is more powerful than μίμησις, imitation, be-
cause it envisions what had never been sensed, i.e. it pro-
duces something visible (artist’s products) or invisible 
(rhetorician’s speeches) which have never been experi-
enced before by the senses.28 Concomitantly, φαντασία 
is also an epistemological tool as it was for the followers 
of Platonism29 because it has to perform mental oper-
ations such as ascertaining similarity, transition, and 
composition, and then transform their results into thought 
(λόγος) and therefore into speeches (λόγοι)30. Thus, 
Stoics treat φαντασία as a fundamental human creativity, 
which allows either to envision things not previously seen 
or sensed or to elaborate sensations into mental objects.31 
Flory writes, “it seems a short jump […] to the creativity 
theories of the rhetoricians” (155). In Late Antiquity a 
slow harmonisation process of concepts from different 
philosophical schools of thought occurs;32 Neoplatonism 
tends to integrate Stoic and Peripatetic concepts in its sys-
tem, including the Stoic vision of φαντασία. In this syn-
cretist process, Synesius plays a seminal role because he 
imports and adapts the Stoic idea of φαντασία to Neopla-
tonism as well as passing on this idea to the following 
Platonism tradition.33 Therefore, he represents one of the 
crucial points of the evolution of this concept and its tra-
dition. This idea is adopted in the Renaissance by authors 
such as Pico and Ficino who bring the concept of imagi-
natio-phantasia at the heart of their thoughts and its im-
portance to the work of rhetoricians.34 
Regarding the Renaissance, the parallelisms between 
oneiric images, products of phantasia, and a rhetorician’s 
speeches found in Synesius return in Ficino and Pico. One 
starting image which ideally ferries us from Late An-
tiquity to the 15th century is the ‘heel/foot of the soul’. 
Synesius compares the pleasure awoken by reading beau-
tiful speeches, a product of the faculty of imagination, to 
the heel on which the soul can sustain the weight of the 
body (ἡδονὴ περόνη τῇ ψυχῇ; Dion 6.4). The image of 
pes animae can be found again in Ficino who uses it to 
indicate the lower part of the soul corresponding to the 
one closest to the world of sensations and images, i.e. 
phantasia (Theologia platonica XIII 2, IV 138-140)35. 
The image of the ‘foot of the soul’ is a widespread image 
in antiquity: however, most authors use it with a negative 
connotation to indicate the concupiscible part of the soul, 
therefore as a symbol of dark cupiditas36. Synesius and 
Ficino are the only ones to use this metaphor positively: 
the faculty of imagination and rhetoric are a luminous 
support on which the whole human nature rests. 
In Ficino, the parallelisms between oneiric dreams 
created by phantasia and the speeches of rhetoricians are 
analysed and problematized throughout his work and, 
specifically, in the Commentaria in Platonis Sophistam37. 
Consider the commentaries were written considerably 
later than the translation of the Platonic dialogue bearing 
the same name and are composed in a moment when Fi-
cino had read and extensively studied Neoplatonic 
authors, including Synesius38. When Ficino comments on 
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the Platonic passage where Socrates explains to 
Theaetetus what the divine and human creative act is (Pl. 
Sph. 265b-c), he focuses on the creative process of the 
divine idola described by Plato, namely on demonology. 
However, he also talks of man’s creative process: he 
writes that the divine production of imagines umbrae is 
specular to the human production of rhetoric speeches, 
beautiful yet misleading. Ficino believes man’s vis imagi-
nativa equals a semi-divine, or rather, demonic power, 
whereby man can also create simulacra just like a god. 
This creative process is defined as a “certain demonic 
contrivance” (“machinatio quaedam daemonica”; in 
Sophistam, 273.9-10; Allen 272).39 These simulacra can 
be verbal if a rhetorician or sophist creates them: assum-
ing the sensible world is a multiple and shadowy reality, 
the rhetorician creates ‘verbal shadows’, thus participat-
ing in the demiurgic process of expressing reality.40 
Therefore, even for Ficino, rhetoric is one of the manifes-
tations of imaginatio-phantasia, which elevates man to 
the status of a demigod. The rhetorician is, so to say, a 
demonic being because of his skill to imagine and create 
verbal simulacra: “what imagines in us is in some respects 
a demon” (“quod in nobis imaginatur est quodammodo 
daemon”; in Sophistam, 271.24-25; Allen, 270). In the 
conclusion to the comment, the rhetorician and sophist is 
defined as a “feigner and manipulator of phantasms” 
(“phantasmatum fictor et praestigiator”; 277.28; Allen, 
278),41 labelled as a demon using an ars quadam phantas-
ticam: 
 
Sophista circa non ens versatur in tenebris, et arte quadam phan-
tastica pollens non res quidem ipsas veras inspicit, sed simula-
chra quaedam earum apparentia fingit (in Sophistam, 231.21-
24). 
 
The sophist deals with shadows in speaking of not-being, and, 
wielding the power of phantastic art, he does not gaze upon 
things as they truly are, but fashions certain simulacra and ap-
pearances of realities (Allen, 230). 
 
Allen highlighted the significance of chapter 46 (in 
Sophistam, 271-277) because it is here that Ficino seems 
to claim that the exceptional nature of man is revealed es-
pecially by the creative power of his imagination, making 
him similar to a god.42 We find the same esteem for man 
due to his faculty of imagination in the Theologia pla-
tonica: Ficino, speaking of man’s superiority compared to 
other living beings, explains this superiority as a result of 
his fantastical skills. They allow him to master multiple 
arts thanks to which he can “imitate the creator of the 
world” (“deum naturae artificem imitari”; Theologia pla-
tonica XIII 3, IV 170-176), and he also includes the ora-
torum facundia among them. 
Even Pico, in the epistle to Ermolao Barbaro, speaks 
of rhetoric as a magical creative power of phantasm and 
simulacra: 
 
Demum res ipsas magicis quasi, quod vos iactatis, viribus elo-
quentiae, in quam libuerit faciem habitumque transformare, ut 
non qualia sunt suopte ingenio, sed qualia volueritis […] (rhe-
tor), fallacem verborum concentum, veluti larvas et simulacra 
praetendens, auditorum mentes blandiendo ludificet (Garin 
1976, 808). 
 
And finally, to transform things themselves, as if by magical 
force of eloquence, which you boast about, so that they assume 
whatever face and dress you wish, not appearing what they are 
in actuality, but what your will wants them to be. […] [The 
rhetorician] by producing the deceptive harmony of words, like 
so many masks and simulacra, it dupes the minds of your audi-
tors while it flatters them (Rebhorn, 59).  
 
Of course, we cannot forget about the Platonic condemna-
tion weighing down on the sophist for being a creator of 
speeches based on opinion, therefore deceitful.43 To say 
that Pico and especially Ficino have a positive view of the 
sophist figure would be incorrect. However, we should 
also consider that the accusation to rhetoric moved by Fi-
cino and Pico is characterised by extreme stereotypes and 
should be interpreted, especially in Pico, as a topos of 
Platonic literary tradition rather than an effective ideo-
logical and cultural sharing.44 Moreover, consider that if 
in both authors the figure of the sophist is followed by a 
shadow, the more resplendent the light of the demiurgic 
and fantastic power projected onto him, the darker the 
shadow will be. The accusation to the sophist would be 
secondary to the fascination they feel for his skill of mas-
tering imaginatio-phantasia.45 We could go as far as say-
ing that the sophist becomes important and acquires depth 
in Pico and Ficino’s work because of the shadows pro-
jected by his ars phantastica. 
The topic of rhetoricians as demon-demiurges found 
in Ficino and Pico is also found in nuce in Synesius who 
claims the following when speaking of good rhetoricians:  
 
Ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς τῶν ἀφανῶν ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεων 
εἰκόνας ἐμφανεῖς ὑπεστήσατο τῶν ἰδεῶν τὰ σώματα, 
οὕτως ἔχουσα κάλλος ψυχὴ καὶ γόνιμος οὖσα τῶν 
ἀρίστων, διαδόσιμον ἔχει μέχρι τῶν ἔξω τὴν δύναμιν (Dion 
5.4). 
 
Just as God has conceived clear images of his secret powers, 
tangible bodies of the ideas, thus a soul possessing beauty and 
fruitful of the noblest things, possesses the force which is trans-
missible even to things outside (Fitzgerald). 
 
The idea that the rhetorician’s labor limae is not that dis-
similar, although inferior, to the κοσμεῖν of a divinity, 
already belongs to the Synesian thought. The rhetorician 
is a model for people wishing to become, to a certain ex-
tent, similar to gods. One has to become “that person who 
knows how to use word in a multiform manner” (“Ὁ 
παντοδαπῶς ἔχων τοῦ λόγου”; Dion 5.5; my trans.). 
 
 
5. Under the sign of Proteus: anthropology between 
rhetoric and imagination 
 
We can now analyse a last, particularly important image, 
as from a theoretical and formal point of view it repre-
sents a summary and resolution to the matter: identifying 
the rhetoric and anthropological model in the figure of 
Proteus, a marine shapeshifting god with prophetic pow-
ers. He is a marine god because he is liquid: he changes 
and transforms to flee from his petitioners curious about 
their future. His ‘liquid being’ manifests more than any-
thing from his σοφιστικὴ θαυματολογία, his sophistic 
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skill of making slights of hand with words, to always ad-
apt and present himself in differing shapes: 
 
Ἄγαμαι δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸν Πρωτέα τὸν Φάριον, εἰ σοφὸς ὢν 
τὰ μεγάλα, σοφιστικήν τινα θαυματολογίαν προὐβέβλητο, 
καὶ παντοδαπῶς τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι συνεγίγνετο· ᾤχοντο 
γὰρ ἂν τὴν περὶ αὐτὸν τραγῳδίαν τεθαυμακότες, ὡς μὴ 
ἐπιζητῆσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὧν πραγματεύοιτο (Dion 5.7). 
 
For my part I admire Proteus of Pharos also because, being wise 
in great things, he was used to show off the ability, so to speak, 
of a sophistic illusionist’s word and to always show up in a dif-
ferent guise to people who bumped into him (Fitzgerald with 
adaptations). 
 
The trait of Proteus is ποικιλία, versatility, the multi-
plicity of colours, being garish. In Greek literary tradition 
ποικιλία is, starting from Callimachus onwards, first and 
foremost linguistic versatility, a skill for mixing genres 
and styles to always create new shapes. In other words 
Synesius admires Proteus for his rhetoric skills. We could 
suggest that if Synesius’ anthropological model is Proteus 
and he, in turn, is the image of rhetoric art and, then to 
fully tap into the human nature one must cultivate the cre-
ative and demiurgic power of rhetoric.  
This marine god beloved by Synesius returns in Pico 
and Ficino and is introduced with the same words and for 
the same goals. Pico in Oratio de hominis dignitate, pub-
lished in 1486 (Bausi 2014, IX-X), uses the renowned 
metaphor of the chameleon and the analogy with Proteus 
to explain his own anthropological model: 
 
Quis hunc nostrum chamaeleonta non admiretur? […] Quem 
non immerito Asclepius Atheniensis, versipellis huius et se ip-
sam transformantis naturae argumento, per Protheum in mys-
teriis significari dixit. Hinc illae apud Hebreos et Pythagoricos 
methamorphoses celebrate (31-35, p.14). 
 
Who will not wonder at this chameleon of ours? […] Not with-
out reason, Asclepius the Athenian said that man was repre-
sented in the secret rites by Proteus because of his changing and 
metamorphous nature. Hence the metamorphoses renowned 
among the Jews and the Pythagoreans (Borghesi, 123-125). 
 
Busi (289-291) highlights the comparison with Proteus in 
Pico as unusual. Indeed, Proteus has been treated as a 
negative figure in the past, a reference to the ambiguous 
and dark aspects of a word in constant flux as well as a 
metaphor for treachery. Clement of Alexandria (Clem. Al. 
Paed. 3.1.1-4), Plutarcus (Plu. Mor. 97a), Lucian (Luc. 
Peregr. 42), and right up until Gregory of Nazianzus 
(Greg. Naz. Contra Iul. 35.585.5-11), all these authors 
have used Proteus as an allegory to the dark side of the 
human soul and its sinister inclination. Therefore, accord-
ing to Busi, characterising the polymorphic nature of the 
human soul with positive terms by using Proteus would 
be innovative for Pico, maybe, as he says, inspired by Or-
pheus’ hymns.46 However, as highlighted in this paper, 
Synesius had already attributed positive traits to Proteus, 
making him an anthropological and rhetoric paradigm. Is 
it legitimate to hypothesise that we are witnessing a Syn-
esian echo? To answer the question, we can proceed in 
the Oratio where we find three other elements confirming 
the validity of this hypothesis. First, shortly after having 
mentioned Proteus, Pico writes: “Hence that saying of 
Chaldeans […] that is, ‘Man is by nature diverse, multi-
form and inconstant’” (“Hinc illud Chaldeorum […], idest 
homo variae ac multiformis et desultoriae naturae ani-
mal”; 44, p. 20; Borghesi, 133). The text features a gap 
and the Chaldean quote Pico refers to cannot be traced.47 
However, we do know that in the Renaissance, Synesius 
was considered one of the main vessels for spreading 
Chaldean knowledge.48 Second, we find an expression in 
the Dion which is very similar both in form and meaning 
to the abovementioned quote by Pico in which man is an 
animal with a “diverse, multiform, and inconstant nature”: 
“multiform is our nature” (“ποικίλον ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν”; 
Dion 6.4).49 Last, proceeding in the Oratio to the point 
mentioning the theory of cosmic sympatheia (230, p.114), 
Pico quotes a passage from Synesius’ De insomnis (2.2) 
proving Synesius is one of the models he has in mind 
when drafting the text. Therefore, why exclude that be-
hind the chameleon image in Pichian anthropology we 
could not find, even implicitly, Synesius’ anthropological 
model based on the creative and demiurgic power of rhet-
oric?  
Even Ficino uses Proteus in the comment on Priscian 
of Lydia from 1498: “Imagination is like Proteus or a 
chameleon” (“Imaginatio est tanquam Protheus vel came-
leon”; Opera, 1825; my trans.). In this case, it is not Syn-
esius who influences Ficino, rather Pico’s Oratio which 
had already been published in 1496.50 However, we notice 
a different element when comparing it to Pico: to Ficino, 
Proteus is not just an image of man, rather his imaginative 
skill.51 Imaginatio therefore becomes the distinctive trait 
of Ficino’s anthropology and, as we have clearly seen in 
the comments on the Sophist, it is closely tied to rhetoric. 
Ficino takes a further step compared to Pico in explicating 
the tie among anthropology, fantasy and rhetoric, ideally 
closing the circle opened by Synesius: Proteus is rhetori-
cian, artist, and man. Ficino, Pico, and Synesius believe 
that whoever experiments and dabbles in the creative act 
represented by imaginatio/phantasia creates a positive 
anthropological model where the skill of moving fluidly 
between light and shadow is positive and the same applies 
to freely taking on all the shapes one wishes to, especially 
if thus occurs using words;52 after all, Pico clearly states: 
“having been born into this condition; that is, born with 
the possibility to become what we wish to be” (“postquam 
hac nati sumus conditione, ut id simus quod esse volu-
mus”; Oratio 46, p. 20; Borghesi, 135). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper has yielded the following conclusions: 1) the 
manuscripts prove that Synesius’ works containing reflec-
tions on rhetoric, especially the Dion, were read by Pico 
and Ficino; 2) we can establish intertextual connections 
among these three authors in passages discussing elo-
quence; 3) Synesius characterises the rhetoric art as an 
expression of φαντασία and therefore as a positive tool 
to express man’s multiple nature; 4) even to Pico and Fi-
cino the figure of the sophist, despite being ambiguous, is 
an extraordinary individual because of his mastery of the 
fantastical art and his ability to express the multiplicity 
which dominates his nature; 4) all three authors select 
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Proteus, god of the shifting word, as an anthropological 
model due to his fantastical and rhetorical skills.  
It is not easy to quantify the significance that Synesius 
had on developing the Renaissance sensibility. After all, 
humanists approached the ancient cultural heritage with 
curiosity and eclecticism, reading whatever they could 
find on the matter back then, until they made it their own. 
The result is the development of a synthetic thought in 
which the borders between one source and the other are 
so blurred to have become indistinguishable53. The Syn-
esian formulations often refer to other sources which 
would have been accessible by humanists without neces-
sarily his intermediation. However, he shares a very simi-
lar sensibility with these authors both in terms of philo-
sophical and cultural interests, thus making him a more 
accessible author and an ideal source to tap into.54 More-
over, if the concept of phantasia inherited by Pico and 
Ficino is the result of the Late Antiquity syncretic pro-
cess, it is highly likely that it had been inherited by Syn-
esius who, as we have seen, played a main role in inte-
grating the Stoic φαντασία into the Neoplatonic system.  
Therefore, we cannot surely guarantee an influence 
among these authors but, at the same time, we cannot and 
must not exclude such a possibility. If the data from ana-
lysing intertextuality are insufficient to claim a connec-
tion in these authors, the topics they discuss and the origi-
nal and parallel way they are developed indubitably are. 
Starting from an unequivocally fragmented and stratified 
textuality we slowly obtain a coherent picture. I believe 
that we should not exclude the possibility that Synesius’ 
reflections on rhetoric, a ‘fantastic’ expression of man’s 
multiple nature, could have played a role in developing 
the Renaissance concept of eloquence so closely con-
nected to the fantastical and verbal characterisation of an-
thropology. Indeed, I believe it to be significant that the 
most evident traits of originality in Synesius feature in the 
works of these two authors. However, the suggestion of a 
relation between Synesius and rhetoric in the Renaissance 
represents a suggestion for a further research project ra-
ther than an answer to the question on the possible rela-
tion between Late Antiquity rhetoric and the Renaissance. 
To give such an answer would be impossible mostly be-
cause of the brevity of this paper, but especially because it 
would risk stiffening the writing of these authors which 
is, by nature, multiple and changeable. 
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Notes 
 
1 See Celenza 2002, 73: “Ficino, for example, often stresses how im-
portant, indeed central, Plato is in his vision of the prisca theologia; but 
many scholars, too numerous to list, have shown that Ficino’s adherence 
to Plato is far from modern.” The importance of the relation between the 
Renaissance and Late Antiquity was highlighted by Celenza 2012, 1192: 
“Ficino’s world was much closer to the world of the late ancient think-
ers, Christian and pagan, he so admired than to that of a post-Newtonian 
natural philosopher. The same could be said for other Renaissance 
thinkers, from Bruni and Biondo to Poliziano, whose lives and careers 
spanned the fifteenth century, a crucial period for the rediscovery, con-
 
 
solidation, and eventual absorption of many of Late Antiquity’s key tex-
tual monuments.” 
2 Recent critique defined this cultural climate as ‘Third Sophistry’ (Per-
not, 14). The same definition was given to the philosophical and rhetori-
cal approach many European authors share between the 15th and 16th 
century (Godard, 173-77). For a more information on the political cul-
ture of emperor Julian, see Pack.  
3 Ficino, Opera, 1968-1978. We have two versions of the translation: the 
first version defined by Ficino in a letter to Aldo Manuzio as “exemplar 
[…] mendarum plenum” is from 1488 and is contained in the codex ric-
cardianus 76, and a definite version published in 1497 in Venice which 
represents the editio princeps (Rabassini, 153-154). 
4 See also Ep. 101.9-15 where Synesius makes the character of literary 
παίγνιον explicit. 
5 For more detailed information on the work, see Treu’s comment (Treu) 
and Aujoulat’s more recent comment in the relative critical edition 
(Lamoureux, 116-138). 
6 Syn. Ep. 154.3-11: “[…] ἔφασάν µε παρανοµεῖν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, 
ἐπαΐοντα κάλλους ἐν λέξεσι καὶ ῥυθµοῦ, καὶ περὶ Ὁµήρου τι λέγειν 
ἀξιοῦντα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ῥητορείαις σχηµάτων, ὡς δὴ τὸν 
φιλόσοφον µισολόγον εἶναι προσῆκον καὶ µόνα περιεργάζεσθαι τὰ 
δαιµόνια πράγµατα. καὶ αὐτοὶ µὲν θεωροὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ γεγονότες· ἐµὲ δὲ 
οὐ θέµις, διότι νέµω τινὰ σχολὴν ἐκ τοῦ βίου τῷ καὶ τὴν γλῶτταν 
καθήρασθαι καὶ τὴν γνώµην ἡδίω γενέσθαι” (“Some of those […] have 
maintained that I am faithless to philosophy, apparently because I pro-
fess grace and harmony of style, and because I venture to say something 
concerning Homer and concerning the figures of the rhetoricians. In the 
eyes of such persons one must hate literature in order to be a philoso-
pher, and must occupy himself with divine matters only. No doubt these 
men alone have become spectators of the knowable. This privilege is 
unlawful for me, for I spend some of my leisure in purifying my tongue 
and sweetening my wit” Fitzgerald). 
7 Probably even Plotinus’ formulations on apophatism as manifestation 
of reaching the goal of the philosophical journey were a disincentive to 
confide in the power of words in a Neoplatonic ambient and embrace the 
idea that it was necessary to proceed ἐπέκεινα λόγου (“Beyond the 
word”; Dion 8.5) to carry out the βίος θεωρητικός. 
8 Also see Dion 10.3-5 and Ep. 154.32. 
9 For more information see Munarini. According to the Neoplatonic 
thought, the soul is ‘one and multiple’, where unity joins it to the divine, 
while multiplicity to the sensible world. See Plot. 4.2.1.65 or 4.7.6. 
10 See for example Dion 8.1: “Ἐγὼ δὲ βουλοίµην µὲν ἂν εἶναι τῆς 
φύσεως ἡµῶν ἀεὶ πρὸς θεωρίαν ἀνατετάσθαι. ἀµηχάνου δὲ ὄντος τε καὶ 
πεφηνότος, βουλοίµην ἂν ἐν τῷ µέρει µὲν ἔχεσθαι τῶν ἀρίστων, ἐν τῷ 
µέρει δὲ κατιὼν εἰς τὴν φύσιν ἅπτεσθαί τινος εὐφροσύνης καὶ 
ἐπαλείφειν εὐθυµίᾳ τὸν βίον” (“Now I should wish it to be a property of 
our nature to be always lifted up toward contemplation; but as this is 
obviously impracticable, I should like in turn to cling to the best and 
again in turn to descend to nature, there to cleave to merriment and 
anoint life with cheerfulness” Fitzgerald). 
11 See Dion 4.2: “Ἐπεξιὼν ἅπασιν, ὅσα Μουσῶν ἑταίροις ἀνδράσιν 
ἐρραθύµηταί τε καὶ πέπαικται, πάλιν δὲ τὴν σπουδὴν ἐπιτείνων, 
ἀναβασµῷ χρήσῃ, τοῖσδέ τε καὶ ἀδελφοῖς τισι τούτων ἀναγνώσµασιν” 
(“Having gone through all things that have been dallied over and played 
with by men who were comrades of the Muses, until, I say, with in-
creased zeal you again use these and certain kindred writings as a means 
of moral ascent” Fitzgerald). See also Pl. Phdr. 264c 2-5 and Ficino in 
Phaedrum, 178 for the comparison between a beautiful speech and body 
of a living being. Also see Dion 8.5, 9.1, 10.9 and 17.2-3 for the scal-
ability of the philosophical and didactic journey started by practising 
rhetoric. Motta (2013, 29) highlighted how in late Neoplatonism reading 
Plato’s mimetic dialogues was assimilated as a real school syllabus, tak-
ing a person gradually from the visible to the invisible, from the image 
to the model. 
12 Both Synesius (Dion 11.2) and Ficino (in Phaedrum, 133) interpret 
the ‘descent’ with an unusual optimism compared to Platonic tradition; 
both use the metaphor of the restorative banquet, which is composed of 
‘Attic delicacies and poetic sides’ for Synesius and ‘nectar and ambro-
sia’ for Ficino. Both authors do not interpret the descent as a failure of 
philosophising, but as an occasion to exercise the lowest functions of 
intellect, including the faculty of imagination, i.e. rhetoric. See Allen 
1984, 163-164: “in doing so, Ficino treats the stopping more as a kind of 
climax than as an anticlimactic epilogue […] In short, it is not the ura-
nian intuitive ecstasy of the charioteer’s gazing at the intelligibles nor 
the saturnian contemplation of the intellectuals that constitutes the fig-
ure’s conclusion, but rather the jovian activity of rational providing.” 
13 Thoughts on the art of the rhetorician are disseminated in the collec-
tion of letters, the Calvitii encomium, and the De insomnis, which was 
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certainly known by Ficino, as he translated it, and by Pico, who owned a 
copy in his private library (Kibre, footnotes 492 and 731). 
14 Codd. Laur. Plut. 55.06 (XI sec.), Plut. 80.19 (XII sec.), Plut. 55.08 
(XIV sec.) and Plut. 60.06 (XIV sec.). For all information on quoted 
manuscripts see Pinakes. 
15 Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine fonds principal 4453. Out of the other 
two codices, one (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 1038) was 
owned by Janus Lascaris and arrives in Florence around 6 years before 
Ficino’s death, while the other contains all the works of Dio 
Chrysostom, Synesius’ Dion, and the margin notes to Dion by Areta 
Cesareo, belonged to Palla Strozzi and remains in Florence until his 
death in 1462 when it was transferred to the Santa Giustina library in 
Padua. 
16 Rebhorn translates cinaedam with “sodomitical”, but I believe it is 
more appropriate to translate it with “shameless” considering the con-
text. 
17 The link between the coiffed hair and a non-virile behaviour can also 
be found in Syn. Ep. 104. 
18 Pico, ad Hermolaum, in Garin 1976, 812: “Expectamus paucorum 
potius pro admiratione silentium, introspicentium penitus aliquid aut de 
naturae adytis erutum aut de caelestium, de Iovis aula ad homines ad-
ductum” (“But we do expect instead the silce that comes from the won-
der of those few who look more deeply into something, whether that 
something is extracted from the inner temple of nature or brought down 
to men from the palace of Jove” Rebhorn, 61). 
19 Pico, ad Hermolaum, in Garin 1976, 822: “Sed exercui me libenter in 
hac materia tamquam infami […] ut veluti Glauco ille apud Platonem 
iniustitiam laudat non ex iudicio, sed ut ad laudes iustitiae Socratem 
extimulet, ita ego ut concitatius eloquentiae causam a te agi audiam in 
eam licentius repugnante paulisper sensu atque natura invectus sum, 
quam si vel negligendam vel posthabendam barbaris existimarem, non 
ab illis ad eam, quod nuper feci, ad graecas litteras […] defecissem” 
(“But I have engaged myself freely in this subject, as in something dis-
reputable […] My aim has been like that of Plato’s Glaucon who praises 
injustice, not out of conviction, but to goad Socrates into praising jus-
tice. Similarly, so that I might hear you plead the cause of eloquence, I 
have inveighed against it rather boldly for a little while, though my feel-
ings and nature fought against doing so. If I thought it right for elo-
quence to be neglected by the barbarians, I would not have almost to-
tally deserted them for it -something I did recently- or for Greek letters” 
Rebhorn, 66-67). In the answer of Ermolao Barbaro see ad Ioannem 
Picum Mirandulanum, in Garin 1976, 844-846. For a detailed study on 
the epistolary exchange between Pico and Ermolao Barbaro on elo-
quence see Bausi 1998 and Grassi, 108-116. 
20 The aim of antilogic speeches in sophistry is to prove the relativity of 
all things and highlight the centrality of man who at the same time dis-
mantles absolute truths and becomes the only measure of comparison. 
For a study on ancient sophistry and its traits see Kerferd 1988. For the 
resurgence of Gorgia’s ideas in the Renaissance see MacPhail, 65-71. 
21 For a detailed study of the epistle see Bausi 1997. 
22 See Pico, ad Laurentium Medicum, in Garin 1976, 800. 
23 In this passage, it emerges that Synesius does not clear if the rhetoric 
skill belongs exclusively to the rational discursive dimension or to 
φαντασία. He does so mainly for two reasons: first, the Dion is not a 
philosophical comment where philosophical categories are systemati-
cally determined, rather a mixed genre with the main aim of backing 
rhetoric as a form of philosophical exercise; second, rhetoric moves ef-
fectively on a rational and discursive plane as well as a fantastical one 
when it transforms paratactical representations of imagination into syn-
tactical propositions. 
24 For Synesius’ concept of φαντασία see Susanetti, 14-17 and Lam-
oureux, 205-214. See also Sheppard, 201: “Phantasia occupies a key 
position at the ‘joint’ of the soul where rational and irrational meet.” 
25 Phantasia as umbra naturae aemulatrix will also be developed by 
Giordano Bruno. See Tirinnanzi, 243-292.  
26 See Insomn. 19.2: “νεανιεύεται δὲ ἡµῶν καὶ κατ’ αὐτῆς ἤδη τῆς 
γνώµης, ἐνδιδοῦσά τι πλέον τοῦ οἴεσθαι […] ἤδη δέ τις ἅµα καὶ νικᾷ, 
καὶ βαδίζει, καὶ ἵπταται, καὶ χωρεῖ πάντα ἡ φαντασία· πῶς δ’ ἂν λέξις 
χωρήσειε” (“Fantasy conducts itself jauntily even against our under-
standing itself, becoming the cause of something more than thought 
[…]. Now in dreams one conquers, walks, or flies simultaneously, and 
the imagination has room for it all; but how shall mere speech find room 
for it?” Fitzgerald with adaptations). 
27 Ficino writes the same; see Allen 1989, 198: “The radial images, be-
ing purely visual, can be reflected by the naturally magical power of a 
plane mirror or focussed by one that is convex or concave. The simula-
cra, however, can only be reflected or focussed in “the animate and 
phantastic spirit” (275.32), that is, in the spiritus phantasticus of Neo-
 
 
platonic pneumatology and more particularly for Ficino of Synesian 
oneirology”. 
28 See for example Philostr. VA 6.19.23-29: “φαντασία […] ταῦτα 
εἰργάσατο σοφωτέρα µιµήσεως δηµιουργός· µίµησις µὲν γὰρ 
δηµιουργήσει, ὃ εἶδεν, φαντασία δὲ καὶ ὃ µὴ εἶδεν, ὑποθήσεται γὰρ 
αὐτὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀναφορὰν τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ µίµησιν µὲν πολλάκις ἐκκρούει 
ἔκπληξις, φαντασίαν δὲ οὐδέν, χωρεῖ γὰρ ἀνέκπληκτος πρὸς ὃ αὐτὴ 
ὑπέθετο” (“Phantasia […] wrought these works, a wiser and subtler 
artist by far than imitation. Imitation can only fashion what it has seen; 
phantasia what it has never seen as well. It can conceive it by referring 
to ideal reality. Imitation is often restrained by fear. Phantasy, however, 
is never limited in the production of its creation” my trans.). The main 
difference with Platonic epistemology is that the Stoic philosophy is 
fundamentally material and does not admit there is knowledge beyond 
our perception of the sensible world. Therefore, phantasia in Stoicism is 
a fundamental cognitive tool as it is directly involved in elaborating sen-
sible data and organising them in proposition-like structures, a function 
attributed to νοῦς, intellect, by the Platonism (Flory, 151). 
29 See also Flory, 158: “It was quite probably the result of Stoic-Platonic 
amalgamation, which brought out a creative feature of the human mind 
that Stoically influenced theories of knowledge required about our per-
ceptions of the world, language, and thinking in general”. See also Au-
joulat, 123: “Il est probable que les néo-platoniciens ont été influencés 
par les stoїciens dans l’élaboration du concept de phantasia.” 
30 See Longin. 15.1.3-5: “καλεῖται µὲν γὰρ κοινῶς φαντασία πᾶν τὸ 
ὁπωσοῦν ἐννόηµα γεννητικὸν λόγου παριστάµενον” (“Generally phan-
tasia is called any thought present in the mind and producing speech” 
my trans.). 
31 See Flory, 149: “phantasia as a mental capacity that allows one to 
both envision and make others aware of realms not seen; and from this 
capacity allegedly arose art, poetry, and oratory.” 
32 See Hadot for the process of harmonisation between Platonic and 
Aristotelic thoughts of the school of Alexandria, which Synesius also 
referred to. 
33 Watson, 91 claims: “The transformation of phantasia into a term for 
creative art was due to Platonic-Stoic syncretism.” For a comparison 
between Stoic φαντασία and Synesius’ see also Aujoulat, 128-132. Syn-
esius develops a typically Neoplatonic process of integration of Stoic 
elements and harmonising the two doctrines. See Brancacci, 158-160 on 
this. 
34 For the role of phantasia in relation to gnoseology and anthropology 
in Ficino and Pico, see the recent work by Fellina (9-53). For Ficino’s 
description on the functioning of phantasia, see Theologia platonica 
VIII 1, II 262-272. For the difference between the two different gnose-
ological moments constituted by phantasia and vis imaginativa see Kat-
inis 1998, 75-76 and Katinis 2002. I should highlight that Fellina (16, 
footnote 26) believes there to be no Synesian influence in the constitu-
tion of the concept of phantasia in Ficino, or that it is secondary to the 
one in Proclus. Regarding the success of the Synesian concept of 
φαντασία in the Renaissance, see for example Bruno, Opera, II, 3, p. 
220: “Synesii Platonici sententiam in medium afferamus, qui de potes-
tate phantasiae spiritusque phantastici ita disserit: in vigilia doctor est 
homo, somniantem vero Dues ipse sui participem facit” (“We hereby 
refer to the statement by Synesius the Platonist on the power of phantasy 
and the fantastic spirit. He claims: when awake man is wise, but when 
he dreams God makes him part of himself” my trans.). 
35 Ficino, based on the Platonic Timaeus and its tradition in Plotinus, 
Proclus and in the Pseudo-Dionysius, proposes the theory of the triparti-
tion of the soul: the upper part of the soul is called animae caput and is 
the part of the anima rationalis in contact with the intelligible world, i.e. 
the anima angelica or mens divina, and they both share the same onto-
logical nature. The lower part is animae pes and is in contact with the 
sensible world: it livens the body and therefore is the centre of phanta-
sia. It is also called idolum and collects material from the five sense and 
elaborates it as fantastical images. In the middle we have mens, which 
with its dianoetical process multiplies and disassembles the subjects of 
noetic contemplation and unites in blocks of meaning the images from 
the sensible world. See Kristeller, 350-368. 
36 For example Aug. Enar. in Ps 9.15 “pes animae recte […] vocatur 
cupiditas aut libido”. The negative image of the pes animae is also pres-
ent in Pico Oratio 78, p. 32: “Profecto pes animae illa est portio despica-
tissima, qua ipsa materiae tanquam terrae solo innititur: altrix - inquam - 
potestas et cibaria, fomes libidinis et voluptariae mollitudinis magistra” 
(“To be sure, the foot of the soul is that part which is most despicable, 
that which leans upon matter as if on earthly soil; it is the faculty, I say, 
that feeds and nourishes; it is, I say, the kindling wood of lust and the 
teacher of sensual weakness” Borghesi, 145). 
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37 Even in the comment to the Theaetetus (Ficino Opera, 1274), Ficino 
relates Protagorean gnoseology, and generally the rhetoric and sophist 
perspective, with the fantastic and creative activity. See Katinis 2013, 
50-51. 
38 See Allen 1989, 31: “After he had translated it between 1464 and 
1466 and written his introduction with his Proclian preface, Ficino did 
not return to the Sophist for several decades […] When he did take it up 
again in earnest towards the very end of his career, it was only after he 
had translated […] a number of important Neoplatonic treatises and 
fragments, including Iamblichus ’De mysteriis, Porphyry’s De ambsti-
nentia, Synesius’s De insomnis, and Proclus In Alcibiadem.” 
39 See also Katinis 2003. 
40 See Trinnanzi, 43: “Shadows, according to Ficino, are a knot between 
souls and bodies, and the principle allowing sensible constructs to re-
ceive and express impulses through vital acts whereby the superior pow-
ers trickle down into their inferior nature. At the same time, multiform 
traits of the explained universe germinate from the shadows: hence, in 
the comment to the Sophist, Ficino uses topics and images of Neopla-
tonic tradition to shed light on the radical shadowy element of nature.” 
41 This expression translates the Greek ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυµατοποιικόν (Pl. 
Sph. 268d 2). See also in Sophistam, 217.7: idolarum fictor. 
42 See Allen 1989, 176-177: “Ficino suggests that in us what does the 
imagining is, so to speak, a demon. […] Ficino is apparently speculating 
with the notion that we become demons in the limited sense that our 
imaginations create their own realm of images and shadows and do so 
usually independently, though on occasion they may merely replicate 
that of the demons who temporally possess them.” To know more about 
the similarity between man’s ingenium and God, the artifex, based on 
the interpretation that Ficino gives to the Platonic myth of the demiurge 
in the Timaeus, see Allen 1987.  
43 See Ficino, in Sophistam, 269.15-18: “Ars imaginaria est duplex: 
altera quidem assimilativa quae ad rei alicuius existentis exemplar ali-
quid exprimit; altera vero phantastica simulachra fingens non exis-
tentium. In genere phantastico sophista versatur et fallit” (“The imagi-
nary art is twofold. One kind is assimilative and it portrays something 
according to the model of something that actually exists. The other kind 
is phantastic and it feigns phantastic simulacra of what do not exists. 
The sophist is busy beguiling us with the phantastic kind” Allen, 268). 
For the accusation against sophists of the antiquity until the Renaissance 
see MacPhail, 45-58. 
44 Katinis (2013, 50-55) highlights that to Ficino, criticising sophistry is 
functional to highlight the analogies between Platonism and Christianity 
as opposed to the anthropocentric relativism channelled by the sophist 
thought, i.e. is part of the Platonic and Christian process of harmonisa-
tion at the heart of Ficino’s philosophy. 
45 The comparison with Ficino in Phaedrum, 168 is important: “non esse 
turpe scribere sed male scribere […] Similiter qui orationum conscrip-
tionem verbis damnant tanquam rem levem aut ambitiosam contraria 
loquuntur atque sentiunt; ipsi enim interim tanquam re praeclara mirifice 
delectantur” (“To write is not shameful in itself, only to write badly. 
[…] Similarly, those who verbally condemn the writing down of 
speeches as something frivolous or ostentatious are voicing the opposite 
of what they think and feel; for in the meantime they are wonderfully 
delighted themselves as with something excellent” Allen, 169). Even in 
his De sole IX (Opera, 992-993) Ficino invites the reader to experiment 
the potential of imagination, independently from the fact that it works 
with shadows suspended between the sensible and intelligible, as long as 
it is done consciously and usefully for the soul.  
46 See Orph. H. 25, 1-3: “Πρωτέα κικλήσκω, πόντου κληῖδας ἔχοντα, 
/πρωτογενῆ, πάσης φύσεως ἀρχὰς ὃς ἔφηνεν/ ὕλην ἀλλάσσων ἱερὴν 
ἰδέαις πολυµόρφοις.” (“I pray to Proteus, who has the keys of the sea / 
primigenial, who unveiled all the principles in nature / and transformed 
the sacred material in multiple forms”; my trans.). 
47 Maybe Orac.Chald. Fr. 106: “τολµηρᾶς φύσεως, ἄνθρωπε, 
τέχνασµα”; “O man, product of a bold nature”. See Bausi 2014, 20, 
footnote 44. Regarding the missing text and the different hypotheses on 
its content, see ibid. 241-242 and Busi, XXVII-XXX. 
48 For more information see Copenhaver. 
49 Also see Ficino, in Phaedrum, 182: “Perfectus orator scire debet ani-
mam quamlibet humanam intrinsecus esse suapte natura multiplicem 
(habere enim rationem, imaginationem, sensum, irascendi atque concu-
piscendi vires). […] Nosse preterea debet qualibus sermonibus qualia 
moveantur ingenia, et suos cuique sermones accomodare” (“The perfect 
orator must know that any human soul is intrinsically and naturally 
multiple (for it has reason, imagination, sense, and the powers of wrath 
and desire). […] Moreover, he ought to know what kind of natural dis-
positions are moved by what kind of speeches and accommodate his 
speeches to each person” Allen, 183). 
 
 
50 Even though the work was written between 1486 and 1487, it only 
circulates among Pico’s closest friends at first. It was published posthu-
mously and is part of the Bologna anthology of Pico’s works edited by 
his grandson, Gian Francesco, and published under the title Oratio 
quaedam elegantissima. See Bausi 2014, IX-XII, for information on its 
date and composition. 
51 See Katinis 2003, 93: “Ficino […] usa Proteo e il camaleonte come 
figure per descrivere non più l’uomo in modo generico, ma piuttosto la 
sua facoltà immaginativa, che diviene, quasi per proprietà transitiva, ciò 
che fa dell’uomo un essere eccezionale.” 
52 Regarding Ficino see Allen 1984, 170: “This implies a mind at odds 
with the extremer manifestations of Plato’s dualism, one drawn to envis-
aging the human condition not in the shadows of unending ἀγωνία, of 
ceaseless war between the animate prisoner and his inanimate bars, but 
rather in the light of intellect and body partaking together in a unitary 
reality”. Also see Katinis 1998, 221: “l’attività immaginativa è il veicolo 
che permette la relazione tra i due piani del composto essere umano”. 
53 See for example Petrarca, ad familiares 22.2.  
54 For example, Ficino has a better affinity with philosophers who were 
Platonists and Christian, just like Synesius, than with pagan ones, as he 
shares with them the attempt at reducing Christian doctrine and Plato’s 
thought to a synthesis (Opera, 925): “Amo equidem Platonem in Iambli-
cho, admiror in Plotino, in Dionisyio veneror” (“I love Plato in Iam-
blichus, I admire him in Plotinus, but I venerate him in Dionysius” 
Trans. Allen 1998, 67). Also see Celenza 2002, 84: “Ficino is at his 
most non-Plotinian wehn post-Plotinian Platonists presented theories 
that were more congruent with Christianity, themselves the result of 
similarities of mentality between fourth- and fifth-century Platonism and 
the Christianity of the same period. It is not just a question of sources, 
but of mentalities.” 
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Abstract: This paper presents some material for a history 
of the reception of ancient Greek sophistic in the Renais-
sance. First, it discusses what knowledge the dialectician 
and rhetorician Rudolph Agricola (1483-1485) may have 
had about the ancient Greek sophists by analysing two 
passages where Agricola explicitly mentions the ancient 
sophists. Second, it explores the meaning and use of the 
word ‘sophista’ in the context of the humanist-scholastic 
debate of the early 16th century and in the first compre-
hensive history of the Greek sophists in antiquity, Louis 
de Cressolles’ Theatrum veterum rhetorum, oratorum, 
declamatorum quos in Graecia nominabant sophistas 
(1620). It will be observed that Agricola’s views on the 
early Greek sophists, in so far as they can be recon-
structed, stand in strong contrast with those of Cressolles. 
 
Keywords: ancient Greek sophists, Rudolph Agricola, 
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1. Introduction1 
 
Since the landmark essays of Hannay Gray and Paul 
Oskar Kristeller it is well known that the study and recep-
tion of the ancient Greek and Roman rhetorical theory and 
practice by the humanists constituted a major contribution 
to the intellectual culture of the Renaissance.2  Neverthe-
less, this is still an area of studies where much is left to be 
explored. In this essay I will look into the question what 
knowledge the Frisian scholar of dialectic and rhetoric 
Rudolph Agricola, whose work has attracted much atten-
tion in recent decades, may have had about the early 
Greek sophists and their place in the ancient history of 
dialectic and rhetoric.3 This discussion will lead us to ex-
plore the wider context in which the word ‘sophista’ was 
used in Agricola’s time and later in the Renaissance. In 
this connection, we will look at Louis de Cressolles’ view 
on the ancient sophists in his Theatrum veterum rhetorum, 
oratorum, declamatorum quos in Graecia nominabant 
sophistas (1620). 
  
 
2. Ancient Greek sophists 
 
‘Sophist’ was a term used in antiquity for a number of 
wandering scholars in the ancient Greek city states during 
the second half of the fifth and the first part of the fourth 
century BCE. These scholars, among whom Protagoras of 
Abdera, Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Cos, and Hip-
pias of Elis were prominent, taught eloquence and the art 
of debating, but also linguistics, esthetic, moral philoso-
phy and other branches of knowledge. Although the soph-
ists never formed a coherent group or movement, their 
biographer Flavius Philostratus (c. 165-c.250 CE) labelled 
their art with the generic term ἡ ἀρχαία σοφιστική (‘an-
cient sophistic’), which he says must be considered as 
ῥητορική φιλοσοφοῦσα (‘philosophical rhetoric’) be-
cause, as Philostratus explains, the sophists discoursed 
about general and philosophical subjects such as courage, 
justice, the heroes and the gods, and the universe. This 
distinguishes them, according to Philostratus, from the 
sophists of his own time, because these sophists dealt 
only with specific subjects such as the types of the poor 
man and the rich, princes and tyrants, and historical sub-
jects; in other words, they did not discuss philosophical 
subject matter.4 The original meaning of the word ‘soph-
ist’ (σοφιστής) is ‘sage’,5 but it obtained a pejorative 
force as a result of  Plato’s and Aristotle’s criticism of the 
logical tricks and the relativism of some sophists, Pro-
tagoras and Gorgias in particular.  
 
 
3. Agricola and the ancient Greek sophists 
 
Rudolph Agricola (1443-1485), born in Frisia, was 
trained in the late-medieval arts curriculum at the univer-
sities of Erfurt and Louvain, where he graduated as 
magister artium in 1465. He became thoroughly ac-
quainted with Italian humanism during a lengthy stay in 
Northern Italy between 1469 (perhaps earlier) and 1479. 
For several years he was active at the university of Pavia 
and contributed to the humanist movement there. In 1475, 
he went to Ferrara, where he learnt Greek and translated 
several Greek texts into Latin, among which (ps.-
)Isocrates’ Paraenesis ad Demonicum (1478), about 
which more below. In Ferrara he also started working on 
De inventione dialectica, which he finished shortly after 
he left Italy in the early months of 1479. In this treatise 
Agricola blends dialectic with rhetoric, which had previ-
ously been separate disciplines. Not long before his un-
timely death in 1485, he wrote a brief pedagogical treatise 
in the form of a letter, that was often printed in the six-
teenth century with the title De formando studio. None of 
Agricola’s writings were published during his lifetime, 
but several of them, in particular De formando studio and 
De inventione dialectica, went through numerous print-
ings during the sixteenth century. 
ON THE RECEPTION OF THE ANCIENT GREEK SOPHISTS AND THE USE OF THE TERM SOPHIST IN THE RENAISSANCE 
 87 
Agricola’s writings contain two explicit references to the 
ancient sophists, one in the letter in which he dedicates 
his translation of the Isocratean Πρὸς Δηµόνικον 
(Paraenesis ad Demonicum) to his elder (half-)brother 
Johannes, the other in De formando studio. First, the letter 
dedicating his translation of Πρὸς Δηµόνικον to his bro-
ther. This text, erroneously attributed to Isocrates in Agri-
cola’s time, is a brief pedagogical treatise, which was 
very well received among Italian humanist pedagogues. 
Agricola recommends it with great enthusiasm to Johan-
nes: 
 
(4) Quum sint autem permulta, que ad uite pertineant insti-
tucionem Grecis Latinisque litteris conscripta, egregia inprimis 
et admirabilis Isocratis ad Demonicum paraenesis mihi uidetur. 
(5) Ea enim suauitas est dicendi, is ornatus et (ut ita dicam) 
sculptura orationis, tanta preterea maiestas utilitas decor precep-
torum, ut, si, quemadmodum pugiles meditatos quosdam nodos 
nexusque habent, quibus inter certamina subito et uel non cogi-
tantes etiam utantur, ita nos quoque oporteat certa quedam et ad 
manum posita uitae habere precepta, que omnes nostras uelut ad 
filum dirigant acciones, quorumque tenax infixa mentibus nos-
tris memoria recti nos limitem egredi unique uetet, hic libellus 
aptus uel maxime ad hanc rem atque accomodatus mihi uideatur. 
(6) Eum itaque tibi in Latinum sermonem e Greco conuerti, me 
rem scrupulosam conatus, ut numeros quoque, quorum ille fuit 
obseruantissimus, et scemata uel (ut nos dicimus) exornationes 
orationis, quoad possem, imitarer. Per similiter enim cadencia et 
desinentia et equata et contraposita et reliquos id genus ornatus 
uoluitur oratio. Quorum ut studiosus precipue Gorgias Leontinus 
preceptor eius aliique etatis illius sophiste fuerunt, ita diligencior 
iste, ut secuta eum, non affectata uiderentur. Hunc ego legen-
dum tibi etiam atque etiam, sed ad uerbum quoque ediscendum 
censeo semperque uelut ante oculos tamquam regulam quandam 
uitę prescriptum habendum. (Letter 15, ed. Van der Laan and 
Akkerman, 102-104) 
 
A great many things dealing with how to arrange one’s life have 
been written in Greek and Latin literature. It seems to me, how-
ever, that Isocrates’ Exhortation to Demonicus is particularly 
outstanding and commendable. Its wording is sweet, its style 
beautifully carved, as it were; moreover, its teachings are par-
ticularly impressive, useful and appropriate. So if we are to learn 
certain things that come in handy at all times, that guide and di-
rect all our actions, and that we firmly implant in our minds so 
as to remind us of the path of righteousness that we ought never 
to stray from (just as boxers have certain holds and grips that 
they practice and then automatically use during a match), then 
this booklet seems to me to be perhaps the most comprehensive 
and appropriate for the job. I have therefore translated it from 
Greek into Latin. I have even tried to do something which re-
quires particular skill, that is, to also include Isocrates’ rhythms 
(to which he paid great attention) as far as I could, and also his 
figures of speech or (as we call them) stylistic embellishments. 
For his text picks up words in like cases, words with like end-
ings, parallel clauses, opposite clauses, all that kind of embel-
lishment. Gorgias of Leontini, his [i.e. Isocrates’] teacher, and 
other Sophists of the time eagerly used these stylistic figures, 
and Isocrates made particular use of them himself, making sure 
that they were naturally incorporated into his text instead of 
forced upon it. I think that you should read this booklet over and 
over again, but also learn it by heart, word for word, holding it 
in front of you as though it were a rule and guideline for life.  
(Van der Laan and Akkerman, 103-105) 
 
Agricola’s remarks on the style of Isocrates and the soph-
ists reflect his reading of several ancient testimonies. The 
suavitas of Isocrates’ style comes from Cicero, De ora-
tore 3.28 (“Suavitatem Isocrates [...] habuit”). Isocrates’ 
use of rhythm (‘numerus’) is attested in De oratore 3.173 
and Brutus 32-33, and one of these passages, or both, is 
probably Agricola’s source.6 Agricola does not follow 
Cicero’s observation in these two passages that Isocrates 
was the first to apply rhythm. This may be due to the fact 
that Agricola was aware that Cicero had corrected himself 
in Orator 174-175, where he says that it was claimed by 
Isocrates’ admirers that he was the first to introduce 
rhythm into prose, but that Thrasymachus was the inven-
tor of it.7 Agricola may also have in mind Orator 165, 
where Cicero mentions that Gorgias was the first to apply 
the skilful connection of words and clauses by means of 
symmetry and antithesis, though he does not use the tech-
nical term concinnitas that Cicero uses in this passage (“It 
is said that Gorgias was the first to strive for this sort of 
symmetry”; “In huius concinnitatis consectatione Gor-
giam fuisse principem accepimus”; Trans. Hubbell 1939, 
443-445). Agricola’s obervation that Isocrates’ use of the 
Gorgianic figures of style was moderate, reflects the gen-
eral praise for Isocrates’ style in the classical testimonies, 
and perhaps in particular Cicero’s observation in Orator 
176 that Gorgias made excessive use of rhythm (“But 
Gorgias is too fond of this style, and uses these “embroid-
eries” (his own word for it) too boldly”; “Gorgias autem 
avidior est generis eius et his festivitatibus – sic enim ipse 
censet – insolentius abutitur”; Trans. Hubbell 1939, 455). 
The second text in which Agricola mentions the an-
cient sophists is his letter to Jacob Barbireau, written in 
Heidelberg on June 7, 1484. The letter is a response to 
Barbireau’s request for advice about the approach he 
should take to his studies. Agricola begins by discussing 
the different subjects one will choose depending on one’s 
talent and financial means. If one has both, and if one as-
pires to follow a study which is honorable in its own 
right, then one must choose to study philosophy, which 
Agricola divides into ethics, including the study of the 
bible, and natural sciences. He then discusses the methods 
one needs to follow in order to achieve good results. This 
includes recording and memorizing systematically every-
thing one has read in order to acquire knowledge and 
have it ready at hand, so to speak. This skill is acquired 
by using a mnemonic system of juxtaposed headings such 
as virtue/vice, life/death, learning/ignorance, friendli-
ness/hatred. Second, one must acquire the ability to make 
the knowledge one has acquired productive, by expertly 
composing new, original texts. This, Agricola says, can 
be achieved by means of the topics of invention, for 
which he refers Barbireau to De inventione dialectica. 
The essence of the method of learning Agricola mentions 
here is discussed in book 2, chapters 28 and 29 of De in-
ventione dialectica and consists of two steps. First, the 
topics are used to collect data (facts, sayings, anything 
one knows or has found in one’s readings) about individ-
ual things (Agricola uses the Latin word ‘res’, which in-
cludes both abstract concepts and concrete things situated 
in place and time); these data subsequently form the ma-
terial for arguments both for and against any proposition 
in which the ‘res’ in question is taken up, either in a 
philosophical debate or in an oratorical discourse intended 
to instruct or persuade an audience. 
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In the course of the passage describing the method of 
study to be followed, Agricola mentions the early Greek 
sophists: 
 
(54) Quisquis ergo prius id recte et cum cura tractauerit, preser-
tim si rationem dialectice inuentionis illi adiunxerit, ingens illi 
paratissimaque de omni fere proposita re disserendi facultas 
continget, modo ea ulla ex parte as eas pertineat, quas didicit, 
artes. Hoc quoque pacto veteres illos professores artium, quos 
Greci sophistas, id est doctores, uocabant, exercuisse se depre-
hendo, quantum ex Aristotele et Platone coniicere licet, atque ad 
eam eruditionem promtitudinemque dicendi peruenerunt, ut, de 
qua re audire quis uellet, proponi iuberent dicerentque, quamdiu 
quantumque uideretur de eo, quod esset propositum. Sic Gorgias 
Leontinus, primus tam audacis cepti auctor, sic Prodicus Chius, 
sic Protagoras Abderites atque Hippias Eleus et instituti sunt et 
alios docuere. (Letter 15, ed. Van der Laan and Akkerman, 216) 
 
So whoever has practised that first point of mine [i.e. the mne-
monic system of headings; the second being the analysis of texts 
in order to range the material they contain under the appropriate 
headings] correctly and with care, especially if he has combined 
it with the dialectical invention method, that person will attain 
an enormous and most readily available capacity to treat almost 
any matter that is suggested, provided it is related in some re-
spect to the arts he has learned. I have found that this is also the 
way in which those ancient teachers of the arts whom the Greeks 
called sophists, which means instructors, practiced their skills, 
as far as I can figure out from Aristotle and Plato. And they 
reached such a degree of learning and such ease in speaking that 
they would ask anyone to suggest any matter they wanted to 
know something about, then would speak on what had been 
suggested as long and as much as they saw fit. In this way Gor-
gias of Leontini (he was the first to engage in such a bold prac-
tice) and Prodicus of Cos, Protagoras of Abdera and Hippias of 
Elis were trained and taught others. (Van der Laan and Akker-
man, 217) 
 
In this passage, Agricola states that his method of study, 
the art of memory combined with topical invention, was 
also applied by the early Greek sophists. He only gives a 
vague reference to Plato and Aristotle to support this 
claim, but he does mention the feat of speaking extempo-
raneously for which Gorgias was famous in antiquity. 
Agricola probably has in mind here Cicero, De finibus 
2.1, where Cicero labels Gorgias’ habit of speaking ex-
temporaneously as an audax negotium.8 In addition, Agri-
cola’s observations probably reflect Cicero, De oratore 
3.126-129, a passage about the rhetoric of the sophists 
and especially their skill in speaking about any subject, 
where not only Gorgias, but also Hippias of Elis, Prodicus 
of Cos, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon and Protagoras of 
Abdera are mentioned. Agricola’s reference to Plato and 
Aristotle may suggest that he systematically collected in-
formation about the sophists and their work, but in fact he 
only mentions a well-known practice of the sophists about 
which many ancient testimonies exist.9 
Peter Mack has mentioned that Juan Luis Vives, in De 
instrumento probabilitatis (1531), cites Agricola’s belief 
that the ancient sophists had drawn their copia and facility 
from the topics.10 Vives says this in a passage in which he 
discusses the description of ‘man’ by means of various 
topics, such as substance, conjugates, actions, causes, 
things that relate to man, such as God, parents, teachers, 
and so forth. Vives continues by listing things which may 
be adduced as arguments:   
pro argumentis adducantur majores, exempla priorum, historiae, 
fabulae, proverbia, si quid praedictum de illo, aut praemonstra-
tum, quid dixit, aut significavit quis, nomen, cognomen, appella-
tio: ex his apparet non solum ad arguendum valere hanc copiam, 
sed ad dicendum de quacunque re velis, ut non absurde videatur 
Agricola Rodolphus existimare Gorgiam, Hippiam, Prodicum, et 
alios Graecos sophistas, qui in conventu hominum paratos se 
esse profitebantur ad dicendum de quacunque re quis vellet 
audire, ex his fontibus ubertatem illam et redundantiam eorum, 
quae dicturi essent, haurire, ut nunquam dicendi materia deficer-
entur (Opera omnia, vol. 3, 116-117).  
 
As arguments one may use ancestors, examples of previous gen-
erations, historical narratives, fictional stories, proverbs, any-
thing said or predicted about the individual who is subject of the 
discourse, what someone has said or indicated, name, surname, 
title. From these things it is clear that this supply not only serves 
towards arguing but also towards speaking about any subject 
you might wish. Hence it does not seem contrary to reason that 
Rudoph Agricola thinks that Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus and the 
other Greek sophists, who claimed that they were skilled at 
speaking in an assembly about any subject anyone might ask 
for, derived their famous abundance, and even excess, of things 
to say from these sources, so that they would never be short of 
material to speak about. (my trans.) 
 
Because Vives makes a clear distinction between arguing 
and speaking about any subject, it is possible that he 
thinks that Agricola had in minds particularly discussions 
of illustrious subjects11 or commonplaces, which Pro-
tagoras and Gorgias were the first to treat, according to 
Quintilian (Inst. 3.1.12) and Cicero (Brut. 46). Agricola, 
however, does not cite of refer to these testimonies. And 
even if Agricola believed more generally that the sophists 
used topics as their sources, it is unclear from this passage 
on the basis of which texts or testimonies he had con-
cluded this. In fact, it seems rather unlikely that Agricola 
supposed that the ancient sophists already had a fully de-
veloped system of topics such we know it from later 
handbooks of rhetoric. This may be inferred from De in-
ventione dialectica 2.25, an important chapter in which 
Agricola argues that the method of topical invention, 
which is common to all arts and sciences, belongs to dia-
lectic, and that there are no topics of invention proper to 
rhetoric. This raises the question why so many teachers of 
eloquence wrote about inventio. Here is Agricola’s an-
swer to this question: 
 
Cum veniant autem tales plerunque quaestiones in forum, de 
quibus nihil perpetuum praecipi possit, sed contentione 
dicendique vi trahantur in quamvis partem, fuit idcirco tradenda 
communis quaedam inveniendi ratio, conveniens omnibus 
quaestionibus. Quae quidem rectissime peteretur a dialectico, si 
tradita iam tum fuisset. Sed multo post secutus est Aristoteles, 
qui primus eam in artis formam cogere adorsus est. (De inven-
tione dialectica 2.25, ed. Mundt, 382) 
 
However, since usually questions come up on the forum about 
which one cannot give any general precepts, but which are 
twisted and turned in any direction in the course of the dispute 
and by the force of speaking, it was necessary for that reason to 
formulate some general method of invention, suitable for all 
questions. If this method had been formulated already at that 
time, it would have been demanded most properly from the dia-
lectician. But Aristotle, who was the first to have undertaken to 
compress it [i.e. a method of invention] into the form of an art, 
came much later. (my trans.) 
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Agricola says here that in the time before Aristotle, rhet-
oricians developed a method of invention suitable for all 
questions that were disputed for and against on the forum. 
It seems likely that, if Agricola believed that this method 
was based on the topics, and if he thought that this 
method had been developed by the sophists, he would 
have said so explicitly in this passage. He highlights the 
practice of reasoning for and against on the forum be-
cause this is the essence of dialectical reasoning, of which 
he maintains that it is applied not only in philosophy, but 
in oratory and in all branches of knowledge. However, 
there is no indication, here or elsewhere, that Agricola 
thought reasoning for and against had been invented by 
the sophists, for instance on the basis of the testimonies 
that Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two 
sides to any issue (Diogenes Laertius IX, 50; cf. Seneca 
Ep. 88, 43). Vives’ remark in De instrumento probabilita-
tis thus seems to be an overstatement. 
The passages discussed above offer no evidence to 
conclude that Agricola has made a thorough study of the 
contribution of the sophists to the early Greek art of rea-
soning. What he says about the early sophists amounts to 
not more than traditional knowledge handed down in an-
tiquity from generation to generation and recorded in a 
handful of testimonies, several of which are cited by 
Agricola.  
 
 
4. ‘Sophista’ in the Renaissance, the humanist-
scholastic debate of the early sixteenth century and 
Cressolles’ Theatrum veterum rhetorum, oratorum, 
declamatorum, quos in Graecia nominabant σοφιστάς 
(1620) 
 
It is noteworthy, however, that Agricola’s judgement 
about the sophists is entirely positive. He highlights that 
they were teachers and good witers, makes no mention of 
Cicero’s remark that Gorgias was excessive in his use of 
rhythm (Or. 175-176), and, although he says that he read 
about the sophists in Plato and Aristotle, he never raises 
their critical stance on the sophists, for instance Aris-
totle’s criticism that the sophist is one who makes money 
from apparent and not real wisdom, and therefore aims at 
apparent, not real proof (SE 165 a 22), Plato’s critical dis-
cussion of Protagoras’ homo-mensura thesis in Theaetetus 
(151 e – 171 a 4), or of the sophists’ logical fallacies in 
Euthydemus. This is remarkable, because contemporary 
readers of Plato, for instance Marsilio Ficino, did bring up 
explicitly Plato’s negative attitude towards the sophists.12 
Likewise notable is the fact that Agricola never uses the 
word sophist (‘sophista’), commonly used in his time to 
denote a student in the Faculty of Arts,13 as a nickname 
for scholastic dialecticians. This practice seems to have 
been common among humanist critics of  scholastic dia-
lectic, both before and after Agricola. For instance, 
Lorenzo Valla, referring to the use of unclassical words in 
contemporary dialectic, speaks of the traps and tricks of 
the sophists (“laquei et captiones sophistarum”),14 and in 
the early days of the Reformation, ‘sophista’ was fre-
quently used by humanists to discredit scholastic dialecti-
cians and theologians, and by university theologians to 
discredit humanists as loquacious orators who wrongly 
connect rhetoric with theology,15 or worse, as dishonest or 
even heretical theologians. Erasmus was a famous victim 
of this practice of framing in his polemic with university 
theologians about his Declamation on the praise of mar-
riage.16 A similar fate struck Cornelius Agrippa of 
Nettesheim, when theologians from the universities of 
Paris and Louvain condemned his Declamation De incer-
titudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium as heretical, and 
expurgated certain passages from it.17 The condemnation 
did not put Agrippa’s work out of circulation, but from 
the middle of the sixteenth century onward his work was 
systematically presented as a literary paradox written 
without serious purpose, and Agrippa was stigmatized as 
a deceitful and insincere scholar.18 
The clash between humanist and scholastic theolo-
gians in the early days of the Reformation and the stigma 
that was subsequently fixed on humanist theologians such 
as Erasmus and Agrippa suggests that the notions of soph-
istry and sophist were applied specifically to scholars and 
theologians who were critical of the Roman Church. The 
first comprehensive history of Greek sophistic, the 
Theatrum veterum rhetorum, oratorum, declamatorum, 
quos in Graecia nominabant σοφιστάς (Paris, 1620) by 
the French Jesuit Louis de Cressolles, published some 
fifty years after the Council of Trent had reinforced the 
established doctrine of the Roman Church, confirms that 
even the art of the early Greek sophists was seen entirely 
from this contemporary perspective. 
Most Renaissance scholars will know Cressolles’ 
work from Marc Fumaroli’s L’âge de l’éloquence from 
1980, in which Fumaroli studies the rhetoric and the cul-
ture of eloquence in France from the second half of the 
sixteenth century (beginning after the Council of Trent) 
until the beginning of the period of classicism, which 
started around the middle of the seventeenth century. In 
this period of the late Renaissance, epideictic rhetoric 
flourished intensely. During the first decades of the 
seventeenth century, the Jesuits in particular played a key 
role in what Fumaroli has called ‘the sacred sophistic’ 
(“la sophistique sacrée”). Cressolles wrote two important 
works, the Theatrum, and the Vacationes autumnales, a 
work in which he discusses actio, the fifth task of the ora-
tor, and how courtesy is a reflection of a good character. 
In his examination of the Theatrum, Fumaroli focuses on 
Cressolles’ discussion of the so-called second sophistic in 
books 3 and 4,19 and especially on what he sees as Cres-
solles’ fascination with – I quote literally – ‘these hea-
thens whom he wants to naturalize as christians’ (“ces 
paiëns qu’il veut naturaliser chrétiens”).20 The focus on 
this aspect of Cressolles’ work is entirely appropriate in 
the context of Fumaroli’s book, but it is equally illuminat-
ing to see what Cressolles has to say about the early 
Greek sophistic. Cressolles offers the first ever systematic 
and critical discussion and interpretation of all the surviv-
ing sources about the notion ‘σοφιστής’ and its uses in 
pre-classical Greece, and of the ancient and the second 
sophistic following Philostratus’ conception of the terms 
(Vitae sophistarum, Book 1, p. 480-481 Olearius), starting 
from the note in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Minos (319 
c 3-7) on verses 178-179 in book 19 of the Odyssee, 
where Zeus is called a sophist, and ending with the era of 
the sophists after the reign of Constantine the Great, 
whose biographies were written by Eunapius. This im-
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pressive work of Jesuit scholarship offers a huge collec-
tion of testimonies that is still useful for modern students 
to consult.21 
In book 1, Cressolles discusses the notion σοφιστής in 
ancient Greece and Rome and presents a brief history of 
the first and second sophistic following Philostratus’ divi-
sion at the beginning of his work. In book 2 he focuses on 
what Philostratus had called ancient sophistic, i.e. the 
sophists of the sixth and fifth century BCE. Cressolles 
begins with the division of the ancient sophists proposed 
by Adrien Tournebous (or Turnèbe, after the Latinized 
form Turnebus, 1512-1565) in his Adversaria. It consists 
of two groups, the sophists who are like orators, for ex-
ample Gorgias, and those who are like the dialecticians 
who were called ‘Eristici’ because they used the conten-
tious arguments (ἐριστικοί λόγοι) discussed by Aristotle 
in his Sophistical Refutations.22 It is the activity of this 
latter group which, according to Tournebous, seems to 
have produced the art of dialectic (Cressolles, book 2, 
chap. 1, pp. 104-110).23 Cressolles continues by explain-
ing that the vast majority of the ancient sophists, begin-
ning with Gorgias, professed to be not only orators but 
also philosophers, and were experts in what Cressolles 
calls the great arts, the magnae artes, including civil sci-
ence (Book 2, chap. 1, p. 105). In chapter 2 (pp. 111-115), 
Cressolles uses Gellius’ portrayal of Protagoras as an un-
truthful philosopher (Noctes Atticae 5.3.7 ‘Protagoras in-
sincerus philosophus’) as the start of a thirty-six pages 
long diatribe against the early sophists and their relativ-
ism and fallacies.24 According to Cressolles, these soph-
ists were corrupted philosophers, for two reasons. First, 
they used their knowledge to satisfy their greed and other 
shameful desires,25 and second, they aimed at probability 
instead of truth. Cressolles develops this second point in 
great detail, starting as follows:  
 
Altera causa fuit, quod in scholis explicandis, & disputationibus 
eruditis, probabilitatem sequerentur, atque omnia sic oratione 
colorarent, vt quae falsa essent, illa homines non nimis docti nec 
arguti, & credibilia, & verissima putarent: ex quo necesse fuit 
prauitatem opinionum, & foedos errores turbulentosque gener-
ari. Hinc δοξόσοφοι olim nominati, de quibus Clemens Alexan-
drinus ita scribit: οἳ µὲν οὖν, δοξόσοφοι καλούµενοι, οἱ τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν εὑρηκέναι νοµίζοντες, &c. (Book 2, chapter 2, p. 112)  
 
The other reason was that in their courses and disputations, they 
sought to attain probability, and in their speech they presented 
everything with a bias, so that not so very learned and clever 
people saw as credible and even as simply true what in fact was 
wrong; from this arose necessarily misguided opinions and 
abominable errors; for this reason these sophists were called in 
antiquity ‘δοξόσοφοι’ (‘wise in their own conceit’), about whom 
Clement of Alexandria wrote: “Those, then, who are called wise 
in their own opinions, who think that they have found the truth, 
etc.” (my trans.)  
 
This passage reflects Plato’s and Aristotle’s defamation of 
the sophists as men who have only apparent knowledge,26 
but Cressolles’ immediate point of reference are the 
Church Fathers who used similar language in their dis-
putes with dissenters. Cressolles’ use of the notion 
δοξόσοφοι (‘pretenders to wisdom’) is particularly reveal-
ing in this respect. Both Plato and Aristotle use it refer-
ring to sophists,27 but Cressolles quotes it from a passage 
in the seventh book of Clement of Alexandria’s Stromata, 
in which Clement replies to the objections asserted 
against the Christians by Greeks and Jews. He argues that 
many sects have emerged among Jews and Greek phi-
losophers, which hold views that are opposed to the 
Christian truth. Among the people who hold such views, 
many deceive themselves in thinking that they have found 
the truth, and are therefore called δοξόσοφοι (‘wise in 
their own opinions’).28 Clement continues by making the 
point that, while those who are δοξόσοφοι only deceive 
themselves because they avoid testing their views for fear 
of rebuttal and refuse instruction for fear of censure, oth-
ers malevolently deceive those who come to them and 
willingly darken the truth with arguments calculated to 
persuade.29 Cressolles elaborates this point by means of a 
set of testimonies from pagan authors and church fathers, 
and concludes that the philosophy of the early Greek 
sophists was impure and phoney.30 Cressolles clearly mis-
represents the historical facts because he randomly com-
bines negative judgements of the early Greek sophists by 
philosophers and rhetoricians with criticisms directed 
against non-Christians by church fathers, and pretends 
that the early Greek sophists were accused of preferring 
their own opinions above the established truth. 
This distortion of historical facts is brought home in 
chapter 3 on the ancient sophists’ method of philosophiz-
ing (‘sophistarum propria philosophandi ratio’, p. 116). In 
this chapter, Cressolles again presents a combined list of 
testimonies of pagan authors and church fathers that stig-
matize sophists and dialecticians as debaters who wanted 
to show off their brilliance rather than search for the truth. 
He then says in the same breath that this attitude is typical 
of all heretics: 
 
Hoc proprium est haereticorum ingenium, haec ingenita malitia, 
in impiis opinionibus tuendis hoc ἐριστικῷ genere impotenti 
animi impetu gloriari, & omisso rationis lumine, apud indoctam 
multitudinem inutili σκιαµαχίᾳ dicta impia ventilare; hinc fraus 
et pertinacia, et in susceptis erroribus animi elati et superbi ob-
stinatio. (Book 2, chapter 3, p. 120) 
 
This is typically the mindset of heretics, this is their inborn mal-
ice, to pride themselves with uncontrollable desire on this kind 
of contentious debate when they defend their impious opinions, 
and, having renounced the light of reason, to bring up for dis-
cussion among the unlearned public impious views in a useless 
fight against a shadow. This is the source of error and stubborn-
ness, and the obstinacy of a haughty mind that has accepted 
false doctrines. (my trans.) 
 
Cressolles concludes this chapter with the observation 
that it was the sophists’ unscrupulous practise of reason-
ing which caused their ill repute throughout antiquity.31 
Cressolles’ discussion of early Greek sophistic in 
chapters 2 and 3 of book 2 clearly stands in the tradition 
of the Platonic debate and is therefore quite negative. 
However, his survey also highlights that the Platonic tra-
dition was very strong among early Christian intellec-
tuals. His testimonies illustrate that church fathers com-
monly used the term sophist to stigmatize their non-
Christian opponents as dishonest intellectuals who op-
posed the Christian doctrine and deliberately preferred 
probability above the truth.32 In fact, one might say that 
Cressolles uses the ancient testimonies to almost redefine 
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the notion ‘sophist’ as a term to stigmatize people con-
sidered to be opponents of the Roman Church.  
In the course of chapters 2 and 3 Cressolles occasion-
ally also refers to authors from the medieval period, when 
the possible conflict between faith (fides) and reason 
(ratio) as sources of justification of belief was a much de-
bated issue. Thus, he quotes in chapter 2 a sentence from 
a tenth-century commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, 
attributed to Oecumenius, in which it is said that sophists 
are called impostors because they obscure the truth with 
deceit and fallacies (p.114), and in chapter 3 he cites Peter 
Damian who categorically rejects rhetoricians with their 
stylistic embellishments and enthymemes, and dialecti-
cians with their syllogisms and sophistries (p.117).33 
Cressolles does not specifically mention any later testi-
monies that stem from the debate of faith versus reason 
nor does he refer to the early sixteenth-century university 
theologians who condemned humanist theologians. How-
ever, his framing of intellectuals judged rightly or 
wrongly to be opponents of the official church doctrine 
appears to be similar to the way early Christian, Medieval 
and Renaissance champions of Church orthodoxy ap-
proached their opponents. In each case, an opponent is 
denied the right to debate by claiming that the subject 
presented for discussion cannot be discussed by means of 
dialectical reasoning, because it represents a truth which 
may not be called into question. The sole motive for such 
an attack on dialectical reasoning was to prevent discus-
sions that were judged by conservative theologians to be 
detrimental to the Church. 
For Agricola, however, dialectic is not questionable 
because he assumes that its users properly apply it to sub-
jects about which arguments for and against can legiti-
mately be defended, even if they concern subject matter 
pertaining to the Christian faith. As a typical humanist, 
Agricola accepts that belief in God and religious truth, as 
revealed in the Bible or established by either church 
dogma or binding council pronouncements, were the 
cornerstone of human existence.34 This fundament of hu-
man existence cannot be a subject for debate, while 
everything else belongs to the realm of uncertainty and is 
therefore by definition disputable. Hence, assuming that a 
debater has good faith, reasoning for and against cannot 
by itself imply a fundamental denial of the Christian truth, 
and dialectic cannot be discredited categorically as a 
source of corruption. Accordingly, when Agricola ex-
plains that dialectic is an ars, he is remarkably mild about 
sophistical reasoning and he does not emphatically impute 
it to dishonesty of its users: 
 
Fallit tamen nonnunquam dialecticus, et pro veris falsa tradit. 
Evenit id quidem, sed et navem gubernator evertit, et medicus 
aliquando perimit. Hominum sunt ista, non artium. Atque vel eo 
magis fatendum erit, utilem esse dialecticen, cum et qui oratione 
seducunt, astu id persaepe, nulla etiam instructi arte faciant, et 
qui fallitur, si artem calleret, vel nequaquam id vel minus utique 
pateretur. Sane sicut reliquae artes, quae remedio sunt inventae 
humanis necessitatibus, non potuerunt succurrere incommodis, 
nisi prius ea detegerent, sic dialectice, cum magna ex parte in eo 
sit posita, quo pacto laqueos captionum fraudumque in dicendo 
vitemus, necesse habuit aperire insidias et ostendere quam varie 
quis capi posset. Quae si quis inde deprompta utenda sibi puta-
vit, non artis haec est culpa, vitare fugienda monstrantis, sed 
improbitatis, sectari vitanda cupientis. Aperienda enim sunt, ut 
caveantur, mala et nemo artifex tantum remedia novit. Relictum 
ergo nobis sit, artem esse dialecticen. (De inventione dialectica 
2.2, ed. Mundt, 208) 
 
But the dialectician sometimes misguides and teaches false 
things instead of true ones. This happens indeed, but sometimes 
a steersman sinks a ship and a doctor causes a patient to die; that 
is the fault of human beings, not of their arts. Besides, one must 
admit all the more that dialectic is useful, since those who mis-
lead by means of speech very often do so without any instruc-
tion, and the person who is being misled would either not at all 
or at least less likely allow this to happen, if he were to know the 
art. Indeed, as the other arts that are invented to a remedy 
against the needs of mankind cannot relieve misfortunes if they 
do not first uncover these, so dialectic, which is for the most part 
concerned with means to avoid the traps of sophisms and deceit 
in reasoning, must necessarily explain first the treacheries and 
show in how many different ways one can be deceived. If some-
one thinks he has to use the insights gained from these rules, this 
is not the fault of the art that shows to avoid things that must be 
shun from, but the responsibility of the wicked person who 
wishes to chase what he must avoid. For bad things must be dis-
closed so that one may guard against them, and no craftsman 
knows only the remedies. Our conclusion therefore is that dia-
lectic is an art. (my trans.) 
 
Agricola presents his theory of the topics as a reform of 
its medieval counterpart and his discussion of it is em-
bedded in the medieval tradition of philosophical debate 
in the universities. But, similarly to the ancient Greek 
sophists, he is not only a dialectician who focuses on 
philosophical debate, but also a rhetorician who teaches 
how to use the art of reasoning in the public sphere. He 
knows the power of language,35 and explains that, in order 
to convince an audience, it is not enough to instruct (do-
cere), but also to inspire (movere). Thus, when he intro-
duces topical invention and its uses, he explicitly men-
tions deliberative oratory and the art of preaching, and in 
his discussion of the shortcomings of medieval dialectic, 
he points out that university theologians study physics, 
metaphysics and dialectic, but prove inadequate in teach-
ing common people and stimulating them to the obser-
vance of the Christian virtues.36  Early sixteenth-century 
humanists, such as Cornelius Agrippa and Erasmus in 
their declamations, adopted a similar view and promoted 
the use of rational argumentation and emotional persua-
sion to stimulate Christians to live in accordance with the 
moral standards of the Gospel. In the circumstances of 
their time, however, such liberty could not exist, and their 
opponents silenced them using the same technique of 
framing which had been used to discredit the ancient 
Greek sophists and the early Christian dissenters. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In summary, the texts and testimonies discussed in this 
essay have shown that the fifteenth-century humanist 
Rudolph Agricola appears to have had a more positive 
view of the early Greek sophists and their art of dialectic 
and oratory than the Jesuit Louis de Cressolles, who was a 
champion of post-Tridentine Catholic orthodoxy. Fur-
thermore, the texts reviewed suggest that there was a 
strong tradition, going back to the times of the Church 
Fathers, of using the term ‘sophista’ in debates between 
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theologians as a nickname to frame opponents of official 
church doctrine as dishonest and misguided intellectuals. 
In the Renaissance, this practice was continued by a typi-
cally conservative theologian of the Roman church such 
as the Jesuit Cressolles in his history of the ancient soph-
ists. In his discussion of the early Greek sophists, Cres-
solles followed Turnebus’ division of the sophists in those 
who practised oratory on the one hand and those who 
practised eristic and invented dialectic on the other. This 
division implies a negative judgement about the early 
Greek sophists and dialectic in general, which stands in 
stark contrast with Agricola’s positive view of both dia-
lectic and the early Greek sophists. 
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Notes 
 
1 This paper is a revised version of a keynote lecture presented at the 
conference ‘The Sophistic Renaissance. Authors, Texts, Interpretations’, 
Venice, September 26, 2016.  I thank the organizer, professor Katinis, 
and the participants for their comments. 
2 Gray, 497-514; Kristeller, 242-259. 
3 This interest was initiated by the international conference on Agricola 
organized by Fokke Akkerman and Arjo Vanderjagt in Groningen, 1985. 
The proceedings of the conference were published in 1988. 
4 Philostr., VS, Book 1, p 480-481 Olearius. Loeb edition, 4-6.  
5 Herodotus uses the word for the followers of Solon (1.29), Melampus 
(2.49), Pythagoras (4.95). 
6 de Orat. 3.173: “Idque princeps Isocrates instituisse fertur ut incondi-
tam antiquorum dicendi consuetudinem [...] numeris astringeret” (“And 
it is said that Isocrates first introduced the practice of tightening up the 
irregular style of oratory which belonged to the early days” Trans. 
Rackham 1942, 139); Brut. 32: et cum cetera melius quam superiores 
tum primus intellexit etiam in soluta oratione, dum versum effugeres, 
modum tamen et numerum quendam oportere servari” (“He was in other 
respects superior to his predecessors, and particularly he was the first to 
recognize that even in prose, while strict verse should be avoided, a cer-
tain rhythm and measure should be observed” Trans. Hendrickson 1939, 
41). 
7 Orat. 174-175: “Nam qui Isocratem maxime mirantur hoc in eius 
summis laudibus ferunt, quod verbis solutis numeros primus adiunxerit. 
[...] Quod ab his vere quadam ex parte, non totum dicitur. Nam neminem 
in eo genere scientius versatum Isocrate confitendum est, sed princeps 
inveniendi fuit Thrasymachus, cuius omnia nimis etiam exstant scripta 
numerose” (“The enthusiastic admirers of Isocrates extol as the greatest 
of his accomplishments that he was the first to introduce rhythm into 
prose. [...] Their claim is only partly true. We must grant that nobody 
showed greater skill in this style than Isocrates, but the inventor was 
Thrasymachus. All his work shows even an excess of rhythm” Trans. 
Hubbell 1939, 453-455). 
8 Cf. Van der Laan and Akkerman’s note ad loc.: “Agricola’s wording is 
remarkably similar to Cicero’s” (p.362). 
9 Van der Laan and Akkerman’s list various other testimonies in their 
notes to letter 38, p. 362. 
10 Mack, 316; see also Van der Laan and Akkerman, 362. 
See Mack 1993, 316, and Van der Laan and Akkerman, note ad loc., 
362. 
11 rerum illustrium disputationes are the terms used by Cicero to denote 
the commonplaces of Protagoras (Brut. 46).  
12 Marsilio Ficino, ‘In divinum Platonem Epitomae, seu Argumenta, 
Commentaria, Collectanea et Annotationes’, in Opera omnia, vol. 2, fol. 
1129 ff. Translation in Farndell, see for relevant passages the Index, s.v.: 
Sophists. 
13 See, e.g., Clasen, 263, quoted from the 1457 statutes of the Cologne 
Faculty of Arts. 
14 Valla 1982, vol. 1, 277; Trans. Valla 2012, 208-209. 
15 Rummel, 21-24. 
16 Van der Poel 2005. 
17  Van der Poel, Cornelius Agrippa, 116-152. 
18 Van der Poel, Cornelius Agrippa, 160-166. 
19 In Book 5, pp. 437-528, Cressolles discusses the vitia  for which the 
sophists were criticized in antiquity, such as their self-exaltation (tumidi 
animi elatio), their greed displayed in their tuition fees (avaritia in do-
cendo), their lust (‘impura libido’), and other bad character traits.      
20 Fumaroli, 302. 
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21 C.J. Classen lists Cressolles’ work in his Bibliography included in the 
volume ‘Sophistik’, published in the ‘Wege der Forschung’-series pub-
lished by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (vol. 187, 1976). 
22 Cressolles, book 2, chapter 1, p.104. “Duo enim genera Sophistarum 
fuerunt olim, unum simile oratoribus, qualis Gorgias Leontinus fuit, 
alterum simile dialecticorum, eorum qui Eristici vocabantur, unde 
ἐριστικοὶ  λόγοι apud Aristotelem in Topicis et in Elenchis, a quibus 
Eristicis dialectica profecta videtur” (Turnebus, Advaersaria, Book 4, 
chapter 2, ed. 1604, col. 100. “For there were in times past two kinds of 
sophists, one similar to orators, such as Gorgias of Leontini was, the 
other similar to those dialecticians who were called eristics, whence 
ἐριστικοὶ  λόγοι in Aristotle’s Topics and Sophistical Refutations; it 
seems that dialectic originated from these eristics” my trans.).  
23 Turnebus quotes Diogenes Laertius 2.106 as the authoritative testi-
mony on this matter: “καὶ οἱ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ Μεγαρικοὶ προσηγορεύοντο, εἶτ᾽ 
ἐριστικοί, ὕστερον δὲ διαλεκτικοί” (“And his [i.e. Euclides’] followers 
were called Megarians after him, then Eristics, and at a later date Dialec-
ticians” Trans. Hicks).  
24 Gellius calls Protagoras an insincere philosopher because he affirmed 
that he could teach how the weaker cause could be made the stronger; cf. 
Aristotle, Rh. 2.24, 1402 a 23-5. Cressolles’ discussion of the ancient 
sophists covers book 2, chapters 2 to 7, 111-147. In Books 3 and 4, 148-
436, Cressolles discusses the Second Sophistic or, in Cressolles’ words, 
the sophists of the second kind. 
25 “Nam ad sordes inanis avaritiae, aliaque flagitia, cognitione abuteban-
tur” (Cressolles, book 2, chapter 2, p.111). 
26 For instance Plato, Sph. 233 c sqq., Aristotle, SE 165 a 20ff. 
27 Plato, Phdr. 275 B; Aristotle, Rh. 2.10, 87 b 32, and see the commen-
tary by Cope ad loc., vol. 2, 125, and the commentary by Grimaldi ad 
loc., p.167. 
28 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 7.15, 92.5: “οἳ µὲν οὖν, δοξόσοφοι 
καλούµενοι, [οἱ] τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὑρηκέναι νοµίζοντες, οὐκ ἔχοντες 
ἀπόδειξιν οὐδεµίαν ἀληθῆ, ἑαυτοὺς οὗτοι ἀπατῶσιν ἀναπεπαῦσθαι 
νοµίζοντες” (ed. Stählin, 65, lines 23-24: “Those, then, who are called 
wise in their own opinions, who think that they have found the truth, but 
have no true demonstration, deceive themselves in thinking that they 
have reached a resting peace” Trans. Wilson, 550). 
29 Clement, ibid. 92.5-6 (ed. Stählin, 65, lines 25-30). 
30 “Atque ex his clarissimorum hominum testimonijs constat Sophista-
rum philosophiam, insinceram, quod initio dicebamus, & inanem fuisse, 
vmbram tantum, laruam & effigiem, non veram germanamque philoso-
phiam” (Cressolles, Book 1, chapter 2, p.113-114). “And it is certain on 
the basis of the testimonies of these most famous men that the philoso-
phy of the sophists was not genuine and, as we said at the beginning, 
empty, merely a shadow, a specter, an image, not true and real philoso-
phy.” (my trans.) 
31 In chapters 4-5 Cressolles discusses a number of classical testimonies 
about the fallacies of the sophists, in chapter 5 he presents a number of 
these, and in chapter 7, the final chapter of book 2, he discusses the 
question who was the inventor of eristic. 
32 In the course of chapters 2 and 3 Cressolles quotes or mentions John 
Chrysostomus, Clement of Alexandria Origenes, Jerome, Augustine, 
Lactantius, Tertullian, Basil. 
33 The text quoted by Cressolles is slightly different from the text found 
in the modern edition of Peter Damian, edited by K. Reindel, letter 28, 
p. 251, line 14. 
34 In De formando studio, for instance, Agricola states that education in 
the humanities should lead to the study of the Bible, because it contains 
the precepts to arrange our lives and leads to salvation (ed. Van der La-
an-Akkerman, 204-206. See also Van der Poel, Rodolphe Agricola. 
Écrits sur la dialectique et l’humanisme.  
35 Agricola may have known the famous passage on the power of words 
in Gorgias’ Praise of Helen, of which several manuscripts existed in 
fifteenth-century Italy; see the history of the manuscript tradition in 
Donadi’s recent Teubner-edition. 
36 De inventione dialectica, Prologus (ed. Mundt, 10) and book 2, chap-
ter 1 (ed. Mundt, 198). 
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Abstract: This article briefly investigates the reasons for 
Aldus Manutius’ inclusion of Alcidamas in his printed 
edition of Isocratean orations in 1513. These reasons have 
not been properly studied by historiography, even though 
the importance of the collection has previously been de-
scribed. By systematically exploring three different levels 
of book production —the epistemic, material, and social 
ones— it seeks to understand how the career of the soph-
ist Alcidamas in Renaissance Venice can be used as a 
useful case-study to represent Greek information man-
agement and printing in terms of network analysis. 
 
Keywords: Aldus Manutius, antiquarianism, network 
theory, Alcidamas, Sophists. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The early decades of the Venetian book industry, it turns 
out, were more dangerous for historians than, say, the 
later Inquisition or Interdict periods, when many authors 
were forced to silence or clandestine dissemination and a 
storm of trials reflected the insecurity of a newly formed 
class of professionals that did not yet know where it stood 
in relation to the rest of elite society. One of my main 
goals here is to turn the tables on our rosy and inspiring 
view of Aldus Manutius’ firm as a springboard of human-
ist critique, suggesting instead to navigate its output of 
Greek learning at once with greater flexibility and more 
discriminating ambiguity. Given his social prominence, 
Aldus Manutius did not need to shield himself through 
protective self-censorship. In some of his titles he was 
prepared to go further than others. There is little, how-
ever, in our evidence that sustains the idea that either he 
or his firm associates were interested in the ‘situational’ 
ethics of the Sophists. The argument for relativism there-
fore rebounds onto us, the readers of these beautifully 
printed books, since we must be more sensitive to how we 
attribute ‘innovation’ within a system of knowledge and 
to what printers chose not to say and how they said it. As 
I argue two sections below, the peril of attending to the 
dialogic imagination via the Sophists creates wider inter-
pretive pitfalls with regards to the vernacular strategies of 
the book market. In essence, the Manutian engagement 
with the Sophists reveals a Janus-like figure—belated and 
pioneering, a fit in the local trade yet totally eccentric. 
The best way to describe this intellectual experience is to 
see the Aldine imprints as a vast cultural delta which, 
largely by accretion,1 collects the results of Greek net-
works of scribes or scholars located in the Eastern Medi-
terranean. 
The present study is the last part of a triptych, whose 
other leaves present separately the impact of sophistic 
techniques on humanist thought from the vantage point of 
early modern drama,2 and, finally, the Erasmian ethics of 
timing.3 Here we look at printers, and specifically pres-
tigious Venetian printers. The first part lays out the basic 
mechanisms of the externalization of knowledge in its 
paratextual and sociopolitical context, and outlines the 
circumstances that made the work of the Sophists a prof-
itable read for the patricians Manutius was addressing. 
The second part takes a step back from the printed ma-
terial and discusses the historiographical conventions that 
have been applied to this field. I focus on prominent clas-
sical scholars because the study of logos, and the soph-
istic rubrics of kairos and timeliness, are not without 
broader significance to the way Italian philology has ev-
aluated the impact of printing technology. The last two 
sections —which are related and respectively speak to the 
social and epistemic layers of the printing network, as it 
has been called4— rehearse in detail how well the soph-
istic awareness of language and style translated into hu-
manist practice, and examine why Attic and agonistic fab-
rications were attached to the figure of Alcidamas. The 
history of the Aldine academy of Greek studies is still 
frequently figured in terms of an emerging, republican 
libertas that emancipates itself from the oppression of 
medieval bureaucracy (and theocracy), though this al-
leged freedom and vindication of liberal studies have 
never been investigated systematically in relation to the 
Greek diaspora of the late fifteenth century. How original 
were Aldus’ interests against the background of the By-
zantine transmission of knowledge? How remarkable and 
lasting his editorial solutions? 
 
 
1. The paratextual framework: advertising the soph-
ists 
 
It is generally assumed, however incorrectly, that the pri-
mary interest of all Sophists—Plato’s most formidable 
enemy in his struggle to control the content of the emer-
ging discipline of ‘philosophy’—was rhetoric.5 As a rule, 
it is further speculated that an unsafe political envi-
ronment, while hindering the prospects of peace and sta-
bility, also works as a nurturing backdrop for the devel-
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opment of eloquence and learning. It was not without suf-
fering severe repercussions that the Venetians adopted the 
second of these axioms, or at least a blend of the two. Al-
dus Manutius’ preface to Volume I of the Greek Orators 
(1513) is the poster-child for this impression. 
 
Wars and hostilities (bella et arma), dear Egnazio [the dedicatee 
would become the chair of Latin after 1520], have always 
brought disaster and destruction to much else but especially to 
education and literature—that is so well established as not to 
need demonstration. But in our own time [. . .] the study of lit-
erature is so vigorous (sic vigent studia) during the wars that it is 
even flourishing (ut etiam floreant)—and more surprisingly in 
Venice in particular, although the city has been troubled by con-
tinuous warfare these many years.6 
 
In terms of publicity, the existence of these geopolitical 
dangers led other city printers to stall or interrupt their 
business activity; the less timid ones might have investi-
gated both personal circumstances and commercial rea-
sons for the inherent shifts of a profession that appeared 
alternatively profitable or risky.7 But only few, among the 
colleagues of Aldus, would have mastered his exceptional 
defense of thematic coverage, which stands out for two 
reasons. 
The first is not about their good state of conservation 
or the diligence of the editorial work, which, however, 
following the firm’s standards, is explicitly remarked 
upon,8 but rather about the fact that the richness and 
quality of the Greek orations are mirrored by their official 
dedicatees as nodes in a network forwarding political de-
bates and elocution across the spectrum of Venice’s state 
diplomacy. Earlier in 1513, Manutius recommends his 
edition of Pindar (augmented by Callimachus, Dionysius 
Periegetes and Lycophron) to Andrea Navagero, whom he 
addresses less as a patrician and scholar than as a civic 
leader needing to familiarize himself with the great 
speeches of antiquity, and possibly to commit them to 
memory, as Demosthenes did. After the dedicatory epistle 
to Giovanni Battista Egnazio, Manutius offers Volume II 
of the Greek Orators to Francesco Fasolo, another promi-
nent lawyer and chancellor of the Venetian senate: the 
letter in this case is unusually long and historically slip-
pery, but insists vehemently on how a canon of Greek 
orators could benefit the Council of Ten. In short, the Al-
dine resurrection of Greek-speaking orators in 1513 
would have been eagerly received in Venice as an em-
blematic collection to benefit the heart of the state, and 
should not be treated as an academic engagement with 
specifically philosophical themes. Likewise, it plausibly 
appears that the Sophists who ended up integrated within 
the printed anthology (I discuss the case of Alcidamas be-
low) had a very limited role to play: give advice to con-
temporary Venetian diplomats who were involved in legal 
or political disputes. In this, Manutius was simply follow-
ing a Quattrocento search for the orator perfectus, and it 
is interesting to reflect on how adamant Aldus Manutius 
was about insisting on the talent of ancient Greek speak-
ers to improve oral and vernacular performances within 
the closed walls of the city’s Senate.9 
The second, less frequently mentioned, reason has to 
do with the ideal ‘bilingualism’ and corresponding di-
vided geography of the printed speeches themselves.10 
The Aldine volumes of 1513, in the entire holding, cover 
a wide range of constitutional debates, from Alexandrian 
Greeks to Ottoman Turks, as Manutius is quick to point 
out in his letter to Fasolo. At least in their projected re-
ception, the Greek Orators are divided in two parts: one 
in Greek, one in Italian—one written, one oral. Presum-
ably, the Greek text appeals as an object of protracted 
study, intended to fortify and charm (as a powerful and 
weighty delivery did to the Athenians of the day). The 
Venetian reenactment, on the other hand, is predicated on 
the ability to move and rouse on the political battle-
ground. In his expansive letter to Fasolo, Aldus Manutius 
convincingly postulates that the reciprocal integration of 
these practices would result into a process of transferring 
Greek distinction into Venetian public life, and that this 
transfer, in turn, would increase the awareness in worthy 
scholars and patricians of living in a two-sided timeframe 
where the glory of the present (“sunt et nostro tempore 
qui magni cognomento appellantur”) feeds directly on the 
glory of the past (“apud veteres”).11 In other words, by 
printing the Sophists, Manutius understood himself pri-
marily as someone filling a constitutional gap and better 
outsourcing an arena of vernacular diplomatic dispatches 
considered crucial for the life of his city. Already as of 
1532, this situation changed. In the Antisophista, written 
by a former pupil of Niccolò Leoniceno and included as 
the last of the medical opuscula prepared by the master 
for the press (Basel, 1532), the discourse moves away 
from state assemblies, their transcripts, and the transfor-
mation of archival protocols for storing and retrieval, and 
is back to the method of humanists like Ermolao Barbaro 
and Pico della Mirandola. The anti-sophistic polemic then 
aims to confute erroneous practices of teaching and re-
search by making full use of Greek commentaries to Aris-
totle, and, as in a striking passage of the Antisophista, by 
recasting Athenaeus’ judgement on Galen.12 
If, returning to Manutius, we accept the notion that the 
1513 edition of the Greek Orators was an instance of re-
cord-keeping of dozens of classical speeches intended to 
inform future ambassadorial negotiations, the promotion 
of Alcidamas as a participant in the collection emerges as 
an excellent choice. In the cluster of testimonies attributed 
to him, Alcidamas is credited with a protracted reflection 
on the comparative advantages of oral and written style. 
In his treatise On Those Who Write Written Speeches, or 
On the Sophists, he suggests that if the goal is ex tempore 
delivery, one should avoid precision (akribeia).13 Preci-
sion was an important attribute of logos for the Sophists: 
it is promoted in Antiphon’s Tetralogies (an author re-
peatedly sampled by Manutius in his prefaces)14 and in 
Thucydides, who writes of it as a historiographical ideal, 
while a more hairsplitting pursuit of akribeia is also 
parodied by Aristophanes (Clouds 740-42).15 Like Alcid-
amas, Aldus, too, takes for granted the greater affinity to 
detail of written compositions, though his preferences and 
the reasons he gives for printing the Greek corpus as it is 
are different and quite original (here I am citing, again, 
from the preface to Volume I of the Greek Orators): 
 
To these orations of Isocrates we have added, on the suggestion 
of our friend Marcus Musurus, Alcidamas’ speech against the 
teachers of rhetoric, Gorgias in praise of Helen, and Aristides in 
praise of Athens. This has been done since Isocrates also had 
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written on the same themes and it seemed worthwhile to give 
students the chance to read different but very expert authors on 
the same subject. We have appended in addition Aristides’ ora-
tion in praise of Rome because of our affection for that city, so 
that where Athens is praised, Rome may be too, since the same 
author wrote with learning and accuracy about the merits of both 
cities (de utriusque urbis laudibus).16 
 
Manutius’ supplemental logic is firmly inscribed within 
the tenets of the Greek Sophists. Alcidamas’ Odysseus, a 
speech which presents the prosecution’s case, is a later 
response to Gorgias’ work in defense of Palamedes.17 
What if a printer sets up pairs of logoi, on a design in-
spired by one of his trusted collaborators (Musurus): the 
plan does increase the collection’s potential for reading 
and studying, but it does not translate, as desired, into 
public performance, apart from enlarging a basis for intel-
lectual communication. In sum, Alcidamas’ own ambiva-
lence for self-presentation in writing and alternative blue-
print for debates and contests affects the printed edition of 
1513 in surprising ways. This reduction of sophistic tech-
niques as editorial aids for the printing atelier is impres-
sive. In classical antiquity, many speeches were directly 
or indirectly paired to respond to one another (the charac-
terization of Athens by the Corinthians in Thucydides 
1.71, e.g., and by Pericles in 2.36-46, or the debate be-
tween Mardonius and Aristobanus in Herodotus 7.9-10). 
But the unquestionable influence of the larger Pro-
tagorean theory of opposed logoi to be used as an intellec-
tual tool of information management is a significant inno-
vation.18 
Still, nothing in Manutius’ phrasing suggests that he 
considered a weaker argument like something that could 
emerge as the just one, but only that thoughtful, if subjec-
tive, pairing has the constructive result of deepening the 
reader’s understanding of important affairs of causation or 
responsibility. We might try to bring out details to support 
specific conclusions, but the details themselves would 
remain fuzzy. It is unclear, for example, if it was suffi-
cient for the aspiring sophist working in contemporary 
Venice—a writer-for-money, say, or even higher profiles 
such as Bembo and Aretino—to follow the footsteps and 
rhetorical templates of their Hellenic predecessors or if 
one was explicitly required to write panegyrics;19 whether 
members of the “Second Sophistic” movement were ever 
seen as off-limits, mere successors, or, by contrast, as 
pivotal;20 and if such rules were absolute or subject to ex-
ceptions. On the one hand, the Aldine preface to Egnazio 
of 1513 appears to be consistent with both the semantics 
and epistemology of sophistic ideas on the best reasoning: 
knowing how to construct arguments teaches how to plan 
and bind books. Yet, the underlying attention to Isocrates, 
on the other, flattens the Sophists as historical actors on 
their own right onto the profession of ‘logographer’, or 
speech-writer, confining them to the forensic business. In 
fact, we are meant to understand that the 1513 anthology 
in its entirety ultimately appealed to readers of the time as 
an Isocrates plus appendices and, by analogy, to perceive 
that adjacent printing projects worked as a Pindar with 
appendices or a Demosthenes’ “best ten” as well. 
Some among the earliest ‘surviving fragments’ of the 
Sophists in Greek to reappear in sixteenth-century Venice 
were associated with the—mainly commercial—activity 
of the Aldine family. Anybody familiar with the transmis-
sion of a corpus in the early modern period knows that 
when talking about canonization we refer to the periodi-
cal assembling of handwritten manuscripts that circulated 
in several different versions across the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, as well as across the Most Serene Republic’s politi-
cal boundaries, and that were gathered in the city’s vari-
ous mouseia for the benefit of state patrons or private col-
lectors.21 
In a relatively short time span several decisions were 
taken concerning the selection, preservation, and binding 
together of these fragments. The difficulty of teasing out 
all the implications of this process in the case of Aldus 
Manutius comes from our historiography which amounts 
to an almost full-scale narrative of celebration,22 and 
which is daring-to-heroic when it comes to assessing the 
printer’s output in Greek. The present study argues that 
these (implicit) tones of admiration are not always reli-
able. Testing them against the extant sophistic evidence, 
we find that they need to be moderated. Prima facie evi-
dence for caution is provided by none other than 
Manutius: he assembled the Greek Orators as archives of 
speech for the Venetian statesman, and his vivid descrip-
tion of the dangers facing the polity in his prefatory letters 
further testifies that his main preoccupation was republi-
can management, not humanist revival. Navagero and 
Fasolo too might have done exactly what is alleged by the 
printer to have been their first civic duty. We should 
soften our rules: what printers felt that they could publish 
safely varied by circumstance, and often those who were 
willing to take greater risks were not them, but their staff, 
be them the Paduan professors who collaborated with the 
press, the agents who hunted for lesser-known manu-
scripts, or the copyists who transcribed them. We do not 
possess evidence that Manutius or members of his staff 
reacted one way or another to Plato’s malevolent cam-
paign against the Sophists; they saw no lack of continuity 
between Plato, Isocrates, and the promise to fulfill a com-
petent edition of these works within a reasonable amount 
of time. As far as the rediscovery of a lost canon is con-
cerned, the brave in this tale were dislocated brokers and 
translators fleeing from the collapse of their empire, old 
Byzantine scribes who turned to the West for help and 
employment—by sixteenth-century, Venetian standards, 
the really old. 
 
 
2. The methodological framework: antiquarian stud-
ies, Italian philology, vernacular strategies 
 
If we apply a “bottom up” approach to the elusive ques-
tion of agency within the printing house, then the concep-
tion of the 1513 volume of Greek Orators is first and 
foremost the fruit of professor Musurus, although he did 
not necessarily serve as a traditional curator or editor of 
the final text. What gave him a special role was rather a 
sense of allegiance or familiarity with the antiquarians 
and collectors of his day. Musurus was a historical figure 
that could easily be constructed as the intellectual 
counterpart of those who assembled a great library of 
Greek texts—namely, Cardinal Bessarion, Domenico 
Grimani, and the aforementioned Niccolò Leoniceno.23 
How vast was the shadow of the Paduan, when he was 
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credited by Manutius for his editorial invention in 1513? 
And did Manutius intend to summarily evoke a whole 
underground of erudite commentary and antiquarian pur-
suits spreading alongside his printed editions? Beyond 
Momigliano’s seminal research on the figure of the anti-
quarian,24 the answer to these questions takes us a great 
deal deeper into the philological resources and strategies 
used in this field of studies. 
In his 1976 study on early modern astrology, entitled 
The Zodiac of Life, Eugenio Garin recycled a famous dic-
tum by Aby Warburg, whose passion for witty, aphoris-
matic expressions was well-known in turn-of-the-century 
Hamburg. The saying states that it is not always easy to 
see where Athens ends and where Alexandria begins. 
Warburg’s chiastic, miniaturized tale of two cities was at 
once a symbol of his personal struggle with nervous ex-
haustion and a symptom of the perils of adapting eth-
nography, which he helped escorting to life, to the equally 
perilous standards of Weimar Germany.25 In Garin’s 
hands, all this turned into a commentary on the academic 
classification of knowledge in late fifteenth-century Italy. 
Warburg’s Athens, in Garin’s retelling, refers to astrolo-
gia quadrivialis, or the mathematical side of the astro-
nomical lore, whereas the idea of Alexandria is stretched 
to subsume with the so-called astrologia iudiciaria, 
which has to do with divination.26 What remains persis-
tent in this transformation is the tone of elegiac farewell 
to a now-submerged, yet once-prominent world of anti-
quarian erudition that, in Warburg’s case, can be profit-
ably identified with the last generation of art dealers and 
connoisseurs from imperial Germany—a world of learned 
Jewish bankers that succumbs to a prophetic frenzy. For 
Garin, though, Alexandrian antiquarianism is simply em-
bodied by Bessarion’s collection. Is it right to say, then, 
that for Garin it was the homo divinans who would have 
been interested in the Sophists? Or that renewed con-
sideration for their corpus was, in all effects, an Alexan-
drian tale—a story of antiquarians? 
In sixteenth century Venice, Warburghian omen-
mindedness happens to be one factor in a larger mobility 
of labor. The printer, “divining” as Aldus Manutius did in 
his double duty as artisan and philological castigator, is 
sharing his social space (and timeliness) with the oarsmen 
who shuttled across the eastern Mediterranean. This car-
ries enormous consequences for everyone who should try 
to reconstruct the Aldine enterprise not as a wonder-
making template of heroic scholarship, but instead to 
place it squarely within the Venetian culture of expertise. 
If, to paraphrase a receptive reader of Renaissance para-
dox, sophistic doxa is a powerful adversary, yielding only 
to an accomplished scholar,27 the privileged position that 
the Italian school of history of philosophy achieved in ex-
posing the timely and untimely nature of sophistic rhet-
oric should give us pause. Garin himself was one of the 
first to observe how a powerful vein of Quattrocento dia-
logues reshaped simple exercises in antithesis to a more 
comprehensive discourse in which the respective strength 
and weakness of one’s argument are weighed against 
themselves. And while Garin’s insights have been re-
cently qualified,28 the characterization of a central seg-
ment of dialogic theory in Renaissance Italy from the van-
tage point of sophistic antagonism still awaits a sustained 
treatment. Such treatment, I submit, should embrace the 
timeliness of its own topic, maintaining that humanist in-
terests in antilogic were influenced by the brokering func-
tion of Byzantine intellectuals who forcibly relocated in 
Venetian Crete or other locals within the Aegean system 
after the fall of Constantinopolis, and, more in general, by 
the Hellenism cultivated at Byzantium.29 In the end, all 
these oppositions run in parallel: atticism and antagonism, 
Byzantium and Venice, Athens and Alexandria, or, to 
come back to Garin, techne and taxis. Such indistinction 
marks a profound, Braudelian longue durée in the recep-
tion of the Greek sophists in the Venetian republic. 
A rivalry between Athenian vs. Alexandrian cultural 
spaces as a signpost for a ‘purist’ philology of the soph-
ists was cultivated by two other Italian scholars: Augusto 
Rostagni and Mario Untersteiner. Rostagni made of kai-
ros a big business,30 and handed to scholars of the Renais-
sance his consideration of Gorgianic apateia from both a 
magic and medical point of view. Rostagni’s interest is so 
striking that we may as well ask why later critics neg-
lected to pay attention to the Aristotelian distinctions he 
applied to the sophists. In Aristotle’s rhetoric Rostagni 
discovered a difference between speaking πρὸς τὰ 
πράγματα and πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροάτας, which is to say, 
that a logos may be considered in two ways—in relation 
to the audience, and in relation to its subject matter. 
Theophrastus was the first to articulate this distinction, 
but Aristotle himself had this in mind in passages such as 
Rhetoric III:1 (1404a11). Attending to Rostagni’s strategy 
is important. He was reacting to the Hegelian tendencies 
of German historians of philosophy, which had already 
strengthened their hold on the pre-Socratics; within this 
tradition, the death of Socrates, quite arbitrarily, had been 
used as a convenient cut-off point in the case of the Soph-
ists, which is detrimental to our understanding of the 
whole intellectual context of the movement. Rostagni in-
stead looked at Aristotle to offer comments on the writ-
ten/spoken tension, which has become the basis for a styl-
istic analysis of prose in both Gorgias and Alcidamas—
the two authors appended to the Greek Orators by 
Manutius in 1513. 
It is important to recognize at least two points that 
benefited from Rostagni’s analysis. First, the contribution 
of sources about the Sophists should be carried through—
and beyond—Aristotle, and not treated as an exclusively 
fifth-century phenomenon; second, this extended frame-
work can function as a neat counterpoint to an increas-
ingly bookish view of the Hellenistic age. One of the ad-
vantages of bringing Peripatetic philosophy into our ac-
count of the First Sophistic is that it illustrates more 
clearly elements that in our scant evidence we are allowed 
to see through a murky glass in fifth-century controver-
sies. Moreover, it is clear from the editorial plans and the 
prefatory materials surrounding it that Aldus Manutius 
organized his edition of the Aristotelian corpus with a 
keen eye not only to the scholia and lexicographical aids 
that came from Byzantium, but also to Greek commen-
taries; for example, he promoted Alexander of Aphro-
disias’ work (presumably on another suggestion made by 
Musurus) right besides what Aristotle himself had said on 
meteorology.31 
As for Untersteiner, his novelty lies in the method-
ological approach to philosophical genre, rather than in 
the edition of sophistic fragments, appeared in Florence 
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throughout the 1960s.32 Untersteiner’s selection respects 
more or less the inclusion criteria already defended by 
Diels and Kranz. Since the Diels-Kranz collection treats 
the Sophists essentially as a sort of prelude to Plato, this 
picture of intellectual life remains highly misleading.33 
Neither Untersteiner nor Rostagni, however, had an im-
pact on studies of Aldus Manutius comparable to Carlo 
Dionisotti, whose account is nearly ubiquitous.34 What 
deserves emphasis is how, in Dionisotti’s treatment, the 
developments of literary trends or fashions are locked in 
conspicuously national variants, allegedly originating 
from the Venetian advocacy, through print, of the ver-
nacular against Latin. To put it briefly, what we see here 
is the recasting of an older polemic in Norden’s Antike 
Kunstprosa, which put the origins of Atticism ca. 200 BC 
in a wish to avoid crediting the Romans with the move-
ment, and which exhibits a tendency to interpret the 
whole history of style as a righteous battle against bom-
bastic Asianism. If Atticism had been originated only by 
Greeks, it is hard to imagine that Cicero would have 
missed an opportunity to ridicule it in Brutus or Orator as 
one of those fanciful and impractical Greek notions—just 
as fanciful and impractical, in fact, as our current devalu-
ation of the term Byzantine as a short-hand for dull bu-
reaucracy that ignores the creative role of fifteenth-
century Greek intellectuals in the formation of a sophistic 
canon. 
It remains to be seen how useful it really is to il-
lustrate the Aldine academy in Venice through Dionisotti, 
since his almost exclusive interest in the propulsive role 
played by vernacular letters. In his 1513 letter to Fasolo, 
Manutius invokes the exemplum of Janus Lascaris, who 
was sent by Lorenzo de’ Medici to the Peloponnesian ar-
chives with a list of rare desiderata.35 This choice, it 
seems to me, illuminates two aspects of his approach. 
First, it points to a larger assimilation of Greek rhetoric 
and methodology (to which I return at the end of the next 
section). Second, it expresses the view that entrepreneu-
rial agency within a printing network must be brought 
back to the ‘minor’ historical actors who worked before 
an editio princeps was assembled and not necessarily with 
printing in mind. It is to this level of concerns that I now 
turn. 
 
 
3. The social framework: versions of Greek paideia 
 
Two brief examples of scholarly engagement with the 
Sophists might help identifying the social response to 
them within the politics of knowledge of sixteenth-
century Venice, and the chronology of such response. The 
first has to do with the short-lived experience of the so-
called Venetian Academy, between 1557 and 1561. This 
academy was founded by the young patrician Federico 
Badoer in February 1557, after a three-year mission as 
ambassador at the imperial court of Spain and Germany. 
Primarily, it was a publishing venture that turned out to be 
unsuccessful. Its goal was to enhance the prestige of the 
Republic of Venice, following the blueprint of the Floren-
tine Academy, which to some extent functioned as a cul-
tural ministry for duke Cosimo I. Its fate became inter-
woven with that of the prestigious Aldine press, at the 
time run by Paolo Manuzio, the third son of Aldus’s mar-
riage with Maria Torresano. Rather mysteriously, by 1559 
Manuzio stopped printing for Badoer, and the idea of 
opening their own bookstore did not help either. The pub-
lishing program of the Academy, however, was presented 
to the public—namely, the international public of the 
great German book fairs of Leipzig and Frankfurt—
through the Somma delle opere, a 32-leaved folio listing 
631 works divided in their respective categories. It is im-
possible to tell to what extent the academy would have 
stuck to this program: there are only two octavos, 67% of 
the total are quartos, the rest are folios. The combination 
of book size and the beauty of the Aldine fonts suggest 
that, in Badoer’s intentions, these were books meant to be 
noticed. 
In terms of intellectual history, while canon and civil 
law alone represent almost half of the total, one finds a 
suggestive reference to the Sophists in no. 203 of the list, 
which planned a monograph on those authors condemned 
by Aristotle, which, as the academy felt, needed a com-
prehensive rehabilitation. It might seem surprising to find 
a dissertation on the pre-Socratics in the section on Phys-
ics. But precisely in that sector, Aristotelianism was at its 
most malleable.36 In short, although the academy’s pro-
jected commentary on the pre-Socratics was isolated, it 
puts pressure on Badoer’s opinions, expressed in a letter 
to Andrea Lippomano, that Greek learning was not at all 
necessary to a statesman. And more pressure comes from 
the lending registers at San Marco, where Badoer is cited, 
in January 1545, for the borrowing of the Aethiopica of 
Heliodorus, a Greek manuscript bequeathed by cardinal 
Bessarion to the Marciana. The Venetian Academy has 
been characterized by Lina Bolzoni as an institution that 
simply failed to conform to the ideal promotion of Italian 
carried out by the lines of Bembo and Speroni, but it has 
also been described by Shanti Graheli as strongly aligned 
to Latin as the universal language.37 The Sophists might 
indicate that, contrary to expectations, Aldus’ overall atti-
tude on Greek culture, as exemplified by the Greek Ora-
tors of 1513, had not faded entirely. 
Admittedly, my first example presented here is only a 
late and tantalizing instance of Venetian attention to the 
Greek Sophists, but it is useful as part of a general argu-
ment concerning the hegemony of philosophical lan-
guages. With my second, much earlier and more doc-
umented example, I intend to pave the way for a discus-
sion of how the renewed prestige of the Sophists is vir-
tually indistinguishable from a celebratory argument 
about the ancestral primacy of Athens, and therefore from 
the prestige of Attic itself. 
The circumstances of such unique lawsuit are offered 
by a passage of the treatise Misopogon by the emperor 
Julian. Writing in Antioch in 363 AD, before he engaged 
in the war with the Parthians in which he would be mor-
tally wounded, Julian gives a long survey of the training 
which he received from his teacher, the eunuch Mar-
donius and highly praises the man’s pedagogical method, 
seemingly enjoying the contrast between his maxims and 
the supercultivated paideia of Antioch, which inspired 
Peter Brown his nexus of power and persuasion.38 One of 
the city residents wonders if it might be possible for the 
emperor to leave off his bad habits and learn better ways 
(μεταμαθεῖν). To this fictitious question Julian replies: 
No, that is impossible for Ἒθος, φασί, δευτέρη φύσις 
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(“habit, they say, is second nature)”. What interests me in 
this response is, in part, its paremiographical success,39 
but especially the fact that, while Julian quotes the sen-
tence in the Ionic dialect, the Marcianus Graecus 251—
which belongs to the fifteenth century and was probably 
produced in the orbit of Bessarion—replaces the Ionic 
form of δευτέρη by the Attic one. 
As we know, when working with Greek fragments, 
dialects give valuable hints to a possible source and often 
narrow the circle of its potential authors. Of the Greek 
philosophers, Democritus is most credible in mixing 
Julian’s ethical terms of discussions: his Fragment 33 (in 
the Diels-Kranz collection) comes very close in juxtapos-
ing habit and training. Indeed, when Diels published the 
third edition of the fragments in 1912 he translated the 
last part of it in a very significant manner; the idea of 
changing one’s nature becomes “eine zweite Natur,” by 
which Diels introduced—quite involuntarily, perhaps—
just what we read in Julian’s treatise. In conclusion, the 
attribute “zweite,” or “second” has no equivalent in De-
mocritus’ Greek text, but it is a conjecture that gives am-
munition to the cause of Attic purism.40 If in the world of 
the Sophists awareness of language closely related to 
awareness of style itself, then a scholar might succeed in 
one historical reconstruction in the same way a speaker 
captured his audience, simply by sprinkling a few Attic 
flosculi in an otherwise indifferent literary texture.41 
When Norden collected quotations of Sophists in 
Philostratus, his goal was to show that the florid euphu-
ism cultivated by Gorgias and his followers could be sim-
ultaneously flaunted or concealed. It should be em-
phasized that Manutius’ own position as the editor of the 
Greek Orators is not very different: at one extreme, every 
sophistic revival is an induction to sheer fabrication. For 
instance, the fortunes of the flamboyant panegyrist (but 
hypochondriac intellectual) Aelius Aristides are better 
understood if we evaluate the task of writing the language 
he was so keen to praise; even in this most conspicuously 
purist writer—whom Philostratus hails as τεχνικώτατος 
(‘most skillful’)—koine forms creep in syntax, affecta-
tion, and lexical preferences. Readers of the Manutian ap-
pendices might not have been easily swayed by the al-
leged fondness for Rome as a justification for Aristides’ 
praise. But they would have followed with interest an ar-
gument based on the prestige of a linguistically homoge-
nous region as a cultural tradition.42 For this, as Aldus 
maintains, is what the Venetian man of state should have 
been attuned to: discover by comparison, among the 
printed objects offered by the printers, what could im-
prove the elegance and trustworthiness of a new genera-
tion of orators and public speakers. 
Two consequences might be drawn here. First, the ap-
preciation for the sophists went hand in hand with an in-
dustry for grammarians and lexicographers, and this ex-
plains why the Aldine press decided to tackle Gorgias and 
Alcidamas in concurrence with a series of key instru-
ments such as, in ascending order of strictness, the Byzan-
tine Souda, Pollux’s Onomasticon, and Harpocration’s 
commentary to the Attic orators (which was already 
hunted for by Lascaris as a particularly prized possession 
in the 1490s). Second, not only did linguistic ability set 
the sophists above the throng of their admirers: the ability 
to think in language intelligible to Pericles, as Graham 
Anderson has written, gave them a lifeline to their own 
past, as well.43 The extent to which Renaissance human-
ists were able to see through this scheme could still be 
pressed to higher scholarly results. As a careful printer, 
Manutius fought against inaccuracies and errors, and 
alongside overwhelming pressure of business.44 It must be 
taken into account that the ‘Atticism’ of the Sophists re-
assembled in 1513 was not coincidental, and that it pro-
vided an important approximation of what a school of 
thought and its linguistic conventions looked like. In the 
current work of classical philologists, who must assess the 
morphology and genealogy of individual manuscripts, 
Attic language can be taken as reproducing more or less 
accurately the style of a lost archetype. Yet, Manutius had 
reasons to proceed otherwise. While his entourage en-
sured him about the reliability of discrete emendations, it 
was his decision to defend a conflation of sophists and 
orators as something entirely different from a mere acci-
dent of textual transmission. In a manner of speaking, the 
social response to the Greek Orators was determined by a 
hypercorrection on behalf of the printer himself. 
 
 
4. The epistemic framework: the controversial in-
tegrity of Alcidamas 
 
Readers of the Aldine collection knew that they possessed 
the genuine text of ‘real’ Attic orators, by way of seren-
dipitous scribal discoveries detailed in the paratextual ma-
terials; failing that, they would have been content to enjoy 
a piece of ‘designer Attic’ prose based on them, which is 
exactly what Manutius is encouraging the young Venetian 
lawyers to do. Questions of authenticity are often unspec-
tacular and almost certainly more familiar to historians of 
the fifth century BC or to scholars of the Second Soph-
istic than to those working on sixteenth-century Venice. 
Only by simultaneously accounting for the 1513 Alcid-
amas as both a virtuoso display of humanist (and edi-
torial) integrity and a piece of ersatz Attic recreation, one 
could properly see why being virtually indistinguishable 
from the genuine article was a positive feature. Lucian 
described the neighboring domains of fraud and philology 
in a passage of his Pseudologist which narrates the for-
ging of a manual by Tisias, the alleged founder of Greek 
rhetoric, and then the gulling of a collector who is forced 
into buying it at an exorbitant price. Tisias was a Syracu-
san. Thus imperial collectors in Byzantium sought ac-
counts and proofs in Doric dialect. In this way, Lucian’s 
accusation testifies to a demand for such a prized relic 
that would continue well into the Renaissance, and to the 
incentives of producing, at some juncture, a lucrative sub-
stitute for irretrievable titles. Sophistic inventiveness 
achieved a proverbial status, but hardly with more fitting 
results than in Aldus’ Venice. 
Naturally, speaking of integrity, a first task for stu-
dents of the Sophists is to determine the relation between 
printed and scribal copies. The Alcidamas edited by 
Manutius has little independent value from the manu-
scripts it depends on—namely, copies of two identifiably 
older archetypes, the MS 88 in Heidelberg and Burney 95 
in the British Library. Even though scholars disagree on 
the stemmatic autonomy of these Venetian copies, they all 
bear the name of Alcidamas as the author of the surviving 
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fragments. Among these is a short speech called Odysseus 
against the Treachery of Palamedes, which recalls a very 
similar speech under the name of Gorgias in defense of 
Palamedes, but which is perhaps more directly compa-
rable to the speeches attributed to Antisthenes for Ajax 
and Odysseus when claiming the armor of Achilles. 
Either way, elaborating a prosecution speech against an 
old enemy of Odysseus based on the plotting of Greek 
myth fits neatly with the cultural context of Alcidamas’ 
generation and the generation of his teachers. Inciden-
tally, this chronological dimension is lost on the Aldine 
imprint, which banks on sophistic rhetoric as much as on 
mythological importance. There are no ancient allusions 
to the work, except Plato’s reference, in Phaedrus 261, to 
an “Eleatic Palamedes,” identified by Quintilian (or by an 
exegetical tradition reaching the Spaniard) with Alcid-
amas. 
Quintilian might have been right about the identifica-
tion and wrong about the speech being a forgery; as for 
Plato, it is suggestive to think that by inventing a nick-
name for the sophist, he was also forced to imagine the 
speech that Alcidamas could have written on Palamedes. 
In fact, paragraph 22 of Alcidamas’s Odysseus concerns 
the deceiving of the youth and institutes a clear parallel 
between Socrates before his death and Palamedes—a 
suggestion briefly reprised by Diogenes Laertius. In 2008, 
Neil O’Sullivan, the world’s leading scholar on Alcid-
amas, asked himself if the anonymous speech could have 
been attached at a later time to Gorgias’s pupil, and 
moved his examination from historic to linguistic back-
ground. Basing his conclusions on the presence of post-
classical clauses that have no business at all in a text of 
the classical era introduced by the particles ἴνα or ὄπως, 
but that are otherwise documented in papyri of the Ptol-
emaic era, O’Sullivan persuasively demonstrated that the 
speech could not have been written by Alcidamas and 
cannot be earlier than the first century BC.45 
O’Sullivan’s demonstration of forgery is important in 
itself, for the light it sheds on Manutius’ intentions, and 
for displaying the overwhelming preference for prose by 
which the sophists were commonly understood. Before 
Aldus, the promotion of the book as the necessary me-
dium for the permanent recording of their thought was 
crucial. On the one hand, at the heart of the First Sophistic 
lies a controversy between written and spoken perform-
ance, or, as Aristotle is prepared to acknowledge in the 
third book of his Rhetoric, between written and ‘competi-
tive’ style—and Aristotle’s case is remarkable, as I have 
mentioned earlier, because the sophists, having been re-
jected, now provide the cornerstone of the philosopher’s 
analysis of rhetorical prose. In that way, along with Gor-
gias, Alcidamas is dismissed in the early chapters of Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric, only to be reintroduced as an arbiter of 
Hellenistic fondness for books—against his better will as 
a great champion of extemporaneous speech, more con-
cerned with emotional impact than with conveying the 
truth. On the other hand, the unambiguous self-
presentation of writers in the larger sophistic orbit like 
Euripides as intensely bookish is contradicted by the criti-
cism heaped upon him by Aristophanes: not only one of 
the very few certain sources for the critical language of 
Aristophanes’ Frogs is Gorgias himself, but in the 
Knights (347-50) the grandiloquent Cleon abuses a rival 
for having to stay up at night, drinking water and prepar-
ing his speech. Furthermore, Aristophanes’ preoccupa-
tions resonate with a fragment of another discourse by 
Alcidamas, On the Sophists, which was included in the 
Manutian volumes and in which Alcidamas rejects 
Prodicus’ reliance on the skills of the written word. 
The Sophists flourished in cities littered with book-
sellers and stalls, while Alcidamas remains a paradoxical 
witness of that larger trend. In the fragments attributed to 
him Alcidamas defends the spoken word and insists that 
he was unhappy with ineffective or harmful persuasion 
(showing in this a strong affinity with Antisthenes), but 
every time he was anthologized, either in manuscript or in 
print, a decision was made to emphasize within the col-
lection the forensic background of his work. Manutius is 
no exception: no matter how Alcidamas wanted his logoi 
to be understood as tools for thinking, they were brought 
back to the courthouse to provide a feasible intellectual 
counterpart to Gorgias and increase the firm’s tally of 
available Attic orators. 
The talent of Marcus Musurus aside, by the 1510s the 
best traces of Alcidamas’ career in fifteenth-century 
manuscripts had already migrated from the Medicean 
court in the 1490s to the orbit of Venetian bibliophiles 
such as Grimani and Bessarion.46 Still, the Manutian con-
struction of the Greek Orators was not without frustra-
tion. The primary witness of Alcidamas is the Marcianus 
gr. VIII.1, which also has a central role in the transmis-
sion of Lysias47 and can be traced to the scriptorium of 
Cardinal Bessarion. Bessarion’s copy put together Lysias, 
Gorgias in praise of Helen, the two speeches of Alcid-
amas—that is, Odysseus and On the Sophists—followed 
by two orations of Antisthenes and a small anthology of 
Pythagorean writings. According to Lotte Labowsky, who 
worked on the inventories of Bessarion’s library, the 
Cardinal considered this copy as part of his collection of 
history and rhetoric, and stored it between Libanius and 
Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistae.48 There would be many 
considerations to offer at this juncture, ranging from the 
importance of genre to Bessarion’s information manage-
ment, but the following statements are a feasible, conclu-
sive assessment of how the epistemic production of the 
Greek Orators differs from the scribal models it depends 
on. 
Once again, the Medicean “Attic” tradition—to which 
the work of the sophists Alcidamas and Antisthenes was 
appended—was no longer in Florence but in the Venetian 
bibliophile market (with or without the intervention of 
personnel with open Strozzi sympathies). If one compares 
these manuscript testimonies in their entirety—meaning, 
form and construction, but also the highly complementary 
nature of their content—with the 1513 edition of 
Manutius, the result is that only the Quattrocento set is 
unified, whereas the Aldine Orators are fractured in two 
volumes, first omitting Gorgias’ Helen and Alcidamas’ 
Odysseus, despite their established scribal warranty, and 
then reinserting them in Volume II, forcibly laboring to 
justify this belated intervention in order to restore their 
original, parallel position besides the Palamedes. One 
might speculate that Musurus had some part in rectifying 
Alcidamas’ omission, but in any event details are incon-
clusive. By including Odysseus Manutius might have ad-
mitted an interloper (more or less like Diels with Critias), 
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although, to his credit, no evidence of its non-Sophistic 
status was available at the time. By the same token, his 
decision to treat the sophists as orators rather than phi-
losophers was not only intensely practical but also sanc-
tioned by the manuscript tradition of these works. 
In fact, by trying to set up Gorgias and Alcidamas as 
the two sides of an identical demonstration, Aldus 
Manutius was only responding—with some perplexing 
delay and anxiety on his part—to the advances of the Cre-
tan copyists and the way they organized the topic. It was 
from Crete, then, that sophistic antagonism brought a 
“supplementary” logic to printing or library pursuits, ef-
fectively functioning as a meta-rhetorical tradition. If we 
see the concomitant revitalization of display oratory —
instigated in equal measure by the First and the Second 
Sophistic— as a discipline of knowledge, rather than a 
recasting of the classical dichotomy between performative 
and text-centered practices, the rewards are both episte-
mological and spatial. Epistemological —because a sig-
nificant portion of the intellectual persona is now taken by 
a public performance of its work. And spatial— because 
the cultural backdrop of the Eastern Mediterranean is now 
forefronted and demonstrated to be a crucial factor in the 
Venetian book trade. To the extent that commercial char-
ters were more stable than the fickle political allegiances 
of the city, this segment of sophistic rediscovery (to say 
nothing of the Aldine academy as a whole) could be re-
written as a sea-to-inland narrative. After all, if ships 
change the shore, to borrow a formulation from social 
network analysis, why not Greek books? 
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Notes 
 
1 This approach takes the environmentalist view that for Vene-
tian entrepreneurs the sea is normal and the land is the fringe. 
The ‘return’ of the Sophists was endemic to the books and ideas 
exchanged through coastal seafaring and the role of funnel pla-
yed by locales such as Crete or Cyprus. In this way, my sugge-
stion of grounding the study of Venetian book trading on a new 
‘archaeology of the sea’ (see Malkin) responds to Politian’s de-
sire for the humanist to ‘swim without support’ (Moss, 79). 
2 Gulizia 2015. 
3 Gulizia 2017. 
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 4 See Renn et al. 
5 For the sophist as a teacher of rhetoric, see Ostwald and 
Lynch. 
6 I cite from the recent translation of Wilson, 223. 
7 Cf. Baten and van Zanden, and Buringh and van Zanden. 
8 “[O]rationes diligentius recognitas” (Wilson, 222). 
9 On the tradition of republican deliberative debates see Cox. 
10 Here and in what immediately follows I profited from Moli-
no’s discussion of a separation of two media across a linguistic 
divide—avviso and Zeitung. 
11 Wilson, 224. 
12 “Aut saltem scirent, quale sit de hoc medico Athenaei iudi-
cium, qui in quodam convivio ad quod multi viri docti convene-
rant, ait inter caeteros adfuisse Galenum Pergamenum medicum, 
qui neminem habuerat usque ad suae aetatis tempora philoso-
phandi scientia, vel dicendi facultate superiorem” (Nicolai Leo-
niceni Opuscula, Basel 1532, c. 147r). 
13 Gagarin, 19-21. 
14 Cf., e.g., Manutius’ preface to the Greek Rhetoricians in 1508 
(Wilson, 195-197). 
15 Lexicon Historiographicum, vol. I, pp. 36-66. 
16 Wilson, 225. 
17 Incidentally, nothing in Gorgias’ exercise—which is based on 
repeated eikos arguments—sustains Plato’s assertion that the 
Sophists saw that “probabilities should be more honored than 
truths” (Phaedrus 267a). 
18 On Manutius promise of indexing (“Quibus est animus facere 
indicem eorum omnium, quae scitu digna in iis ispsis habentur 
commentariis,” Wilson, 220), see Cevolini. 
19 As Cicero reports (Brutus 12.47), Gorgias thought an orator 
should “amplify a subject with praise.” 
20 It is one thing to see the Second Sophistic as an intellectual 
aftermath, quite another to construct a taste based on figures 
such as Philostratus and Galen, and their propensity to adversa-
rial disputation; see Mattern. 
21 Cf. the classic study of Irigoin. 
22 It does not help that most volumes have been commissioned 
for anniversary or with the purpose of working out catalogues of 
printed titles; see, most recently, Plebani. 
23 See at least Mugnai Carrara and Jackson. 
24 Miller. 
25 Levine. 
26 Lehoux, 21-46. 
27MacPhail. 
28 Bausi. 
29 Cf. Naser Eslami, Gaul, and Kaldellis. 
30 Rostagni. 
31 Cf. Kotwick. 
32 Untersteiner. 
33 Many scholars who followed Untersteiner’s legacy, however, 
including Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, Andrea Capra, and Anna De 
Pace, have embraced Renaissance humanists as the heirs and 
successors of the sophists; see for all De Pace. 
34 See Dionisotti and Cambiano. 
35 Speake. 
36 Cf. Martin. 
37 See Bolzoni and Graheli. 
38 Brown. 
39 The editors of the 1964 Liddell-Scott-Jones lexicon, induced 
by the parenthetical φασί, called it a proverb. 
40 Lenz. 
41In “A Professor of Public Speaking,” Lucian described this 
situation, observing a sophist attaining great success by calling 
sunbathing ‘insolation’, dawn ‘crepuscule’, and scraping down 
‘destrigillation’. 
42 Judging from the ‘best and purest’ (“candidissimum”) in Wil-
son, 220. 
43 Anderson, 100. 
44 Cf. Wilson, 161. 
45 O’Sullivan. 
 
 
46 In this respect, Aldus’ strategy is similar to the one he used 
for Galen with regards to the private collection of the humanist-
doctor Leoniceno, with the difference that Leoniceno was per-
sonally much more reluctant than Musurus to lend his services 
and only marginally associated with the press; see Perilli. 
47 The MS is constructed in parchment, in regular quinions, and 
its scribe has been identified with the Cretan copyist Aristobulus 
Apostolius. Several apographs have been taken from this Cretan 
antigraph, all containing an anthology of Lysias’ orations along 
with Gorgias, Alcidamas, and various other epistles. 
48 The exact same content has been described in Vat. lat. 3960, a 
sixteenth-century inventory of Domenico Grimani’s library at 
the time in which it was transferred, by deed, to the convent of 
S. Anthony in Venice. 
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From Wit to Shit: Notes for an “Emotional” Lexicon of 
Sophistry during the Renaissance  
 
Jorge Ledo 
 
Abstract: From the late fourteenth century to the early 
sixteenth century, authors of neo-Latin literature devel-
oped an ever-increasing catalogue of disparaging terms 
aimed at their perceived rivals, the ancient and contempo-
rary sophists. This extensive vocabulary was deployed 
against the sophists’ perceived attempts to confuse their 
listeners, misguide their interlocutors, and corrupt classi-
cal learning. This vocabulary ranged from philosophical 
jargon, to straightforward critiques, to directly derogatory 
sobriquets. In these pages, I seek to tease out the origin, 
evolution, and adscription of these terms. In addition, I 
argue that the study of this lexicon can shed light on the 
role played by sophistries in the culture of disputation, 
conversation, and intellectual exchange during the Re-
naissance. Finally, I will clarify some issues related to the 
evolution of Latin during the sixteenth century.  
 
Keywords: history of communication, history of educa-
tion, history of derogatory language, humanist latin, hu-
manist-scholastic debate, abusive remarks. 
 
To Roland Béhar 
Introduction1 
 
After the first confrontations of classicists with scholastic 
philosophers and theologians2 at the end of the fourteenth 
century, humanists never stopped collecting labels from 
classical and Christian tradition, or coining new ones, to 
caricaturize scholasticism. Far too frequently, this vo-
cabulary has been read as a manifestation of the human-
ists’ interest in stressing the gap between themselves and 
the predominant culture in cathedral schools and universi-
ties through the display of their command of Latin and 
their wit. This view, based upon the fact that such terms 
were basically abusive remarks, has left aside questions 
such as how a humanist selected and disseminated certain 
phrases, labels, and epithets, how they were approved and 
used by his peers, and under what circumstances they en-
dured. Furthermore, once one of these labels was incorpo-
rated into their vocabulary, humanists took it for granted 
that their fellows could grasp its nuances without further 
clarification. Because of this, Renaissance scholars, as 
well as editors and translators of early modern texts, have 
been commonly misled by such terms; and, contrary to 
the general understanding, they should be considered 
more than a mere cabinet of lexical curiosities and their 
study far from trivial. 
Before outlining the history and evolution of some of 
these words, I need to give one definition and explain two 
limitations with regard to my approach. As for the defini-
tion, the “emotional” in the title stresses that I do not in-
tend to explore how Renaissance humanists dealt with 
classical and medieval insolubilia and obligations, late-
medieval speculative grammar, classifications of argu-
ments, issues of scholastic logic, theology, and so on; but 
rather, that I aim to appraise how these authors created 
and developed an ever-increasing lexicon of derogatory 
labels to refer to scholasticism as a form of sophistry, and 
how these terms acquired new overtones through their re-
lationship to each other and their signifieds. “Emotional” 
also alludes to a particular quality of this vocabulary: 
namely, that it was shaped with the intention of being 
precise with regard to which aspects of scholasticism it 
wanted to deride, but, at the same time, was never in-
tended to provide a philosophical criticism of scholasti-
cism as such. Finally, “emotional” denotes the historical 
evolution of this vocabulary, as anger, verbal violence, 
and coarseness eventually replaced both elegance and wit. 
In line with the general topic of this issue of Philo-
sophical Readings, I have limited my exploration of these 
terms to those which exploited the identification between 
scholasticism and sophistry. As a second limitation, im-
posed by the amount of material that must be considered 
for such a task, and by the fact that the following pages 
represent a research in progress, I have provided a cursory 
set of problems which correspond to the main sections 
below: “What is a sophist?”, “How to fight and defeat a 
hydra”, “Scholastic disputation redux: The logotheca of 
verbal duels”, “The logothecae of minutiae scholasticae”, 
and “Sophistry as shit”. 
 
 
1. What is a sophist? 
 
As researchers on late-medieval education have ex-
plained,3 around the middle of the thirteenth century two 
new concepts, quaestionista and sophista, started to be 
used at the University of Oxford with a very precise 
meaning that went far beyond the traditional attribution of 
the terms. They were rooted in quaestio and sophisma, 
two common terms in cathedral schools and universities 
across Europe, where they referred to the stages in stu-
dents’ education and masters’ careers and to the specific 
roles students and masters were expected to perform 
within the university. 
The Latin origin and evolution of each term is none-
theless quite different. Quaestio, on the one hand, already 
referred to instruction in classical antiquity, and it kept 
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this meaning during the middle ages until around the 
twelfth century. At that point, it started to acquire a more 
refined connotation that included, in the first place, the 
lectio—that is, a master reading and commenting on a 
text—and, secondly, a direct inquiry addressed to the stu-
dent concerning exacting passages. This inquiry could 
only be answered positively and negatively, through the 
proposition (propositio) of arguments pro et contra, to 
find a solution (determinatio) to the problems (dubia) 
posed by the master. As this procedure became common 
in schools and universities, these conundrums, which had 
their origin in the reading and exposition of particular 
authoritative texts, were soon gathered into collections of 
quaestiones. As the popularity of such collections in-
creased, the discussion of these puzzling questions in-
creasingly came to replace the lectio in classes for ad-
vanced students. The collections evolved into several 
subgenres, among them the quaestio disputata—a record 
of a given disputation or a treatise written following the 
mode of the quaestio itself—widely used in faculties of 
arts, law, medicine and theology, and the quodlibeta 
(Hamesse 17–48). 
Sophisma, on the other hand, did not enjoy such a long 
tradition as a Latin educational term. Only after its inclu-
sion in medieval instruction did it partially shake off the 
negative connotations it had carried from classical an-
tiquity onwards.4 In medieval universities, sophismata 
referred to statements with twofold implications found in 
readings of the curriculum. These statements led to dis-
cussions on general or abstract issues of grammar, logic, 
natural philosophy, law, and eventually theology, based 
on other readings also included in the curriculum. The 
student was not only expected to have a good knowledge 
of assigned readings, but also to demonstrate his com-
mand of logical reasoning and debate. Like quaestio, once 
transformed into a technical concept sophisma evolved to 
refer either to the statement itself or to the conjunction of 
the statement and its subsequent discussion. Soon, 
sophismata were gathered into collections and, like 
quaestiones, came to constitute a literary genre (Spade). 
By the late thirteenth century, sophismata had become 
one of the premises of the medieval curriculum, from its 
first steps to the baccalaureate. From the fourteenth cen-
tury onwards, sophismata also became public disputations 
in which different schools competed: bachelors played the 
roles of respondents and opponents, and the masters were 
present as a jury. But the role of quaestiones and sophis-
mata did not end there. To become baccalaureus and then 
doctoratus required proof of the mastery of both tech-
niques. At the University of Paris, this assessment was 
composed of three long, exacting, and complex exams 
called vesperiae, aula, and resumpta or resumptiva, to 
which tentativa and magisterium were eventually added.5 
These exams were part of the curriculum until certain re-
forms were made to the course of studies from the six-
teenth century onwards. This system was adopted, al-
though with differences, in late-medieval universities all 
across Europe and lived on during the Renaissance.6 
Given the complex and excursive nature of these cur-
ricula, it is not difficult for a scholar of the Renaissance to 
find attacks made by humanists against this highly techni-
cal approach to disputation, with its exceedingly strict 
norms and the disregard for the elegance of Latin by mas-
ters and students alike.7 However, not all humanists 
shared a negative opinion of these practices. For instance, 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who had the chance to 
attend the vesperie of Johannes Laillier, celebrated at the 
Sorbonne between July 1485 and March 1486, extolled 
them as follows in his so-called Oratio de hominis digni-
tate [1486]:8 
 
Primum quidem ad eos, qui hunc publice disputandi morem ca-
lumniantur, multa non sum dicturus, quando haec culpa, si culpa 
censetur, non solum vobis omnibus, doctores excellentissimi, 
qui sepius hoc munere non sine summa et laude et gloria functi 
estis, sed Platoni, sed Aristoteli, sed probatissimis omnium eta-
tum philosophis mecum est communis. Quibus erat certissimum 
nihil ad consequendam quam querebant veritatis cognitionem 
sibi esse potius, quam ut essent in disputandi exercitatione fre-
quentissimi. Sicut enim per gymnasticam corporis vires 
firmiores fiunt, ita dubio procul in hac quasi litteraria palestra 
animi vires et fortiores longe et vegetiores evadunt.  
 
First, to those who slander this practice of disputing publicly, I 
am not going to say much, except that this crime, if they judge it 
a crime, is the joint work not only of all you very excellent doc-
tors—who have often discharged this office not without very 
great praise and glory—but also of Plato and Aristotle and the 
most upright philosophers of every age, together with me. To 
them it was most certain that they had nothing better for reach-
ing the knowledge of the truth which they sought than that they 
be very often in the exercise of disputing. As through gymnas-
tics the forces of the body are strengthened, so doubtless in this, 
as it were, literary gymnasium, the forces of the soul become 
much stronger and more vigorous. 
 
Over against Pico’s intellectual vigorexia; we find the de-
rogatory position, predominant among Renaissance hu-
manists. In 1506, twenty years after the Oratio, Erasmus 
himself fled from Paris partly to avoid taking these 
exams; and yet twenty years later he remembered the 
practice very well, as is clear from the following state-
ment taken from his De utilitate colloquiorum (1526):9 
 
Huiusmodi permulta grammaticuli discunt ex meis colloquiis, 
quibus sic obmurmurant isti. Sed indecorum est theologum io-
cari. Saltem hoc mihi concedant apud pueros, quod ipsi permit-
tunt sibi viri apud viros in vesperiis, vt vocant rem insulsam in-
sulso vocabulo. 
 
Beginners learn many things of this sort from my Colloquies, 
about which these fellows mutter so. “But for a theologian to 
crack jokes is unseemly”. At least they should grant me the right 
to do with boys what they, grown men, permit themselves pub-
licly during “Vespers”—insipid name for an insipid thing. 
 
It is in fact not far from reality to view Erasmus’s defense 
of the Colloquia against their banning by the Faculty of 
Theology of the Sorbonne as a confrontation between two 
different ways of understanding education, conversation, 
dialogue, and dialectics. 
 
 
2. How to fight and defeat a hydra 
 
As I have already mentioned, however, Erasmus was not, 
by any means, the first to oppose the medieval academic 
curriculum and the practice of disputation that it propa-
gated. In The Sophistic Renaissance, Eric MacPhail col-
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lected a number of passages from the works of Petrarch 
that are quite illustrative for understanding one of the first 
opinions on “modern sophistry” made by a fourteenth-
century classicist. However, I shall follow a different path 
here and call attention to this well-known excerpt from 
Plato’s Euthydemus (297c–d):10 
 
You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; you refuse 
to answer./ Yes, and with good reason, I said: for I am weaker 
than either one of you, so I have no scruple about running away 
from the two together. You see, I am sadly inferior to Hercules, 
who was no match for the hydra—that she-professor who was so 
clever that she sent forth many leads of debate in place of each 
one that was cut off; nor for another sort of crab-professor from 
the sea—freshly, I fancy, arrived on shore: and, when the hero 
was so bothered with its leftward barks and bites, he summoned 
his nephew Iolaus to the rescue, and he brought him effective 
relief. 
 
This passage is of interest insofar as it was unknown until 
the late fifteenth century. In fact, Socrates’s comparison 
of Euthydemus with the Hydra of Lerna survived—before 
Ficino recovered and translated Plato’s Dialogues—
thanks to St. Jerome’s translation of Eusebius of Cae-
sarea’s Chronicon,11 where it was found in turn by Gio-
vanni Boccaccio, who made the following comment in the 
Genealogies of the Pagan Gods [ante 1375]:12 
 
Eusebius autem in libro temporum de hac Hydra aliter sentire 
Platonem dicit, quem ait asserere Hydram callidissimum fuisse 
Sophistam, nam Sophistarum mos est, nisi quis auertat, adeo 
propositiones suas tradere, ut uno soluto dubio multa consur-
gant. Sed astutus philosophus dimissis accessoriis ad interni-
tionem principalis conatur, quo remoto, caetera remouentur. 
 
In the Chronicon, Eusebius states that Plato had a different in-
terpretation of this Hydra. Plato affirms, he says, that the Hydra 
is a most skillful sophist, as sophists are accustomed—unless 
someone brings them into light—to say their propositions in 
such a way that once a doubt is solved, many more arise. But the 
wary philosopher, putting aside subsidiary issues, seeks to de-
stroy the main proposition, so once it is removed, so are the rest. 
 
This brief second-hand mention and the elaboration made 
by Boccaccio are enlightening. It is evident from the 
words he chooses for providing a Euhemeristic interpreta-
tion of Socrates’s comparison—and it could not have 
been otherwise—that the sophista he has in mind is the 
one bred in the art of the quaestiones and sophismata. 
Both this brief mention and its contents would be en-
riched soon.  
Only eight years after the death of Boccaccio, Coluc-
cio Salutati had already begun one of his most ambitious 
works, De laboribus Herculis (1383–1391). In the ninth 
chapter of the third book, Salutati provides a much more 
extensive interpretation of Socrates’s Hydra, partly drawn 
from medieval sources,13 introducing three important 
ways of looking at the acceptation of “sophist” within a 
new intellectual paradigm—that of the humanists—and 
marking a clear difference over against the succinct 
treatment by Boccaccio. Salutati first approaches the 
fundamental opposition between the philosopher and the 
sophist, which, as can be inferred, has nothing to do with 
Plato’s Euthydemus, but rather with the defense of a new 
art of disputation that is clearly opposed to the culture of 
medieval schools and universities. From this point of 
view, Salutati contrasts his reckoning of education as 
based on the recovery and study of the classics with the 
technical scholastic view related to the creation of experts 
through verbal confrontation.  
The second aspect of Salutati’s approach is the dis-
tinction between logic, grounded in reasoning, and soph-
istry, built upon arguments that hide fallacies. The third is 
the establishment of an art of disputation which contrasts 
a technical approach to the defense and legitimization of 
certain ideas with an ethical inclination which includes, 
paradoxically, the classical definition of rhetoric on the 
one hand, and the definition of ethics on the other. 
Because Boccaccio and Salutati lacked the sources 
that would have been required for a correct interpretation 
of what Socrates meant by “sophists”, they were able to 
establish a fortunate parallel with contemporary affairs 
and to use the authority of Plato, the master of Aristotle, 
to attack scholasticism. This interpretation instituted a 
tradition which identified scholastic sophistries and soph-
ists with the Hydra of Lerna and which would become 
much richer during the fifteenth century.14 Furthermore, 
when Plato’s works began to be exhumed, epitomized, 
and translated into Latin, this association of sophist and 
Hydra was not simply discarded in favor of more histori-
cally accurate understandings.15 As a matter of fact, Mar-
silio Ficino—who knew Plato’s works and the deeds of 
Plato’s sophists extremely well—wrote the following pas-
sage in a letter dated 15 September 1489 and entitled A 
defense treating medicine, astrology and the life of the 
cosmos, and also the Magi who greeted the new-born 
Christ,16 calling his circle to defend the publication of his 
De vita libri tres (1480–1489): 
 
Tu vero, Guicciardine, carissime compater, ito nunc, ito alacer, 
Politianum Herculem accersito. Hercules quondam ubi periculo-
sios certandum foret, vocitabat Iolaum. Tu nunc similiter 
Herculem. Nosti profecto quot barbara monstra Latium iam 
devastantia Politanus Hercules invaserit, laceraverit, interemerit; 
quam acriter expugnet passim, quam tuto propugnet. Hic ergo 
vel centum hydrae capita nostris liberis minitantia statim con-
tundet clava, flammisque comburet. 
 
But you, Guicciardini, dearest comrade, go now, go swiftly, 
fetch Poliziano, our Hercules. Long ago, when there was to be a 
particularly dangerous fight, Hercules used to call out for Iolaus; 
you must now likewise call out for Hercules. You know only too 
well how many barbarous monsters Poliziano, our Hercules, has 
attacked, battered and destroyed: monsters ravaging Latium. 
You know how fiercely he fights on all sides, how sure is his 
defense. Therefore, he will immediately pound with his club and 
burn up in flames even the hundred heads of the Hydra which 
are now threatening our children.  
 
Here, Poliziano is represented as Hercules—a sobriquet 
as adored by Ficino as it was disliked by Angelo17—that 
is, as the champion of the politiores sive humaniores litte-
rae against an ever-increasing number of sophists who 
constantly threatened to spoil the aims and destroy the 
fruits of the new erudition.  
The influence of these allegorical and mythological 
interpretations of the Hydra, as the monster of mystifying 
sophistry who had to be defeated in order to impose a new 
model of learning—a model that would erase the dark 
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middle ages and pave the way for a new golden age—was 
not constrained to Italy or humanists. This powerful 
image spread widely, employed at the beginning of the 
Reformation not only by Luther himself (from 1509 on-
wards),18 but also in H. Eobanus Hessus’s representation 
of Reuchlin as Hercules19 and in his attacks against Ed-
ward Lee,20 and even by Reuchlin himself in his letters to 
Hermann von Neuenahr the elder.21 It appeared also in the 
widely popular image of Luther as the “Hercules Ger-
manicus”, destined to slash the many-headed monster of 
the Catholic Hydra.22 The Hydra was deployed to such an 
extent that Andrea Alciato’s words in his Epistula—a 
declamatio, in reality—contra vitam monasticam (c. 
1517–1518),23 addressed to Bernardus Mattius, a fellow 
humanist who entered the Franciscan order, seem more 
than fair some ten years after the comparison became 
widespread: 
 
Cum enim divinus ille Plato sophisten quendam fuisse Hydram 
prodidit, vaticinabatur credo et unum aliquem vestrum animo 
volutabat, cum quo quisquam de suo dogmate disputare ausit. 
Quotquot argumenta referes, rursus pullulant et mille syllogis-
mis fortiores insurgunt. 
 
For when divine Plato declared, as someone dared to dispute 
with him about his doctrine, that a certain sophist was a hydra, 
he was prophesying, I believe, and had in mind one of your peo-
ple. However many arguments you put, they multiply theirs in 
return and rise up stronger again with a thousand syllogisms. 
 
 
3. Sophistry redux: the logotheca of verbal duels 
 
As the hydra of “new sophistry” had many heads, the war 
against the “new sophists” had to be fought on several 
fronts and by diverse methods: the institutions of studia 
humanitatis and academies, the (literary) foundation of a 
new way of intellectual exchange, new models to ap-
proach texts critically, the display of formidable erudition, 
and the rapid and insistent deployment of this erudition to 
reveal the lack of accuracy in scholastic Latin or to de-
molish its philosophical assumptions and methods. But, 
instead of appraising the brawls, acrimonious confronta-
tions, and decisive exchanges of blows in the cultural, po-
litical, and religious arenas, I will focus on the trench 
warfare, where humanists used Latinitas to build up a 
substantial “arsenal” against scholasticism. 
Three ideas should be stressed with regards to the 
supplies of this arsenal. First, the incorporation of new 
terms was grounded on the identification of scholastic 
philosophy as sophistry, which allowed humanists to 
draw these terms from a wide variety of sources, usually 
written for purposes other than those of the humanists. 
Second, the incorporation of new terms, more than simply 
demonstrating erudition, provided precise concepts with 
which to attack every purportedly negative aspect of 
scholasticism. Third, these terms, besides being weapons 
against scholasticism, were most fundamentally tools in-
tended for domestic consumption, so to speak; as such, 
they served as feedback of humanists’ core ideas on 
communication, and reinforced their sensibility as classi-
cists. To stress the fact that the re-collection and coinage 
of these terms went beyond antiquarian accumulation and 
was backed up by an idea of order, I have borrowed from 
Guillaume Budé the term logotheca24 to refer to them. 
Moreover, to introduce this extensive archive of terms 
succinctly, I have divided the “emotional” labelling of 
sophistry into three different yet complementary and per-
meable logothecae: one directed at the scholastic practice 
of disputation as such, another at the qualification of 
scholastic sophistae, and yet another at the labelling of 
sophistic arguments. 
The first group is important because it paves the way 
for appraising the other two. With terms such as alterca-
tiones, argutiae, austultationes [sic.], blateramenta, 
caedes, convicia, contentiones, dedalogiae, digladi-
ationes, kainophoníai, lites, logomachíai, logodaedaliae, 
mataeologiae, naucae, nugae, pugnae (rusticanae, ver-
borum, etc.), pugillatus, rationes (logicales, metaphysica-
les, etc.), rixae, seditiones verborum, or tolutiloquentiae, 
among many others, humanists stressed three essential 
aspects of the new sophistry and the disputations held in 
her name: their violence, their dogmatism, and their irrel-
evance.25 However, things are not as simple as they may 
seem.  
As I have suggested elsewhere (Ledo), these concepts 
were not perfectly equivalent; rather, they presented a 
subtle hierarchy that had the virtue of helping an educated 
reader reconstruct not just their ramifications for general 
issues but also the relationships among them. Thus, read-
ing contentio—a crucial term for the history of communi-
cation thanks to its inclusion in the medieval systems of 
the sins of the tongue and its leading role in late-medieval 
and Renaissance ethics of language—a humanist was able 
to reassemble a full genealogy of the values of communi-
cation defended by classical learning—sapientia, sodali-
tas, pluralitas, and civilitas—as opposed to medieval in-
struction and disquisition, characterized, from their point 
of view, by its insipientia, superbia, and mendacitas.26 
Logomachía, by way of example, was “recovered” by 
Erasmus from St. Paul’s First Epistle to Timothy (1:4, 
2:8, 6:4) and explained in many places, as in De copia,27 
Explanatio symboli Apostolorum,28 and Ciceronianus.29 
But undoubtedly this Hellenism made its entry in the 
logotheca of sophistic contentiousness thanks to its debut 
in the following passage of the Praise of Folly:30 
 
Nec enim adduci possum, vt credam Paulum, e cuius vnius eru-
ditione licet omneis aestimare, toties damnaturum fuisse quaes-
tiones, disceptationes, genealogias, et (vt ipse vocat) 
λογομαχίας, si eas percalluisset argutias, praesertim cum on-
nes illius temporis contentiones pugnaeque rusticanae fuerint et 
crassae, si cum magistrorum nostrorum plusquam Chrysippeis 
subtilitatibus conferantur. 
 
Nothing will make me believe that Paul, from whose learning 
we may judge all the other apostles, would so often have con-
demned questions, arguments, genealogies, and what he himself 
called “battles of words” if he had been well up in those niceties, 
especially when all the controversies and disagreements of that 
time would have been clumsy and unsophisticated affairs in 
comparison with the more than Chrysippean subtleties of the 
schoolmen of today.  
 
This passage appears in Erasmus’s Folly just after three 
extensive lists of sophistical technicalities, quaestiones, 
and sects, delineating the fields of action for the detrac-
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tion of sophistic scholasticism and clearly showing Eras-
mus’s procedure in providing a fair number of equivalent 
terms. But what interests us here is that, in bringing back 
logomachíai—the original Pauline term in Greek, which 
St. Jerome rendered as contentiones—Erasmus was not 
providing a Greek equivalent to a Latin word, but rather 
expressing where the battle against sophistry was about to 
be fought—in the study of the three sacred languages, in a 
new translation of the New Testament, etc.31—comparing 
the confrontation between humanism and scholasticism to 
the Pauline endeavor to disseminate the evangelical mes-
sage in its purity against Jewish sects, pseudo-Christians, 
and mystifiers.  
Besides its ability to produce this set of equivalences 
in an educated reader, the logotheca of verbal duels ex-
panded in two more directions. In the first place, as I have 
said, it established connections with the other two 
logothecae (which insisted on the dogmatism of scholas-
tic explorations and their irrelevance, as we will see be-
low). These links were at times established by simple 
morphological variations (nuga, nugator; logodaedalia, 
logodaedalus; etc.), but at other times by the creation and 
expansion of a whole conceptual field (nuga: deliramen-
tum, ineptia, inquinamentum, naucus, latratus, peripse-
mata, sterquilinium, etc.). Secondly, the speed with which 
new terms were able to be incorporated into these 
logothecae raises the question of how this was done; and 
although the inclusion of a candidate in a blockbuster 
such as the Praise of Folly would not exactly hurt, the key 
for the success of a new term was its ability both to add 
something which was lacking in the logotheca (as we 
have seen with logomachíai) and to relate with its peers. 
This procedure can be seen over and over again. Pau-
line kenophoníai or kainophoníai, another concept in-
cluded in this logotheca (although secondary and with 
very reduced circulation), was presented in Erasmus’s 
Annotations on 1 Timothy 6–20.32 His commentary on this 
passage not only provides a translation of κενοφωνίαι to 
Latin, but it does so by accompanying it with a whole set 
of terms which will be related to it both in the logotheca 
of verbal confrontations and in that of minutiae scholasti-
cae. Examples abound. Take, for instance, this formula-
tion from the Colloquiorum formulae (1518) as applied to 
Scotists: “All right, he shall be admitted, as long as he 
leaves at home his sophistical monsters, his nonsense, 
sycophancies, arrogance, virulence, sardonic grin, Thra-
sonical boasts, and self-love”.33 As a matter of fact, the 
new labels for the scholastic disputations and controver-
sies became a genre in themselves, going well beyond 
Erasmus and extending to the practices of the faculties of 
arts, law, medicine, and theology and their respective pro-
fessions. A final example can be found in connection with 
the study and practice of law in Cornelius Agrippa’s De 
incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum (1531)34:  
 
Quibus tum ad hoc ipsum adsunt procuratores et notarii, quos 
vocant, tabelliones, quorum injurias et damna, et nequitias et 
falsifica, omnes patienter ferre oportet, cum omnium fidem et 
licentiam, ac potestatem apostolica et imperiale authoritate se 
obtinuisse videntur. Atque inter hos illi sunt praecipui qui norint 
forum egregie perturbare, miscere lites, confundere causas, 
supponere testamenta, instrumenta, rescripta, diplomata, tum 
egregie fallere, decipere et ubi opus est pejerare et falsum 
scribere. Omnia audere, et construendis dolis, fraudibus, tech-
nis, calumnis, laqueis, captiunculis, insidiis, tricis, ambagibus, 
circumventionibus, Scyllis et Charibdibus se a nullo vinci pati-
antur. 
 
Among these publike notaries are to be reckon’d, whose inju-
ries, falsities, and mischiefs continually by them wrought, all are 
bound to endure, while they pretend to have their credit, license, 
and authority from the Apostolike and Imperial power. Among 
whom they are to be accounted the chiefest, who know best how 
to trouble the court, perplex causes, counterfeit wills and deeds, 
to abuse and deceive their clyents, and, if need be, to forswear 
themselves, venturing at any roguery, rather than be outdone in 
plotting and contriving cheats, scandals, quirks, tricks, quillets, 
treacheries, Scylla’s and Charybdis, by any other person what-
soever. 
 
 
4. The logothecae of minutiae scholasticae 
 
Together with the derisive terms employed to refer to the 
medieval and contemporary practice of disputation held in 
universities (and to scholastic disputation in general), 
humanists’ re-collection, coinage, and use of labels to ex-
press their contempt for old-fashioned grammar teachers, 
to scorn scholastic sophists, and to attack the arguments 
and the techniques employed in their disputations soon 
conformed to two more complementary logothecae. 
In the attacks on scholastic teachers and philosophers, 
sometimes irony sufficed. The titles employed in the 
schools and universities of the time usually included a 
pinch—sometimes a handful—of scorn, following a tradi-
tion started around the middle of the twelfth century. For 
instance, one of the more popular titles assigned to doc-
tors in theology, magister noster, was already employed 
with irony by Peter Abelard against his master, William 
of Champeaux,35 and it continued to be used from the thir-
teenth to the sixteenth century to stress that, as a matter of 
fact, these magistri nostri did not master any discipline at 
all.36 Other titles employed in the universities of the time, 
such as baccalaureatus, licenciatus, magister, doctor 
(used most often when accompanied by angelicus, 
seraphicus, etc., to refer to authorities) and common de-
signations such as summulista, logicus, physicus, in-
trante,37 modista, logista, quaestionista, calculator, glos-
sator, legista, and canonista were used scornfully as well, 
not only to censure the pride behind these titles and as an 
attack against what they represented with regard to the 
institutionalization of philosophy and theology, but also 
because they were considered to be unclassical barbar-
isms, coined in a period when the European classical tra-
dition and heritage were lost in darkness.38 The same mo-
tivations lay behind the attacks ad hominem of the sur-
names of scholastic philosophers.39 Even such common 
terms as dialectica and dialecticus could become derisive 
when employed by humanists such as Lorenzo Valla.40 
When irony did not suffice to stress the divide be-
tween the cultural, educational, and philosophical tradi-
tions of the new sophists and those of the humanists, there 
were a number of procedures that reinforced it—for in-
stance, contrasts such as grammatista/ grammaticus;41 ar-
gutator, disputator, logiculus,42 logista, nebulus,43 oc-
camicus, occamista, occanista, φιλόνεικος, philoscotus,44 
pseudodialecticus, sc(h)olasticulus, sophicaster, sortista 
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(or sortistus)45/ logicus and dialecticus; morologus,46 mo-
rosophus,47 philomorus,48 philobarbarus/ philosophus; or 
aristotelicotatos, magisterculus, sententionarius, Sor-
bonicus, Sorbonista, theologaster, theologastrus, theolo-
gista/ theologus49—but also with characterizations of 
teachers of grammar, sophists, and philosophers taken 
from the classical tradition. In this last instance, wrath and 
pride, common to the first logotheca, were depicted and 
taken to the extreme. But to follow them, I am afraid, 
would divert us from our main topic. 
For the third logotheca, which interests us more here, 
humanists collected and created from c. 1400 to c. 1530 
an outstanding set of terms to refer to the arguments em-
ployed by scholastic philosophy and to their mnemonic 
formulas.50 The census of the set of terms grew as a result 
of two main complementary procedures. On the one side, 
humanists gathered references to ancient dilemmas, falla-
cies, and paradoxes from classical sources51 with the aim 
of linking them to the logical arguments taught in the 
schools and universities of their time. For instance, in a 
renowned passage of the Praise of Folly52—“and I’ll 
demonstrate (docebo) it, not by the Crocodile’s Syllogism 
(crocodrilitis), or the Heap (soritis), or the Horns (cera-
tinis), or any other dialectical subtlety of that kind; no, 
with what is called sound common sense”—Erasmus 
mentions terms already explained in classical authorities53 
and brought together in Poliziano’s Miscellanea.54 How-
ever, Folly’s allusion cannot be understood as a mere eru-
dite exhumation and repetition of classical loci; it needed 
to be connected with the instruction in logic of her own 
time. Therefore, there is no doubt that she is bearing in 
mind the tradition of insolubilia in the context of obliga-
tional disputations here, a connection that can be easily 
established once Melanchthon’s treatment of coacerva-
tiones in his Compendiaria dialectices ratio (c. 1520), or 
Vives’s treatment of insolubilia,55 is taken into account.56 
The contrast between the somehow aseptic approach to 
sorites in Lorenzo Valla’s Retractatio57 and the bitter at-
tack against scholastic sophistries made by late four-
teenth- to sixteenth-century scholars—either humanists, 
like Elio Antonio de Nebrija,58 or non-humanists, like 
Jean Gerson59—only makes the antithesis between the 
emotional or derogatory use of the term and the technical 
use more clear.60 The ludic role played by these terms, 
most probably motivated by the educated Renaissance 
reader’s familiarity with them, is evident not only when 
we observe how humanists played with some of these 
concepts, but also when we move forward in time and 
find that Thomas Wilson offers in The Rule of Reason 
(1551) a collection of examples of crocodilites, 
antistrephon, ceratinae, asistaton, cacosistaton, utis, and 
pseudomenos “to delyte the reader”.61  
Besides commenting on classical dilemmas, and in 
order to provide points of comparison between them-
selves and scholastic logic, humanists also enlarged the 
logotheca of arguments and reasoning by adapting classi-
cal and post-classical vocabulary to add nuances to their 
attacks. The terms they chose sometimes amplified a tra-
ditional acceptation when this was originally very precise; 
or, conversely, the original terms were transformed into 
precise terms to attack a certain aspect of sophistry, not-
withstanding their more general meaning in classical and 
post-classical Latin. Such a catalogue would include ar-
gutia, argutiola, calculatio, captiuncula, cavilla, cavilla-
tio, cautela, centaurus, chimera, commentitia, conclusi-
uncula, decipula, deliramentum, ignavia, importunitas, 
(sui[s]setica) inania,62 ineptia, ineptiola, inextricabilia, 
insania, inventiuncula, involucrum, labyrinthus, labyrin-
thiplexia, laqueus, latebra, logodaedalia, lucubratiun-
cula, naenia, pedica, praestigia (or praestygia), quisqui-
lia, quaestiuncula, ratiuncula, retia (us. in plural, argu-
mentorum, argutiarum, etc.), spina, sphinx, superstitio, 
techna, telae Vulcani, tendicula, thrasonismus, trica, triv-
ium, vaframentum, verborum perplexitas, and versutilo-
quentia, to mention just a few, but I will concentrate here 
on captiuncula, which will serve as an apt example of 
how this vocabulary acquired new acceptations.  
Captiuncula, as a diminutive of captio, appears, as far 
as I know, only twice in classical Latin: once in Cicero’s 
Letters to Atticus XV. 6 to refer to the political and legal 
traps suffered by Servius, and again in Aulus Gellius’s 
Attic Nights XVI. II. 8: “Quid autem legis istius pro-
pugnatores in illa captiuncula facient, in qua haerere eos 
necessum est, si nihil amplius quam quod interrogati erunt 
responderint?”, where captiuncula was translated by 
Rolfe in his edition for the Loeb Classical Library as 
“(false) dilemma”. This value of the diminutive, con-
strained to the perverse exploitation of law and legal pro-
cedures, had, as one would expect, an impact on the Latin 
of fifteenth-century humanists, as for instance in a pas-
sage of Cristoforo Landino’s De vera nobilitate ([1469–
1470] c. 1487),63 wherein he employs it to refer to the 
practice of lawyers changing a jury’s understanding of a 
given fact. Consequently, although the term was correctly 
translated as “fallacies” by Albert Rabil in the following 
passage, part of the meaning was inevitably lost: 
 
Sin vero tam valida arma, tam humano generi salutaria in bon-
orum innocentiumque virorum pertinitiem convertet, atque avar-
itia ductus disciplinam suam, operam ac linguam venalem habe-
bit, si mercede victus omnia invertet, si astutia, calliditate, dolo 
malo, captiunculis malitiosisque interpretationibus nigerrima 
quaeque in candidiora vertere conabitur. 
 
If, on the other hand, he changes such powerful weapons—
things so advantageous to the human race—into the ruin of the 
good and the innocent and, led by avarice, puts up for sale his 
teaching, work, and language; if, overcome by desire for gain, 
he turns everything on his head and with adroitness, artifice, and 
evil deceit attempts to change the blackest things into the whit-
est by fallacies and crafty interpretations… 
 
This was not the only acceptation of captiuncula for 
Landino, however, as he uses it in the Disputationes 
Camaldulenses (c. 1474) to refer to the uses of scholastic 
philosophy;64 so it would be useful to ask ourselves when 
exactly it came to refer to philosophical sophistry. An an-
swer can only be provisional: the first instances I have 
found in the Quattrocento with this meaning are Lorenzo 
Valla’s Repastinatio (1447–1455),65 the Encomium of St 
Thomas (1457),66 and Leon Battista Alberti’s Momus 
(1450).67 So, it would be possible to affirm that around 
the middle of the fifteenth century captiuncula had been 
incorporated into the vocabulary of the humanists to de-
ride “sophistic” arguments. But the process of transforma-
tion of captiuncula does not end there. Just a decade later, 
the term appears with a new acceptation which hints at 
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the relation of captiuncula with captio. At the same time, 
this new acceptation is in line with medieval use, that is, 
to designate the quasi-magical power of sophistry to catch 
the attention and mystify the listener, as happens in Gio-
vanni Pontano’s Charon (c. 1469).68 This idea is also re-
flected in Marsilio Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Sym-
posium or De amore (1469),69 wherein after presenting 
the lemma incantator fascinatorque, potens, veneficus 
atque sophista, he writes the following passage: 
 
Sophistam Plato in Sophiste dialogo ambitiosum et subdolum 
definit disputatorem, qui captiuncularum versutiis falsum pro 
vero nobis ostendit cogitque eos qui secum disputant sibimet in 
sermonibus contradicite. 
 
A sophist Plato defines, in the dialogue [the Sophists], as an am-
bitious and crafty debater who, by the subtleties of sophistries, 
shows us the false for the true, and forces those who dispute 
with him to contradict themselves in their speeches. 
 
Interestingly enough, in later works both Pontano and Fi-
cino abandoned this reference to magic, and used capti-
uncula according to its new acceptation as “sophistical” 
tricks, or a more general “deception”.70 Therefore, we can 
affirm that at the end of the fifteenth century, captiuncula 
was used as a part of the vocabulary that referred to scho-
lastic “sophistries”.71 Antonio de Ferrariis uses the term to 
mark a clear distinction between two kinds of philoso-
phy,72 one focused on disputation and linguistic tricks 
(captiunculae), the other on the Stoic tradition, which 
teaches that forgetting both material things and passions 
leads to a good and a happy life—the term is related 
therefore to the concept of philosophical persona which 
Christopher Celenza (2014, 149–150) discussed in a re-
cent essay. Interestingly, the passage is also a reformula-
tion of Salutati’s De laboribus Herculis: 
 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, most humanists 
would have agreed that captiuncula in its classical mean-
ing had been displaced by its value as a technical term—a 
technical jibe, if you wish—to refer to the arguments used 
in scholastic disputation and, more precisely, to its prac-
tice in universities.73 So extensive was this updated use 
that Agostino Nifo felt the need to include a new term in 
the logotheca devoted to sophists: captiunculator.74 
 
 
5. Scholastic sophists and sophistries as shit 
 
To do justice to the title of this article, and to the process 
of degradation of scholastic sophistry in the logothecae of 
the humanists, these pages that opened upon the thirteenth 
century, when quaestiones and sophismata were con-
sidered wit, need now to be closed with these practices’ 
eventual comparison to excretion and, more particularly, 
to excrement, which happens to be much more frequent 
than expected.  
Although there are comparisons of scholastic logic 
with dirt, rubbish, and even dunghills as early as the 
twelfth century,75 it was only between the 1510s and 
1530s that humanists developed freely into this common-
place. Several factors explain this. In the first place, hu-
manism’s achievements had become widespread thanks to 
the popularity of some of its representatives, the role of 
the printing press in disseminating the materials they cre-
ated, and the clear impact of classical learning in the cur-
ricula of many universities across Europe. Secondly, even 
though scholasticism was far from exhausted in higher 
education, students arrived at colleges with a body of 
knowledge much nearer to the litterae humaniores than 
that of previous generations, especially outside Italy; 
moreover, traditional bastions of scholasticism such as 
Oxford, Cambridge, and Paris had modified—or were 
close to modifying—their curricula, and humanists were 
appointed as teachers and tutors on a regular basis. It 
seems feasible that these changes led to a hastening de-
cline in the ability to identify the nuances of the logothe-
cae created and developed by scholars who were, if not 
dead, at least in their forties or fifties. Thirdly, when wit 
descends to scatology, it is probably a good sign that the 
possibilities of playing with and elaborating on an idea 
have come to an end. 
From this point of view, it will not come as a surprise 
that Erasmus, following in the steps of Petrarch76 and 
Bartholomaeus Coloniensis77 (among many others), was 
one of the most active contributors to the logothecae of 
scholastic mystifications, nor that he played with compar-
ing (sophistic) scholasticism to rot, excrement, and so 
forth from time to time—a game which soon attracted the 
attention of a considerable number of followers, imita-
tors,78 and “emulators”.79 A well-known example is his 
use in the Parabolae of the analogy of rotten food, sprout-
ing from rotten brains,80 when speaking of the literature of 
the Scotists81: 
 
Vt cibi male olentes non videntur male olere his qui ederint, ita 
spurcae Scotistarum et Sophistarum literae cum alios meliori-
bus imbutos literis vehementer offendant ac nauseam moveant, 
eos qui nugas istiusmodi imbiberunt, nihil offendunt, imo bellae 
videntur et elegantes. 
Salutati De Ferrariis 
 
Huic igitur, sicut 
oportet, intentus dep-
rehendit duos esse dis-
putandi modos, unum 
veris et existentibus 
rationibus, alium so-
physticis et apparenti-
bus, ut, nisi discatur 
uterque, aut haberi phi-
losophia nequeat aut 
inventa nullo modo 
defendi. 
 
 
Pater illi optimus phi-
losophus fuit et medicus, 
qui in illum simul cum 
anima philosophiam 
quoque infudit, non eam 
quae in captiunculis dis-
putationibusque, sed 
quae in bene beateque 
vivendo versatur et in 
contemnendis humanis 
rebus, hoc est, in coer-
cendis affectibus. 
 
Therefore, the one who 
attends in a fitting way 
to this perceives that 
there are two manners 
of debating, one with 
true and manifest rea-
sons, the other with 
sophistical and appar-
ent ones, so that, unless 
he learns both, either 
he will not be able to 
acquire philosophy or 
else, having found it, 
there will be no way to 
defend it.  
 
 
That one’s father was a 
most excellent philoso-
pher and physician, who 
also infused philosophy 
into him together with 
the soul; not that phi-
losophy which meditates 
on logical quirks and 
disputations, but that 
which meditates on good 
and fulfilled living, and 
on despising human mat-
ters, that is, on control-
ling the affections.  
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Food which smells unpleasant seems to have no smell to those 
who have eaten it. The filthy literature of Scotists and sophisters 
is like that: it gives great offence to others, who have had a more 
liberal education, and makes them feel sick, but to men soaked 
in that sort of rubbish it gives no offence and even seems to 
show neatness and elegance. 
 
It was Erasmus also who provided, when vividly describ-
ing his life in the Collège de Montaigu, the link between 
university life and dirt. In 1532, the comparison of medi-
eval textbooks and glosses with excrement had become 
widespread, as can be seen in this passage on Accursius’s 
glosses to the Pandectas in Rabelais’s Pantagruel:82 
 
Ainsi vint à Bourges où estudia bien long temps et proffita 
beaocup en la faculté des loix. Et disoit aulcunes fois que les 
livres des loix luy sembloient une belle robbe d’or, triumphante 
et précieuse à merveilles, qui feust brodée de merde: “Car (disoit 
il) au monde n’y a livres tant beaulx, tant aornés, tant élegans 
comme sont les textes des Pandectes: mais la brodure d’iceulx, 
c’est assavoir la glose de Accurse, est tant salle, tan infâme et 
punaise, que ce n’est que ordure et villenie”. 
 
So he came to Bourges, where he studied quite a long time, and 
learned a lot in the law school; and sometimes he used to say 
that the law books seemed to him a beautiful golden gown that 
was bordered with shit. “For”, he said, “there are no books in the 
world so beautiful, so ornate, so elegant, as are the texts of the 
Pandects; but their border, to wit, the gloss by Accursius, is so 
foul, unspeakable, and smelly, that it’s nothing but sewage and 
sludge”. 
 
Around two decades later, in a wonderful passage from 
his Hieroglyphica (1556),83 Piero Valeriano animates his 
explanation of nugae and cavillae with the following 
image of a sophist as a pig romping in its own excrement: 
 
Et ut, quod initio dicere coeperamus, prosequamur, sacerdotes 
illi cum nihil aeque abhorrerent quam inanes sophistarum nugas 
et cavillosas verborum argutias argumentorumque decipulas in 
naturae viribus indagandis, eiusmodi notae hominem per suis 
hieroglyphicum significabant. Eodem intellectu apud Hebraeos 
suillam abstinere praeceptum ait Philo, admonitosque nos ea 
divina lege ut sophistas evitaremus, per evitabilem huiusmodi 
animalis impuritatem. Illi enim acutissimis tantum acuratissi-
misque rerum distinctionibus, quod per bifidam animalis ungu-
lam interpretantur, quasi luto inhaesitantes, ita illis adhaeres-
cunt, ut inde nunquam avelli possint, sed ad extremam usque 
senectutem ibidem computrescunt, nam et porci nihil illustre, 
nihil purum, nihil limpidum amant, sed turbida tantum spissa et 
sordida et faeculenta sectantur, inque his praecipuam statuunt 
voluptatem. 
  
And to go ahead with what we started to say at the beginning: 
because there was nothing more abhorrent to those priests than 
the empty trivialities of sophists, quibbling nimbleness of words, 
and logical traps when investigating the forces of nature, they 
indicated this type of man by means of the hieroglyphic of a pig. 
Philo affirms that the commandment among the Hebrews to ab-
stain from swine-flesh was understood in the same way; and 
that, by this divine law, through the avoidable impurity of such 
an animal we are admonished to avoid sophists. For they, by 
their so sharply pointed and highly elaborate distinctions about 
things, which they explain by means of a cloven-hoofed animal, 
are as it were caked in mud, and they stick to those things so 
much that later they can never scrape it off, but stink of it all the 
way to extreme old age. For pigs also love nothing bright, noth-
ing clean, nothing transparent, but run after only what is muddy, 
thick, foul, and mucky, and their principal pleasure is in these 
things. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
With some highly valuable exceptions,84 the history of 
verbal violence, derision, and contempt during the Re-
naissance as yet lacks a study which accounts for how this 
vocabulary was inspired, learned, and driven. From the 
starting point of a simple image—the identification of 
sophistry with the Hydra of Lerna—and its reinterpreta-
tion in the fourteenth century, I have sought to explain 
schematically the dramatic multiplication of derogatory 
terms against scholastic sophistry during the fifteenth and 
early sixteenth centuries. Poetic images aside, my hypoth-
esis can be summarized in three main points.  
First, the thriving of this vocabulary cannot be ex-
plained by increasing tensions between scholasticism and 
humanism—a less-than-accurate historiographical 
commonplace—but was in line, rather, with the evolution, 
maturity, and partial decadence of the Latin of the human-
ists. With this in mind, we ought to be able to identify 
discrete patterns of linguistic evolution in which this 
word-stock was able to prosper. In pursuit of such a pat-
tern, I have borrowed from Guillaume Budé the concept 
of the logotheca, which allowed me to explain two com-
plimentary facts. First, I showed that in the evolution of 
this vocabulary, the survival and eventual success of a 
new term depended upon its relations with its likely peers. 
This was most often done through the new term’s inclu-
sion in lists of correlatives and through the exemplifica-
tion its unique contribution to that list.  
Secondly, for clarity’s sake and due to the volume of 
terms considered, I have approached this vocabulary by 
sorting it out in three separate yet permeable logothecae: 
(1) terms that highlighted the opposition between the 
communicative and intellectual aims of humanism and 
those of scholasticism, (2) terms that referred to the 
agents and guardians of scholastic sophistries, and (3) 
terms that referred contemptuously to the arguments and 
“tricks” employed in scholastic debate. 
In addition, given the permanent need to find new and 
effective derogatory terms and the fact that Latin was an 
artificial language in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
I have outlined the predictable consequences of carrying 
this process to an extreme. In this spirit, I have chosen to 
close my exposition with two complementary expressions 
of contempt: humanists’ attacks ad hominem against 
scholastic thinkers and the comparison of scholastic soph-
istry with shit. It was certainly not by chance that Eu-
rope’s doctrinal schism and the shift from creative deri-
sion to an outbreak of coarseness went hand in hand. My 
aim in these pages has been to offer an alternative to 
scholarly accounts explaining the trajectories of this early 
modern vocabulary with recourse to political or inter-
group animosities between humanists and scholastics. In-
stead, we ought to examine closely (and indeed at greater 
length) the institutional and formal characteristics that 
drove the evolution of these derisive repertoires “from 
within.”  
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1 I would like to express my gratitude to Eric MacPhail for his commen-
taries on this text. All the remaining mistakes and omissions are my 
own. 
2 Whom Eric MacPhail (2011, 52) called “new sophists” in a brilliant 
and seminal book. The term, made famous by Erasmus in the Praise of 
 
 
Folly (MacPhail 2006, 73), can be traced back at least to a known ex-
pression by Coluccio Salutati: “moderni sophiste”, Epistolario III. 15. A 
Roberto Guidi conte di Battifolle (Salutati 1891, 179). On Salutati’s 
passage, see the comments by Ullman, 85, Lawn, 107–108, and Fubini, 
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3 The first part of this section is a synthesis of Fletcher 1967, 417–454; 
Becker, 23–25; Weijers 1987, 180–182 and 1988, 44–45; Fletcher 1988, 
50; Lawn, 39–65; Maierù, 100–103 and 121–141, esp. 130–134; Weijers 
2002, 79–80; Teeuwen s. v., 120–121; and Périgot, 25 and 102–107. 
4 For the attacks on sophismata and sophistae from the twelfth century 
onwards, see Lawn, 101–126, esp. 104–107. 
5 Koch, 160–168; Farge, 26–28; Weijers 1987, 407–424; Teeuwen, 315–
317; and Weijers 2009, 49, 87–92, 196–198, 247, 249 and 253. 
6 Schwinges, 232–234; Müller, 343–345; Grendler ,152–157, 174–175, 
175n106, 283–285, 298–299, 308, 318, 358, and 384–385; Davies, 119–
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7 Garin’s essay, “Per una cultura nuova: la polemica contro i 'Barbari'’’ 
(Garin 1969, 137–177), still offers a balanced approach to the problem. 
See also his “I filosofi italiani del Quattrocento”, Garin 2009, 156. 
8 Pico della Mirandola, 1965, 19 and 2014, 76. Further examples of hu-
manists—mainly Salutati and Vergerio—praising the medieval system 
of disputation in Gilbert, 206–208 and 217–218. 
9 Erasmus, ASD I. 3: 751; CWE 40: 1108. 
10 Plato, 469, 471.  
11 Eusebius, 91: “Hercules consummat certamina, Antheum interficit, 
Illium uastat. Dicitur autem Antheus terrae filius, quia solorum palaes-
tricae artis certaminum quae in terra exercentur scientissimus erat et ob 
id uidebatur a terra matre adiuuari. Hydram autem callidissimam fuisse 
sofistriam adserit Plato” (“Hercules finishes his labors, slays Antaeus, 
devastates Ilium. Antaeus, however, is said to be the son of the earth, 
because he was most versed in the art of wrestling in single matches that 
are staged on the earth, and on that account was seen to be aided by the 
earth as his mother. But Plato asserts that a Hydra was (just) a most 
cunning sophistry”), my italics. It should be noted that Jerome himself 
identifies heresies with the Hydra several times: Contra Vigilantium I. 
355 (Jerome of Strido 2009, 400); In Hieremiam prophetam libri sex III. 
1. 119 (Jerome of Strido 2008, 202); Commentariorum in Hiezechielem 
prophetam libri XIV. Prologus and book VI (Jerome of Strido 2005, 4 
and 374); and Commentariorum in Michaeam prophetam II. [Praef.] 
(Jerome of Strido 2000, 840). According to Isidore of Seville (246), this 
comparison started with Ambrose of Milan’s De fide I. 4. On the fortune 
of this comparison between the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth cen-
turies, see Girardi 399–400. 
12 G. Boccaccio (1532, 326 and 1951, II, 640), Genealogiae deorum 
gentilium libri XIII.1. 
13 Boethius (2005, 121), Consolatio Philosophiae IV. Prose 6. 3; Ber-
nardus Silvestris VI [287–288], 69; and Wheatley IV. 10, attributed to 
Thomas Aquinas during the middle ages. 
14 See, for instance, Cristoforo Landino, De vera nobilitate [1469–1470, 
c. 1487] 1970, 110; Rabil, 257: “[…] sed si in altum et ad divina 
elevetur, tunc illarum amore raptis animis nostris funditus perit omnis 
terrenarum rerum libido. Neque vos cancrum, qui pedem Herculis ad-
versus hydram validissime pugnantis mordicus apprehendit, ullo modo 
contemnatis. Est enim animi torpor cancer, qui magnos persaepe viros 
doctrinam per hydram, id enim est per dialecticas subtilissimas inquisi-
tiones inquirientes saepe defatigat; sed illum vir magno animo et qui 
nullo labore succumbat, calce terit, idest perseverantia exsuperat” (“But 
if our minds are lifted up on high to divine things and seized by the love 
of those things, all desire for earthly things completely perishes. You 
should not in any way scorn the crab who, with his teeth, seizes the foot 
of Hercules while he is fighting fiercely against the Hydra. The crab is 
sluggishness of mind, which very often wearies great people seeking 
learning through the Hydra, that is, searching through the most subtle 
dialectics; but one with a great mind who does not give way under any 
labor grinds him under his heel, that is, overcomes through persever-
ance”); Landino, Disputationes Camaldulenses [c. 1474] 1980b, 235; 
Bartolomeo Sacchi, De falso et vero bono [ante 1480] 1999, 25 and 111; 
Niccolò Perotti, Cornu copia [1478, princeps 1489] 1994, I. V. 61, 89: 
“Plato Hydram acutissimam sophistriam scribit fuisse, cuius mos erat 
cauillari et quaestiones ita proponere, ut uno soluto dubio multa renas-
cerentur. Ego inde datum huic fabulae locum existimo, quid anguium 
genus, sub quo hydra continetur, omnium fertilissimum sit, et nisi in-
cendiis semina exurerentur, non esset fecunditati eorum resistere” 
(“Plato writes that the Hydra was a cunning sophist whose habit was to 
criticise and to put questions in such a way that, when one doubt was 
resolved, many more would arise. I think what gave rise to this fable is 
that the genus of serpents to which Hydra belongs is the most fertile of 
all, and unless its offspring are burned out with fire, it is impossible to 
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stand against their fecundity”); Lodovico Lazzarelli, Crater Hermetis [c. 
1492–1494] 2005, 15.1, 212–213; Hernando Alonso de Herrera, Dispu-
tatio adversus Aristoteles Aristotelicosque sequaces [ante 1517] 2004, 
252–253; etc. For the commonplace of the Hydra as multiplication of 
errors, see, e.gr., Biondo Flavio’s De verbis romanae locutionis Blondi 
ad Leonardum Aretinum XXV. 104 (Tavoni, 214), Marcus Musurus’s 
introduction to Aristophanes (Manutius, 276–277), and Erasmus’s (ASD 
II. 1: 338–340; CWE 31: 238) Adagia I. III. 27. Lerna malorum. 
15 Ficino had already translated, with a summary, Euthydemus in 1484 
(Plut. LXXXII 6. Mbr. s. XV), soon thereafter came the renderings by 
Cornarius and Serranus. On the transmission of these early translations, 
see Hankins 1990, 331–332, 334, 340 and 1990b, 683, 726, 741, 778, 
810, 813. A translation of the summary of Euthydemus into English can 
be found in Ficino 2006, 74–80. Although Erasmus (ASD II. 1: 516; 
CWE 31: 420) already quoted Euthydemus 297c–d freed from this tradi-
tion in Adagia I. V. 39. Ne Hercules quidem adversus duos, another 
equally influential work, Alciato’s Emblems, incorporated from the 1546 
edition (fol. 15r) onwards the emblem ‘XII certamina Herculis,’ which 
gave new life to the image of the Hydra as sophistry. Compare Achille 
Bocchi 2015, III. XCII, 446–447, and Pierio Valeriano 1678, XVI. 36–
37, 200. 
16 Ficino 2009, appendix B, 41. The Latin text, with an alternative trans-
lation, in Ficino 1998, 400. 
17 Poliziano 1526, fols. 103v–104r, also collected in Kristeller 1937b, 
278 (LXXI.3). A translation into English can be found in Ficino 2009, 
appendix F, 47. Further data on Poliziano as Hercules in Batkin, 108–
114. 
18 WA 8: 48, WA 9: 29 (Murphy 64), etc. 
19 Eobani Hessi de Capnioni eulogium [c. 1514]: “That subduer of mon-
sters, Jupiter’s son, is renowned all over the world in recognition of his 
heroic deeds. Reuchlin’s glory is not inferior to his. He has vanquished 
monsters no less savage than the Hydra and the other beasts. Nobody 
asks what kind of monsters they are — unless you, cowl, perhaps don't 
recognize yourself anymore”, Eobanus Hessus 2012, 49–51. See also 
Mutianus Rufus’s addition and gloss to the poem (dated November 1, 
1514): “Hactenus imposuit ficta gravitate Catonis,/ non poterit populo 
nunc dare verba Magus./ Debita Capnioni laus inviolata manebit,/ sed 
tua quam simulas gloria, Barde, jacet./ Ceu Nemesis subito tetigisset 
sidere linguam,/ infans perpetuo non blaterator eris. Habes igitur Hes-
sum et Rufum. Accipe glossam. Jove natus, i. e., Hercules alexiacus, 
Musagetes, Melampygus, monstrorum domitor. Subito sidere, i. e., apo-
plexia. Cetera sunt cognitissima” (“So far he deceived the people with 
the feigned seriousness of Cato, / The magician will not not be able to 
speak to them. / The praise owed to Capnio [i.e., Reuchlin] will remain 
inviolate, / but your glory that you feign, Bard, lies prostrate. / Just as if 
Nemesis had touched [your] tongue with sudden stars / you would not 
henceforth be a babbling infant. There you have Hessus and Rufus. Here 
is the gloss. Jove natus, i.e., Hercules alexiacus, Musagetes, Melampy-
gus, a tamer of monsters. Subito sidere, i.e., apoplexy. The rest are very 
well known”), Mutianus Rufus, 497–498. 
20 In Eduardum Leeum Epigrammata [1520], Eobanus Hessus 2016, 
140–143, 160–161, and 164–165. 
21 Reuchlin 2013, 51, 75, and 238. See also Reuchlin’s De arte cabalis-
tica II 2010, 230, and his letters to Jakob Questenberg (Augusburg, 
April 25 1514) 2007, 52, and to Girolamo Ricci (Stuttgart, August 4 
1516), 2007, 298 
22 Warburg, 568 and 570; Seidel Menchi, 80–86 and 94; and Whitford, 
27. Still, leading anti-Lutherans, such as Eck (1979, 274, 404, and 415), 
Catharinus (87) and Cochlaeus (18), employed "hydra" both against Lu-
ther and contemporary heresies following Ambrose and Jerome, see 
above n11. 
23 Alciato 2014, 34–35. 
24 The word is a rara avis coined by Budé to describe Erasmus’s Adagia 
in a letter (Paris, 19 May 1517) to Cuthbert Tunstall: “[…] certe quum 
Iliadem [vt ita loquar] illam leporum Graecorum iuxta Latinorum lego, 
quae Paroemiae vocantur, nunc logothecam Mineruae videre mihi 
videor; nunc Mercurii salinum, quem Logium appellant, arte sane exi-
mia fabrefactum, et in quo tamen ipso materia cum opificio certet, vnde 
sales candidissimos oratoria comicaque facundia ad vsus dicteriorum 
sumat […]” (“when I look at this Iliad, so to call it, of elegance in Greek 
and Latin that he [Erasmus] calls his Proverbs [Paroemia], I seem to see 
Minerva’s own arsenal of language [logothecam Minervae]. Or again, it 
is Mercury’s own standing salt-cellar—Mercury the god of eloquence—
a masterpiece of craftsmanship in which, even so, the material vies with 
the making, from which those who would be eloquent or amusing can 
help themselves to purest Attic salt when they need to make an effect”), 
Allen, Opus epistolarum II, 566; CWE 4: 357–358, my italics. 
 
 
25 For later examples, and as a proof of the success of this identification, 
see Isidoro da Chiari’s Adhortatio ad concordiam ([1540] 2008, 44) and 
Annibal Caro’s ([1558] 1912, 128) Apologia degli academici di Banchi 
di Roma contra messer Lodovico Castelvetro—Rimenata del Buratto: “E 
come? Con chiarire il mondo che voi siete un sofistuzzo, un fantasticuz-
zo, uno arrabbiatello, che con tanta vanità, con tanta impertinenza e con 
tanta ostentazion di voi, procurate il biasimo degli altri e la vostra ver-
gogna?” and ibid.—Mattaccini: “— Un sofista — dicono — un filosofa-
stro, uno spiritocco, corrompitore della verità, della buona creanza e 
delle buone lettere; un furioso, un empio, un nimico di Dio e degli uo-
mini, ardisce di gar queste cose? Vuol che la sua dottrina, la quale è va-
na e falsa e pestifera, sia di tutti tenuta per buona […]”. 
26 See Petrarch 2006, I. 4. 521, 138–140: “Ex quibus omnibus, fratres, 
piis esse debet has ventosas et frivolas disputationes, quibus non Cristi 
veritas, sed vulgi favor queritur, atque omnem seu vanam inquisitionem 
rerum imperscrutabilium, seu maxime miraculorum concupiscentiam 
pervicacie et curiositatis esse, non fidei” (“From all of this, brothers, the 
pious ought to be convinced that these are windy and frivolous disputa-
tions by which, not the truth of Christ, but the favour of the crowd is 
sought, and all either vain investigation of things beyond the possibilty 
of examination, or lust especially for miracles is the sign of obstinacy 
and curiosity, not of faith”), the translation into English in Trinkaus I, 
39, my italics; Petrarch 2014b, XII. 2. 123–124, 390: “[Pythagoras] sa-
pientem dicere, quo cognomine primi illi septem usi erant, erubesceret, 
primus omnium nominis huius inventor, philosophum se respondit, hoc 
est nondum sapientem, sed sapientie amatorem; quod tunc nomen hu-
millimum, brevi postea vehementer intumuit, nunc et tumidum et inane 
est, his qui illud profitentur non iam sapientiam, sed ostentationem et 
ventosas contentiones amantibus” (“[Pythagoras], because he was em-
barrassed that they called him ‘Sage’, that is, wise man, the name used 
for those famous first Seven, responded that he was a ‘philosopher’—he 
was the first man to coin this term—, meaning not so much a wise man 
as a lover of wisdom. A name that was then most humble soon afterward 
grew extremely swollen, and is now puffed up and vain; those who pro-
fess it are now not lovers of wisdom but of showiness and windy argu-
ments”); Salutati (1891, 178–179), Epistulae III. XV (to Roberto Guidi, 
16 August 1374): “[Petrarch] in philosophiam […], omnium scientiarum 
et artium imperatrix ac magistra, quantum excessit! Non dico in hac, 
quam moderni sophiste ventosa iactatione inani et impudente garrulitate 
mirantur in scolis; sed in ea, que animos excolit, virtutes edificat, 
vitiorum sordes eluit, rerumque omnium, omissis disputationum am-
bagibus, veritatem elucidat. Gaudeant siquidem illa priori, quos indis-
solubilia, ut aiunt, argumenta multo conflata labore reperire delectat, 
quos scolastice palestre gloria movet hanc autem posteriorem nos merite 
veneremur et totis animi viribus amplectamur” (“How greatly did [Pet-
rarch] excel in philosophy, the empress and mistress of all sciences and 
arts! I am not speaking of this modern, sophistical, windy, boastful, 
empty philosophy of impudent chatter that is admired in the schools; but 
that which—leaving aside the evasiveness of disputations—develops 
minds, builds up virtues, purifies low vices, and brings to light the truth 
of all things. So then, let them rejoice in the first kind [of philosophy] 
with its so-called indestructible arguments brought together with much 
labour, and the glory of the scholastic arena moves them: let them re-
joice in it, but we will venerate as worthy the second kind and embrace 
it with our whole heart”); Salutati 1985, 63 and 70; etc. 
27 “Porro Graeca Latinis in loco intermixta non mediocrem addunt gra-
tiam. In loco adhibentur, vel cum Graeca vox est significantior, vt 
λογοµαχία pro ‘contentione’ siue ‘rixa’” (“Not a little charm is added by 
the judicious mingling of Greek forms with the Latin. This can be when 
the Greek word is more expressive, like λογοµαχία [battle of words] for 
‘dispute’ or ‘quarrel’), ASD I. 6: I. XI, 50, ll. 460–462; CWE 24: 317. 
28 ASD V. 1: 290, ll. 488–490. 
29 ASD I. 2: 626, ll. 20–21. 
30 ASD IV. 3: 154; CWE 28: 128. 
31 A good example of the use of the term under these premises can be 
found in Reuchlin’s Defensio… contra calumniatores suos Colonienses 
[1513] 1999, 241–243; see also his letter to Jakob Lemp (Stuttgard, 
August 1 1512; 2003, 322), where he amplifies the list of equivalents 
with “γλοσσοµαχίας” and “µικρόλογον σοφίαν”, taken from Gregory of 
Nazianzus, among others. Once the situation changed, the term normally 
lost its ability to provide the set of equivalences that motivated its inclu-
sion in the census of derisory terms, as can be seen in Melanchthon’s 
Ethicae doctrinae elementorum libri duo [1550]: “Quaestio haec sit: An 
virtus sit finis hominis, an vero voluptas? Aristoteles inquit: actionem 
virtutis finem hominis esse. Nos cum dicimus, virtutem finem esse, non 
intelligamus ociosum habitum, sed Aristotelis sententiam retineamus, 
etiamsi brevitatis causa, tantum virtutem nominamus, ut et Cicero loqui-
tur. Removeantur ergo λογοµαχίαι et plane statuamus, falsam esse sen-
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tentiam Epicuri, qui contendit, voluptatem finem esse. Rectius autem in 
Philosophia dici. Virtutem esse finem hominis, id est, recte faciendum 
esse, etiamsi dolores et detrimenta sequantur” (“Here is the question: is 
virtue the end of man or is it, in fact, pleasure? Aristotle says that virtu-
ous activity is man’s end. When I say that virtue is the end, I do not 
mean an inactive disposition; rather, I support Aristotle's opinion, even 
if, for the sake of brevity, I refer to it simply as virtue, in the manner of 
Cicero. Let us be done, therefore, with logomachíai and clearly establish 
that Epicurus’s opinion is false. He contends that pleasure is our end. It 
is stated more accurately in philosophy, however, that man's end is vir-
tue, that is, doing what is right even if pain and loss are the conse-
quences”), quoted from Melanchthon 1553, 11 and Turmeda et al., 112, 
my italics. 
32 “Vocum novitates. Κενοφωνίας, id est ‘vocum inanitates’. Ambrosius 
et interpres legisse videntur καινοφωνίας. Quanquam Graeca scholia per 
ε legunt. Nec enim hic agit de novandis vocibus, sed de disputationibus 
supervacaneis. Ex interpretatione Chrysostomi non liquet quid legerit. 
Theophylactus legit et interpretatur κενοφωνίας, id est µαταιολογίας, 
non dissimulans tamen Chrysostomum videri legisse καινοφωνίας per αι 
diphthongum. Addit ‘videri’ quod quemadmodum diximus, ex illius 
enarratione non liquet quid legerit. Falsi nominis. Ψευδωνύµου, quasi 
dicas ‘falso nominatae scientiae’. Nec enim est scientia vbi fides non 
est. Et haec omnia mire quadrant in hos quosdam spinosos theologistas. 
Non enim de omnibus loquor et fortassis nulli futuri sunt. Et apte dixit 
 ντιθέσεις, ‘oppositiones’, quod omnibus de rebus inter istos mira sit 
digladiatio” (“Vocum novitates [‘newness of voices’]. Kenophonias, that 
is, ‘emptiness of voices’. Ambrose and the translator appear to have read 
kainophonias, although the Greek glosses give an ‘epsilon’. For this is 
not dealing with new voices but with unnecessary voices. From 
Chrysostom’s translation it is not clear what his reading was. Theophy-
lact reads and interprets it as kenophonias, that is, mataiologias, while 
not hiding the fact that Chrysostom appears to have read it as kaino-
phonias with the diphthong ai. He adds ‘appears to’ because, as we said, 
it is not evident from his commentary what his reading was. Falsi 
nominis [‘of a false name’]. Pseudonumou, as if you were to say, ‘of 
falsely-named knowledge’. For there is no knowledge where there is no 
faith. And all these things fit amazingly well with certain of these thorny 
theologists. For I do not speak of all of them, and possibly not all will be 
such. And he aptly said antitheseis, ‘confrontations’, for among these 
men every topic is a marvellously fierce combat”), ASD VI. 10: 118. 
33 “Age admittetur, modo domi relinquat gryphos sophisticos, 
mat[a]eologias, sycophantias, supercilium, virulentias, risum Sar-
donium, glorias Thrasonicas, philautiam”, ASD I. 3: 90n40–45. The 
passage was soon removed from the Colloquia, but Erasmus commented 
it again in his Apologia qua respondet duabus invectivis Eduardi Lei, 
from where the translation into English has been drawn, ASD IX. 4: 59; 
CWE 72: 50. 
34 Agrippa von Nettesheim 1531, ch. XCIV. De arte notariatus et pro-
cumtoria and 1676, 325. 
35 Abaelardus 57, 59, 64, 67, 82, etc. 
36 Boccaccio, Letters XXIV [1374] 1992, 734; Salutati, Letters X. XV 
[to Pellegrino Zambeccari, April 23, 1398] 1896, 290; Gerson, Letters 3 
[to Pierre d'Ailly, April 1, 1400] 1960, 25–28; Salutati 1985, 48–49; 
etc.; Erasmus’s Encomium Moriae (ASD IV. 3: 158–160; CWE 27: 130–
131), Opus epistolarum (Allen I. 145: 105; I. 337; II. 608, 100, ll. 345–
347; III. 628: 21, ll. 10–19), De recta Latini Graecique pronuntiatione 
(ASD I. 4: 26–27), Responsio ad annotationes Eduardi Lei (ASD IX. 4: 
266–269), etc. The formula “magistri nostri” is sufficiently defined in 
the Epistolae obscurorum virorum I. 1: “Et intelligit bene facta sua, et 
habet multos discipulos, parvos et magnos, senes cum iunioribus, et cum 
magna maturitate dixit, et tenuit quod dicendum est 'nostermagistran-
dus', quod sit una dictio, quia 'magistrare' significat 'magistrum facere', 
et 'baccalauriare', 'baccalaurium facere', et 'doctorare', 'doctorem facere'. 
Et hinc veniunt isti termini ‘magistrandus, baccalauriandus, et doctoran-
dus.’ Sed quia doctores in sacra theologia non dicuntur doctores, sed 
propter humilitatem et etiam sanctitatem, et propter differentiam nomi-
nantur seu appellantur magistri nostri, quia stant in fide catholica in loco 
domini nostri Iesu Christi qui est fons vitae, sed Christus fuit nostrorum 
omnium magister; ergo ipsi appellantur 'magistri nostri', quia habent nos 
instruere in via veritatis, et deus est veritas, quapropter merito vocantur 
'magistri nostri', quia omnes nos scilicet Christiani debemos et tenemur 
audire praedicationem eorum, et nullus debet dicere contra eos, ex quo 
sunt omnium nostrum magistri” (“He [Warmsemmel] knoweth his busi-
ness right well, and hath many pupils, high and low, young and old; and, 
speaking with ripeness of knowledge, he held that we should say 'nos-
termagistrandus'—in one word—because 'magistrare' signifies to make 
Master, and 'baccalauriare' to make Bachelor, and 'doctorare' to make 
Doctor (whence come the technical terms 'magistrand', 'baccalauriand,' 
 
 
and 'doctorand'). Now Doctors in Divinity are not styled 'Doctors', but 
on account of their humility and sanctity, and by way of distinction, are 
named and styled 'Magistri Nostri', because in the Catholic Faith they 
stand in the room of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the fount of life, and 
the 'Magister' of us all: wherefore are they styled 'Magistri Nostri' be-
cause it is for them to instruct us in the way of truth—and God is truth”), 
Von Hutten 2004, 131 (the translation into English has been drawn from 
Von Hutten 1909, 292) and ibid. II. 43; see also Becker, 85–89, 92, 95, 
104–106, 107–117, and 135–138. 
37 For the derogatory use of these four terms, see Ong, 138–139 and De-
faux, 39, 45n7, and 141. 
38 Bausi, 177–184. See also the list of terms collected by Nizolio 1956, I, 
19–20: “Si prius tamen oraverimus Lectores, ut nobis ignoscant, nec 
vitio vertant, si quando inter refutando barbaros, barbaris aut parum lati-
nis vocabulis utemur, qualis sunt exempli gratia, ens, essentia, essen-
tialis, entitas, quiditas, accidentalis, potentialis, potentialitas, praedi-
care, praedicatum, praedicamentum, praedicamentalis, univocum, ae-
quivocum, univocam univocans, univocum univocatum, aequivocum 
aequivocans, aequivocum aequivocatum, realis, substantialis, intention-
alis, principale, principaliter, secundario, Metaphysica, metaphysicalis, 
Logica, logicalis, mentalis, sermocinalis, orationalis, logice, meta-
physice, realiter, intentionaliter, consequenter, infinitare, universal-
izare, et alia quamplurima huiusmodi plusquam barbara, a Pseudophi-
losophis prorsus inaniter inventa, et temere in Philosophiam introducta” 
(“If we nevertheless pleaded previously with the readers to indulge us 
and not cast blame if we ever use, while refuting the barbarians, barbaric 
or hardly-Latin words, as for example: ens, essentia, essentialis, entitas, 
quiditas, accidentalis, potentialis, potentialitas, praedicare, praedica-
tum, praedicamentum, praedicamentalis, univocum, aequivocum, univo-
cam univocans, univocum univocatum, aequivocum aequivocans, ae-
quivocum aequivocatum, realis, substantialis, intentionalis, principale, 
principaliter, secundario, Metaphysica, metaphysicalis, Logica, logi-
calis, mentalis, sermocinalis, orationalis, logice, metaphysice, realiter, 
intentionaliter, consequenter, infinitare, universalizare, and many others 
of this sort that are more than barbarous, entirely and inanely invented 
by pseudophilosophers and rashly introduced into philosophy”), my 
italics. 
39 See Bruni 1994, I. 25, 247 and 1987, 69: “Quid autem de dialectica, 
quae una ars ad disputandum pernecessaria est? An ea florens regnum 
obtinet, neque hoc ignorantiae bello calamitatem ullam perpessa est? 
Minime vero; nam etiam illa barbaria, quae trans oceanum habitat, in 
illam impetum fecit. At quae gentes, dii boni! Quorum etiam nomina 
perhorresco: Farabrich, Buser, Occam, aliique eiusmodi, qui omnes 
mihi videntur a Rhadamantis cohorte traxisse cognomina” (“What about 
dialectic, an art very necessary to disputation? Does it possess a flour-
ishing realm, and has it endured no calamity in this war of ignorance? 
Not at all, for it has been assaulted even by that barbarism which dwells 
across the ocean. What peoples! I shudder even at their names: Ferab-
rich, Buser, Occam, and others of this sort, all of whom seem to have 
drawn their names from the throng of Rhadamanthus”), my italics. 
40 See Copenhaver’s and Nauta’s “Introduction” to Valla 2012b, xi–xii. 
The attacks on dyaletici/dyaleticuli appear many times in Petrarch 2016, 
I. 10. 2–6, 40–43; 2004, I. 7, 100–109; 2014a, III. 47, 270; 2009, V. 2. 
63–66, 44–47; etc. 
41 Grammaticus referred to a deep knowledge of Latinitas in the first 
place and familiarity with classical antiquity in all its aspects. Litteratus 
and litterator is, in this context, nothing more than a variant of the same 
concept inherited from Suetonius. For the acceptations and uses of both 
terms, see Rico, 52–54; Poliziano 1986, 102–103 and 2010, 40–41, 92–
93 and 140–141; and Cummings, 249–270. It should be stressed that, 
despite the success in the use of this opposition, and that Erasmus was 
one of his most ardent defenders—he liked to call himself a grammati-
cus—this did not mean that this use would not strike some of them back. 
See, for instance, Estúñiga’s attack against the humanist of Rotterdam in 
the handwritten version of Erasmi Roterodami Blasphemiae ac impie-
tates (c. 1522): “Immo tu es complorandus, grammatista superbissime 
ac lamentis luctuosis omnino prosequendus, qui christianae modestiae 
prorsus immemor tanta verborum insolentia ac procacitate in omnem 
christianorum gradum ac ordinem aperte debaccharis” (“But you, most 
arrogant grammatista, ought to be bewailed and accompanied with sor-
rowful tears, who, recklessly heedless of Christian modesty, openly rave 
against every rank and order of Christian with such insolent speech and 
impudence”), ASD VI. 7: 307n849–858. 
42 Logiculus stems from the famous textbook of Paolo Veneto, the Parva 
logicalia. See Pomponazzi’s Quaestio de speciebus intelligibilibus et 
intellectu speculativo [c. 1504] 1970, 207: “Et est simili illi quod dicunt 
sophistae et logiculi quod nomen et significat sua significata et significat 
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seipsum” (“And it is similar to what the sophists and logicians say, that 
the name signifies its signifieds and signifies itself”), my italics. 
43 Nebulus or nebulonicus were much to the liking of Thomas More, see 
by way of example his Responsio ad Lutherum II. 27: “nec aliud in ore 
gestare, quam sentinas, cloacas, latrinas, merdas, stercora, faciant quod 
uolent alij, nos ex tempore capiemus consilium, uelimus ne sic bacchan-
tem ex eius tractare uirtutibus et coloribus suis depingere: an furiosum 
fraterculum et latrinarium nebulonem, cum suis furijs et furoribus, cum 
suis merdis et stercoribus, cacantem cacatumque relinquere” (“and to 
carry nothing in his mouth but bilge-water, sewers, privies, filth and 
dung, then let the other do what they will; we will take timely counsel, 
whether we wish to deal with the fellow thus ranting according to his 
virtues and to paint with his colors, or to leave this mad friarlet and 
privy-minded rascal with his ragings and ravings, with his filth and 
dung, shitting and beshitted”), More 682–683, my italics. See also be-
low: “Scholastic sophists and sophistries as shit”. 
44 See Mutianus Rufus’s (1885, 658, 665) letter to Erasmus (Gotha, c. 
March 1523): “Quorsum tendat temeritas et peruersa ostentacio non 
video. Non obsunt cameli et philoscoti…” (“…where their headstrong 
folly and their perverse desire to shine will end, I do not know. The 
Camels and the Scotophiles are no obstacle…”); also collected in Allen, 
Opus epistolarum V. 1425: 409; the translation is taken from CWE 10: 
191. There is a wordplay (Duns) Scotus/ σκότος (‘darkness’ in Greek) 
here, see Erasmus 2011, 327n335. 
45 Sortista stems from ‘Sortes’, that is, ‘Socrates’ abbreviated in medie-
val syllogisms. It is a fairly uncommon term, but it can be found in 
Pomponazzi’s Expositio libelli de substantia orbis [1507] 1966, 63. 
46 On morologus, far less common than morologia, see Perotti 1995, I. 
X. 114, 63: “Et morologi dicuntur qui in sermone morosi, hoc est, mole-
sti, sunt. Vnde et sermones huiusmodi dicuntur morologi. Plautus: ‘Nec 
molestum esse nec sermonibus morologis uti’” (“And those who are 
fussy, that is, affected, in their speech they call morologi. Thus words of 
this sort are also called morologi. Plautus: Neither be affected nor use 
morologi words”). Erasmus translates µωρολογία as stultiloquium, an-
other term with a long tradition in the attacks against sophistry, in his 
translation of Eph. 5:4, ASD VI. 3: 530. See my note to Erasmus 2014, 
69n7 and later examples in Ramus fol. 63r; Cardano III. XI, 177b; and 
Estienne I, 111. 
47 On morosophus—a term taken from Luc., Alex. 40—and, more gener-
ally, for the Greek derogatory terms employed by Erasmus, see Thomp-
son 333–335. The term became very common after Erasmus used it in 
the Praise of Folly, either in direct imitations of the work, such as the 
one found in Palingenius Stellatus 2012, vv. 504–520, pp. 325–326, or 
in original pieces, such as Rabelais’s Tiers Livre or Gulielmus 
Gnapheus’s play, Morosophus (1531). 
48 Budé sigs. p4r, p7v, q8r, and r1v. 
49 For the term theologaster (or theologastrus), see Erasmus’s Adagia 
870. Elephantus non capit murem (ASD II. 2: 388–390) and Apologia 
contra Sanctium Carranzam (ASD IX. 8: Ioannis 20. Dominus meus et 
Deus meus, 34) and Melanchthon 1834, 286–326. The vocable was in-
troduced to French very soon thanks to the anonymous Farce des 
théologastres [1523–1525], Des Périers’s Cymbalum mundi [1537], and 
Viret’s Cosmographie infernale [1552]. For the term theologista, see 
Reuchlin’s Defensio contra calumniatores suos Colonienses [1513]: 
“[…] not to mention myself being unjustly attacked by the Cologne 
‘theologists’ […]. I cannot call my Cologne slanderers theologians; they 
are false theologians… and I shall call them from now on by a term of 
reproach ‘theologists’ because I do not want to anger anyone in the 
saintly assembly of true theologians at other universities”, Rummel 
2002, document 4, 103. See also the following words in the anonymous 
pamphlet entitled Conciliabulum theologistarum [c. 1521]: “Eck. […] I 
was unsuccessful because that man [Luther] denies everything and can-
not be bothered with syllogisms [non curat syllogismos]. As soon as I 
produce a neat argument and have come up with a conclusion according 
[consequentiam] to Frisesomorum or Berbelin or Braca [mnemonic 
words for types of syllogisms, see below n. 50] he throws out the conclu-
sion and the whole argument [negat conclusionem at totum argumen-
tum] and says that these are fantasies [fantasiae] and snares [tendiculae] 
laid by men who have no business with theology [in theologia non ha-
bent locum]. And he wants us to cite the gospel or Paul or a text from 
Holy Writ instead of syllogisms […] Arnold. […] There you are 
wrapped up in your wonderful speculations [in illis speculabilibus et in 
mirabilibus super vos] […]. And you know nothing of this world, except 
perhaps as far as avarice and envy goes, because according to the prov-
erb ‘Every theologist is S-upercilious [superbus], A-varicious [avarus], 
and L-ivid [libidus] with envy’ (and you may add ‘with a T-aste for lux-
ury [luxuriosus]’), according to the etymology of the word SALT, as is 
written: ‘You are the SALT of the earth’”, Rummel 1993, 59 and 61. On 
 
 
the meaning of the coupling philosophus/ philosophante (or philoso-
phaster) there is not agreement in early modern sources. 
50 Students were expected to learn by heart the valid categorical syllo-
gisms of the three figures through the following mnemonic formulas: 
“Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipton,/ Celantes, Dabitis, 
Fapesmo, Frisesmorum,/ Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti,/ 
Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison”, as a consequence they 
were collected in the main medieval manuals of logic, such as Petrus 
Hispanus, Summule logicales, Buridan's Summulae de dialectica, Ock-
ham's Summa logicae, and Paolo Veneto's Logica parva, among many 
others. As examples of their derogatory use, see Trapezuntius sig. b4v; 
Melanchthon 1854, 738; Ramus (Ong, 45–47); etc. Therefore, J.C. Sca-
liger's (374) complaint about these jokes is fairly understandable.  
51 An early example of this procedure can be found already in Petrarch 
2014a, II. 51. Dyogenes cynicus. 2, 160. 
52 ASD I. 3: 92: “Docebo autem non crocodilitis aut soritis, ceratinis aut 
aliis id genus dialectorum argutiis sed pingui, quod aiunt, Minerua rem 
digito propemodum ostendam”, CWE 27: 96–97. 
53 On crocodilites and ceratines, see Quint., Inst. I. X. 5 and Luc., 
Vit.Auct. 22. On sorites, Cic., De div. II. 11; Acad. II. 49, 92–95; Fin. 
IV. 29–31; ND. II. 165, III. 43; and D.L. VII. 44. 82–83. 
54 Poliziano 1489, ch. 44–45, sigs. i1v–i2v. Compare also Lefèvre 
d’Étaples’s preface to the Libri logicorum [1501/1503] (Lefèvre 
d’Étaples 88–89) with the prologue to his Introductiones logicales 
[1496] (ibid. 39), and see Renaudet 274–276. 
55 Vives 1979, 140–143. 
56 Melanchthon 1854, 747–748, and see Ashworth 2008, 631–632. 
57 Jardine, 161–162 and Nauta, 252–255; cf. Ashworth 2008, 631–632. 
58 Rico, 63n77. 
59 Gerson, Contra curiositatem studentium 1962, 233, 239–240 and 242–
244. On the influence of Gerson on the Praise of Folly, see De Vogel, 
106; Rummel 1995, 35–39; and my notes to Erasmus 2014, 103n6–
104.1, 212n6b, 215n8–216.1, 216n6, 220n3 and 235n11–236.4. 
60 See an extreme example of the former in Bèze’s Epitaphs. 13. In Ce-
ratinum, pseudomonachum: “Flete cucullati fratres: iacet ille sepultus,/ 
Ille cucullatae religionis honos./ Ridite, o reliqui; risu dignissima res 
est:/ Haec sunt perpetuis funera digna iocis./ Quippe huius quondam 
mendacibus omnia fucis/ Perdere, sola diu cura laborque fuit./ At dum 
cuncta tegit, dum fraudibus omnia velat,/ Mors simulatorem non simu-
lata rapit” (Cératin, a Pseudomonk: “Come weep, hooded brothers; the 
glory of your hooded religion has died and gone away. The rest of you, 
laugh; oh yes, it is a very laughable matter. This is a death worthy of 
endless jokes. You see, once he gave all his effort and attention to 
wrecking everything by his crooked guile. But though he feigned every-
thing, though he concealed everything in deception, the death that took 
that faker was no fake”), De Bèze, 126–127, my italics. 
61 Wilson fols. 85v–88v, and Howell, 28. 
62 Suisetica stands for Richard Swineshead (†1354), also known as ‘Cal-
culator’. For the attacks against the calculatores and their fortune during 
the Quattrocento and the early Cinquecento, see Dionisotti, 219–253; 
Valcke 1985, 43–56 and 1992, 275–284; and Raimondi 1995, 53–94 and 
2000, 311–358. 
63 Landino 1970, 89; Rabil, 242. 
64 Landino 1980, 208: “Neque rursus levium futiliumque rerum est 
quaerenda doctrina, veluti qui in dialecticorum superfluis captiunculis 
ac vanis amphibologiis aut inanibus fabellis omne paene tempus terunt” 
(“Again, neither should one seek for the knowledge of light and empty 
matters; meaning, he who wastes nearly all his time in the unnecessary 
logical quirks of the dialecticians, and in empty words of double mean-
ing or inane little fables”), my italics. 
65 Valla 2012, II. 2. 9, 224–225: “Sed hos duos posteriores modos, ne 
dialecticos nimium onerare videamur, rhetoricae relinquamus. Secun-
dum modum nisi admittant, dialectici caveant ne dicam ideo hunc eos 
nolle admittere quia non ita est ad captiunculas opportunus” (“However, 
lest I seem to put too great a burden on the dialecticians, let me leave the 
last two ways to rhetoric. If they do not allow the second way, the dia-
lecticians should take care lest I claim that their reason for not wanting 
to allow it is that it does not lend itself to sophisms”). 
66 Valla 2014, 308–309: “Id quod etiam visum est theologis graecis, 
Basillio, Gregorio, Ioanni Chrysostomo ac ceteris eius aetatis, qui neque 
dialecticorum captiunculas neque metaphysicas ambages neque mo-
dorum significandi nugas in quaestionibus sacris admiscendas pu-
taverunt, ac ne in philosophia quidem suarum disputationum fundamenta 
iecerunt” (“Such also seemed to be the case to the Greek theologians 
Basil, Gregory, John Chrysostom, and the others of that age. They did 
not think that the sophisms of dialectics, the obscurities of metaphysics, 
or the trifles of the modes of signifying should be mixed in with sacred 
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questions. Nor did they even lay the foundations of their disputations in 
philosophy”). 
67 Alberti 306–309: “Referam quae non a philosopho—nam vestra omnis 
ratio nisi in argutiis et verborum captiunculis versatur—sed a pictore 
quodam memini audivisse. Is quidem lineamentis contemplandis plus 
vidit solus quam vos omnes philosophi caelo commensurando et dis-
quirendo. Adsis animo: audies rem rarissimam” (“I will tell you what I 
remember hearing, not from a philosopher—for all your reasoning re-
volves only around subtleties and verbal quibbles—but from a certain 
painter. By himself this man saw more while looking at lines, than all 
you philosophers do when you’re measuring and investigating heavens. 
Pay attention: you’ll hear something that is very rare indeed”). 
68 Pontano 2012, 36–39: “Nimis ridiculus es qui id arbitrere; in asinum 
mene illos captiunculis suis versuros quasi Apuleium amatorio poculo, 
que ego vix agnovi cum hac iter faceret?” (“Do you imagine that they 
might transform me with their snares, like Apuleius changed by the love 
potion, whom I hardly recognized when he came this way?”) 
69 I quote from Jayne’s second revised edition and translation (Ficino 
1985, 6.10, 126); Allen 1989, 24–28 offers a commentary on the passage 
and on sophistry as incantation. The primitive version of the Epistle to 
Banco can be found in Kristeller 1937a, VII. a. 3, 39: “Nam profitentur 
quod nesciunt, et solis preterea prestigiis quibusdam sive artificiosis 
captiunculis velut aranearum telis confidunt, nec eorum adhuc ullus 
repertus est, cuius memoria ex improviso fecunda promptaque fuerit. 
Itaque cave ne dum ad cacumen pervenire contendis, cum ipsis ramis 
quos comprehenderis decidas” (“For they profess what they are ignorant 
of, and only rely on certain tricks or skilful logical quirks, spiders’ webs 
if you will; up to now we have found not one of them who can think on 
his feet with a fertile and ready memory. And so be careful that, when 
striving to reach the summit, you do not fall down along with the very 
branches you take hold of”), my italics. 
70 Pontano 2002, 114: “Quod si captationem ipsam duplicem fecerimus, 
et eorum quos cupiditas habendi trahit et quos popularis aurae atque 
ambitionis studium, ut alteri pecuniae, alteri popularis aurae captatores 
dicantur, fortasse non male distribuisse iudicabimur, quando etiam sunt 
qui inter loquendum disserendumque etiam verba capent, qui quidem 
ipsi dicantur captiosi et fraus ipsa captiuncula” (“So if we should make 
captatio to consist of two kinds—of those whom acquisitive greed 
moves, and of those moved by popular favour and the zeal of ambi-
tion—, so that both would be called captatores, one moved by money, 
the other by popular acclaim: we will not be judged to have made a poor 
distinction if there are also those who, in the midst of speaking and dis-
cussing, ‘capture’ words too, who indeed would themselves be called 
captiosi, and whose fraud would be called captiuncula”), my italics. 
Ficino 2000, XXV. 16A, 234–235: “Legibus Plato conqueritur, atque 
infamiam adversus legitimos philosophos Socratem praesertim hinc 
exortam in Apologia testatur. Tria haec incurrit vitia adolescentibus cav-
illator. Qui ut primum captiunculas attigit admodum congratulatur, tam-
quam thesaurum sapientiae nactus, laetitiaque exultat ac gestit et argu-
mentatiunculas omnes prompte pertentat, tum gyro multa retorquens in 
unum, tum unum in multitudinem explicans et evolvens, ubi superbia et 
procacitas statim exoritur” (“In the Laws, Plato complains bitterly about 
this impiety [deny God’s Providence] and in the Apology he attests to 
the infamy that befell legitimate philosophers, particularly Socrates, 
from it. The adolescent quibbler falls into three vices. As soon as he 
stumbles on verbal paradox, he congratulates himself as if he’d come 
upon a treasure-house of wisdom and exults and throws his arms around 
with delight and promptly assays every paradoxical argument, now 
twisting the many round and round into one, now unfolding and untwist-
ing the one into the many”). See also Ficino 2005, 136–137. 
71 See, for instance, Merula IV, fol. 73v: “Sed proh dolor, religiosi 
postea viri [...] ad civilia certamina animos applicarunt; alii ut longius a 
conspectu tot malorum et seditionum procella se subducerent, in tran-
quillissimo portu trans Alpes philosophantes non tam speculationi altis-
simarum rerum quam frivolis quaestionibus et captiunculis quibusdam 
vacabant. Quanto conducibilius fuisset […]” (“But alas, afterwards re-
ligious men [...] set their minds to civic struggles; others, in order to 
remove themselves further from the sight of the tempest of so many 
evils and seditions, idled away their time in a most quiet harbour across 
the Alps, philosophisers not so much in speculation concerning the 
highest matters as in frivolous questions and certain logical quirks. How 
much more expedient would it have been...”), my italics. In February 
29th, 1520, in a letter to Pirckheimer, Reuchlin (2013, 321) uses capti-
uncula, according to its original meaning, to refer to legal sophistries. 
72 De Ferrariis XXV, 149–150. 
73 See Clichtove’s Commentary [1502] on Lefèvre’s Paraphrases of the 
Eight Books of Aristotle’s Physics (Lefèvre d’Étaples 10); Eck, 
Briefwechsel 2 (to Matthias Ackermann, June 3, 1506); Erasmus. “Vita 
 
 
Hieronymi”. Erasmi opuscula 178, CWE 61: 52; Id. Enarration on the 
first Psalm. Bonus vir, ASD V. 2: 54, CWE 63: 32; J.L. Vives. “De cau-
sis corruptarum artium” 1783b, 201–202; and Agrippa von Nettesheim 
1531, ch. XCIV, quoted above. 
74 Nifo, 40–41. See Murdoch, 177. 
75 John of Salisbury, Policraticus VII. 12; Id. Metalogicon II. 6; etc. 
76 Petrarch 2003, Contra medicum II. 100, 79–78: “I say that your color, 
smell, and taste come from the stuff to which you are exposed—shit” 
(“Ab obiectis inquam stercoribus et colorem et odorem traxeris et 
saporem”); Petrarch 2003, Contra eum qui maledixit Italiae 99, 454–
455: “But our little Gaul loves Greek titles; and although he may have 
no Greek or Latin learning, he thinks he is someone great when he 
belches forth the word ‘Physics’ or spits out ‘Metaphisics” (“At Gallicu-
lus titulos Grecos amat, et quamvis scientiam forte nec Grecam habeat 
nec Latinam, magnum se aliquid credit, dum ‘Phisicam’ ructat, ‘Meta-
phisicam’ spuit”), my italics. 
77 Bartholomaeus Coloniensis was one of Erasmus’s teachers in Deven-
ter and much admired by him; see his Epigrammata (1497), especially 
those against Zoilus (Coloniensis 5. 1–7, 30–35). Further examples on 
his influence on Erasmus in Ijsewijn 233 and 271–273. 
78 See, e.gr., Van Dorp’s Oratio in laudem omnium artium (31); Reuch-
lin’s (1999, 368) wordplay Asinus aureus/ Asinus stercorarius in his 
Defensio contra calumniatores suos Colonienses, witten originally in 
1513; Beatus Rhenanus’s (410) description of the new sophists as “fo-
eda barbarie;” Von Hutten’s (1862b, 435–436) attack against Arnold 
Tungern in Triumphus Doctoris Reuchlini, written originally in 1517; 
Eck’s Briefwechsel 41 (to Joachim Vadian, March 18, 1517); Ps-
Pirckheimer’s (Pirckheimer, 68–69) Eccius dedolatus, written originally 
in 1520: “Friends. Gracious! He threw up a red beret! Surgeon. He was 
made doctor of canon law. You see now how violently all these things 
abused his stomach? Friends. We do, ad it’s no wonder he took sick. 
The wonder’s more how he could live! Surgeon. I arrived in the nick of 
the time. But now the force of the medicine is descending to the lower 
regions. Did you hear? He voided something. Friends. You mean he 
emptied his bowels! Whew! What a stench! Did he discharge bile? Sur-
geon. Those are the indulgences that that slanderer Hochstraten excreted 
in his cacology […] And these are the sweet-smelling niceties of the 
magistri nostri! But with his chest exposed now, the skin must be re-
moved. My word! What tetter, what psora, or rather ulceration, or, in 
fact, cancer itself!…” (“Amici. Pape, quin rubeum eiecit Biretum. Chi-
rurgus. Iuris Canonici doctoratus. Videtis nunc, quam vehementer haec 
omnia stomachum oppresserunt? Amici. Cernimus, et haud mirum si 
aegrotaverit, magis mirandum quo pacto vivere potuerit. Chirurgus. In 
tempore adveni, sed nunc medicinae vis ad inferiora descendit: audistis? 
Iam oletum fecit. Amici. Quin concacavit. Hui, quantus foetor! Num 
bilem egessit? Chirurgus. Indulgentiae sunt, quas iam pridem 
συκοφάντης ille Hochstratus in cacologia sua permerdavit […]. Et haec 
Magistrorum Nostrorum suave olentes sunt mundiciae. Sed iam aperto 
pectore pellem detrahere est necesse. Hui, quae vitiligo, quae psora, imo 
gangraena, seu potius cancer ipse”), Von Hutten 1860, 540; and, of 
course, Luther’s (1989, 727, 731, also 732 and 733) To the Councilmen 
of All Cities in Germany [1523], together with his Contra XXXII articu-
los Lovaniensium theologistarum [1545] §30–31, WA, 54: 427, just to 
give two examples. Catholic humanists rapidly used these terms against 
early reformers; see, for instance, the following passage of More’s 
(1969, 60–61) Responsio ad Lutherum: “Illi igitur abeunt, alius alio, quo 
quemque tulit animus: et se pero omnia plaustra, uehicula, cymbas, 
thermas, ganea, tonstrinas, tabernas, lustra, pistrina, latrinas, lupanaria 
diffundunt: illic obseruant sedulo, atque in tabellas referunt, quicquid aut 
auriga sordide, aut seruus uerniliter, aut portior improbe, aut parasitus 
scurriliter, aut meretrix petulanter, aut leno turpiter, aut balneator spurce, 
aut cacator obscoene loquutus sit. Atque haec quum aliquot fecissent 
menses: tum demum quicquid undecunque collegissent, conuitiorum, 
iurgiorum, et scurrilium scommatum, petulantiae spurciciae, sordium, 
luti, caeni, stercorum, omnem hanc colluuiem in foedissimam cloacam 
Lutheri pectus infartiunt. Quam ille totam, in libellum istum suum co-
nuitiatorium per os illud impurum uelut comesam merdam reuomuit. 
Inde tibi lector aceruus ille spurcissimorum latratuum, quibus solis 
stultissimus libellus impletur…” (“There they diligently observe and set 
down in their notebooks whatever a coachman spoke ribaldly, or a ser-
vant insolently, or a porter lewdly, or a parasite jeeringly, or a whore 
wantonly, or a pimp indecently, or a bath-keeper filthily, or a shitter 
obscenely. After hunting for several months, then, finally, all that they 
had collected from any place whatever, railings, brawlings, scurrilous 
scoffs, wantonness, obscenities, dirt, filth, muck, shit, all this sewage 
they stuff into the most foul sewer of Luther’s breast. All this he vom-
ited up through that foul mouth into that railers’ book of his, like de-
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voured dung. From there, reader, you receive that accumulated mass of 
indecent brawlings, with which alone the utterly foolish book is filled”). 
79 See Erasmus’s Spongia adversus aspergines Hutteni [1523]: “Fortasse 
sic me volebat Huttenus scribere: ‘spurcissima latrina, tun’ audes viros 
heroas tuis merdosis libellis aspergere?’ Forsitan sic decebat scribere 
Huttenum, at non decebat Erasmus” (“Hutten would perhaps have 
wanted me to address Hoogstraten in this fashion: ‘You filthy cesspool, 
how dare you defile men of heroic stature with your muck-filled books?’ 
Such a style might be fitting for Hutten, but nor for Erasmus”), ASD IX. 
1, 136; CWE 78: 56. Erasmus, as it is known, could be, and actually 
was, equally harsh when the situation required, see by way of example 
(there are many more) his Concio sive Merdardus [1531]: “Merdardus 
suas merdosas purulentias effuderit”, ASD I. 3: 655. 
80 “Sed in nostrae tempestatis theologastros quosdam iocari libuit, quo-
rum cerebellis nihil putidius, lingua nihil barbarius, ingenio nihil stu-
pidius, doctrina nihil spinosius, moribus nihil asperius, vita nihil fuca-
tius, oratione nihil virulentius, pectore nihil nigrius” (“I merely wished 
to make a joke at the expense of a few quasi-theologians of our own day, 
whose brains are the most addled, tongues the most uncultured, wits the 
dullest, teachings the thorniest, characters the least attractive, lives the 
most hypocritical, talk the most slanderous, and hearts the blackest on 
earth”) Allen, Opus epistolarum I. 64: 192–193; CWE 1: 138, my italics. 
81 ASD I. 5: 316–318; CWE 23: 272–273. 
82 Rabelais 1955, 189 and 1999, ch. IV, 149. 
83 Valeriano IX. 5, 100. 
84 Humanist invectives, for instance, have been thoroughly studied in the 
following articles and monographs: Mattioli, 127–139; Allen 1986, 417–
55; Fabbri, 551–556; Godman, 26–30, 39–51, 54–56, 76–77, 82–100, 
253–260, etc.; Laureys, 9–30; Rao; Helmrath, 259–293; and Rizzi, 145–
158. 
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Abstract: Starting from the fierce conflict between De-
siderius Erasmus and Martin Luther, my contribution 
aims to show the rhetorical genesis of Erasmus’ reflection 
on ethics. Specifically, I will focus on the fact that some 
of the most significant and recurrent metaphors in Eras-
mus’ moral and theological meditation (e.g. Hercules, Si-
lenus and the fly) trace their roots back to the work of 
Lucian of Samosata. Against this background, it will be 
possible to investigate the fundamental role of the 
Lucianic attitude in defining some key-concepts of Eras-
mus’ thought, such as the rhetorical concepts of festivitas 
and persona. Moreover, I will demonstrate how these 
concepts become the starting point of Erasmus’ silenic 
moral, modelled on the sophistic ability to transform rela-
tions and proportions between things by using words. 
 
Keywords: Desiderius Erasmus, Martin Luther, Lucian 
of Samosata, Rhetoric, Festivitas, Ethics. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
For a long time critics have underestimated the influence 
of Lucian of Samosata’s work on the pedagogical, rhet-
orical, moral and theological thought of Desiderius Eras-
mus. Critical studies on Erasmus and on Lucian’s Renais-
sance legacy often devote one or more chapters to the re-
lationship between the humanist from Rotterdam and the 
rhetorician from Samosata, but, just as often, their analy-
sis is reduced to a thematic catalogue where recurring 
characters and situations are listed without taking into ac-
count any deeper intellectual accord.1 
The only work by Erasmus on which there exist ex-
haustive scholarly accounts of the formal and substantial 
influence exerted by Lucian is the Moriae Encomium. 
This work, however, despite its symbolic value, is fre-
quently considered either as merely a playful digression 
in Erasmus’ workshop or as a serious labour, in which the 
Lucianic sophistic brilliance is no more than a disguise.2 
Against this background, the objective of my contribu-
tion is to show how Lucian’s rhetorical experimentations 
became the centre of Erasmus’ moral and theological re-
flection, based on the concepts of exercise and contextual 
knowledge. First, I shall focus on the importance of 
Lucian’s legacy in understanding the dispute on free will 
between Erasmus and Martin Luther. Secondly, I shall 
shed light on the fact that the whole of Erasmus’ ethics, 
whose figure are the Sileni Alcibiadis, originated in the 
sophistic aesthetics of the rhetorician from Samosata 
To do this it will be necessary to understand the key 
role played by Lucian during the first years of Erasmus’ 
rhetorical education. In this period the Latin translation of 
the Greek sophist became a training ground in language 
and life that accompanied the humanist from Rotterdam 
and his friend Thomas More for a decade, and laid the 
groundwork of Erasmus’ pedagogy.  
With this contribution, therefore, following the ap-
proach of Eric MacPhail (2006; 2011), I propose to out-
line a first stage in the history of Erasmus’ reception of 
late ancient sophistry. 
 
 
2. Hercules at the crossroads 
  
There is an image that, more than any other, both unites 
and divides the work of Desiderius Erasmus and the work 
of Martin Luther: the image of Hercules.3 
To show how the discussion about the value of rhet-
orical art constitutes the focus of the conflict between Lu-
ther and Erasmus, nothing is more effective than an inves-
tigation of the different ethical and gnoseological ap-
proaches that established their different characterisation 
of Hercules. 
Ulrich Von Hutten was the first, after the Leipzig de-
bate (1519), to connect Luther with the figure of Hercules 
Germanicus, which had become the emblem of the new 
German power, thanks to the authority of the emperor 
Maximilian I and the propaganda of the humanist Conrad 
Celtis4. This representation of Luther as a wild and war-
like destroyer of the papal heresy, in the name of the new 
prosperity of the German nation, was the basis of an en-
graving by Hans Holbein the Younger (1522), in which a 
brawny Luther, covered with the lion skin and gripping 
the club of Hercules, shows his vigour by breaking up 
scholastic philosophers and curial enemies.5 
One year later, Holbein painted a portrait of Erasmus 
(1523) in which the Dutch humanist is represented as a 
man quietly sitting at his desk and resting his hands on a 
bound volume, whose top edge exhibits the words 
ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΟΙ ΠΟΝΟΙ (i.e. Herculei labores).6 
The ironic counterpoint between the two images is 
evident: by turning the challenges of Hercules into a tire-
less research within the changing universe of speech, 
Erasmus’ corpusculum vitreum7 is opposed to the violent 
and aggressive physicality of Luther’s Herculean labours. 
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The harena, where the Herculean gladiator from Rotter-
dam fights, is, explicitly, that of the cultum Musarum 
(CWE 10, 438; Allen V, 590). 
This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that, in the 
portrait painted by Holbein, the volume Erasmus is touch-
ing is a copy of his Adagia, at the centre of which is the 
proverb Herculei labores. Within the texture of the Ada-
gia, this maxim constitutes a real mise en abyme of Eras-
mus’ method of working: it shows his effort to fight the 
Hydra which stands for the mobility of literary sources 
and to bring some partial order into the changeable field 
of proverbial meanings.8 
Following Plutarch’s De genio Socratis, Erasmus’ 
Hercules is he who learned the alphabet under the guid-
ance of the ever-changing Proteus and handed it down to 
the Greeks9, or rather, he is, following the description 
given by Lucian of Samosata, the Hercules Gallicus who 
replaced the emblems of physical strength with the em-
blems of protean rhetorical power. It is no coincidence 
that Erasmus was the first Latin translator of Lucian's 
Herakles: he created a vivid portrait of the new Hercules 
senex, which became, in turn, the protagonist of many 
iconographic and literary “rewrites” as the symbol of vis 
eloquentiae:10 
 
That old Heracles of theirs drags after him a great crowd of men 
who are all tethered by the ears! His leashes are delicate chains 
fashioned of gold and amber, resembling the prettiest of neck-
laces. Yet, though led by bonds so weak, the men do not think of 
escaping, as they easily could, and they do not pull back at all or 
brace their feet and lean in the opposite direction to that in 
which he is leading them. In fact, they follow cheerfully and 
joyously, applauding their leader and all pressing him close and 
keeping the leashes slack in their desire to overtake him; appar-
ently they would be offended if they were let loose! But let me 
tell you without delay what seemed to me the strangest thing of 
all. Since the painter had no place to which he could attach the 
ends of the chains, as the god's right hand already held the club 
and his left the bow, he pierced the tip of his tongue and repre-
sented him drawing the men by that means! Moreover, he has 
his face turned toward his captives, and is smiling [...].In gen-
eral, we consider that the real Heracles was a wise man who 
achieved everything by eloquence and applied persuasion as his 
principal force. His arrows represent words, I suppose, keen, 
sure and swift, which make their wounds in souls. (Luc. Herc., 
tr. Harmon, I, 65-67)11 
 
In this context, starting from the adage Herculei labores, 
in which Erasmus shows himself engaged in the work of 
organizing and reorganizing ancient literary tradition, the 
Herculean labours prove to be an education in the elusive 
luxuriance of the persuasive speech. 
The Lucianic origin of Erasmus’ Hercules-orator well 
illustrates the mediating role that Lucian’s work played in 
the defining process of Erasmus’ idea of rhetoric as a 
playful and contextual cognitive instrument. In accusing 
Erasmus of using words like an equivocal and ambiguous 
mask, which imprisons the interlocutor in the meshes of 
paradox,12 Luther was actually railing against this mock-
ing and evasive Hercules-Proteus of Lucianic ancestry. 
Against this background, the Hercules Gallicus en-
graving by Albrecht Dürer (1498) would have been fully 
appreciated by Luther:13 the German painter represented 
the Hercules Gallicus as a vacillating Hercules at the 
crossroads, his guilty hesitancy staged by details such as 
his helmet, which bears the cock of the loquacious Mer-
cury, the proof that he is an able rhetorician – “trepidat in 
morem galli” (CWE 33, 88; ASD II/3, 146). 
 
 
3. A Lucianic training: mask, representation, exercise 
 
Before turning back to the conflict that, with regard to 
Lucian’s rhetoric, set Erasmus and Luther against each 
other, it will be useful to consider the key role that the 
special sophistic aptitude of Lucian had on Erasmus’ in-
tellectual biography from its very beginning. 
It seems impossible to deal with the relevance of 
Lucian's influence on the definition of Erasmus’ rhetorical 
paradigm without focusing on the intellectual partnership 
and the sincere friendship that, thanks to the rhetorician of 
Samosata, bonded Erasmus and Thomas More. Between 
1505 and 1506,14 Erasmus and More’s translation of 
Lucian’s works15 was not only a test of their knowledge 
of Greek language and literature, but also, and especially, 
a workshop for the construction of a joint educational pro-
ject and a shared view regarding the role of rhetorical 
practice.  
In the eyes of Erasmus and More, what made Lucian 
especially suitable in teaching the elements of Greek, so 
much so that he was regarded as an essential pedagogical 
tool,16 was the quality that can be defined as the festivi-
tas17 of the rhetorician from Samosata. On the one hand, 
this concept of rhetorical origin, crucial for Erasmus’ 
pedagogical and theological elaboration, is concerned 
with a sociable and cheerful, refined and graceful kind of 
laugh. Indeed, the pleasantness of festivitas results mainly 
from expertise in the use of language and from the skill in 
playing with a specific cultural tradition, by translating 
and betraying its topoi.18 On the other hand, the festive 
approach reveals a more comic than tragic theatrical ten-
dency, towards changing voice and character (persona), 
according to the needs of representation19 (“And this dia-
logue is sure to be no less pleasant than profitable, if the 
reader only observe the appropriate way in which its 
characters are treated”; Dedication of Toxaris, sive 
Amicitia’ translation to Richard Foxe, CWE 2, 103;20 
“This dialogue of Lucian [...] is a most skilful perform-
ance, in that the drawing of so many and such different 
characters is so wonderfully lifelike”; Dedication of Con-
vivium, sive Lapithae’s translation to Johann Huttich, 
CWE 4, 28221). Therefore, the festivitas is a cultivated 
comicality (festivissima doctrina and doctissima festivi-
tas) and Lucian’s nugae litteratae are made up of allu-
sions, in which the mask has an essential role because of 
its quality of indirect and oblique enunciation. The im-
pression of lightness communicated to Erasmus and More 
by Lucian’s festivitas has little to do with the idea of idle 
and intellectually weak literary practice.22 This agreeable-
ness seems rather to be the result of a never-ending ex-
ploration of meanings where each mask is an exercitium 
and truth takes the form of a representation. The peda-
gogical importance of Lucian’s work, therefore, concerns 
laughter not only, and not so much, as a rhetorical device 
to capture a child’s attention. Laughter is above all the 
focal point of a perspective in which rhetorical fiction has 
the quality of an intertextual structure to be explored and 
changed, starting from the contexts in which it is used. It 
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is not by chance that Erasmus and More identify the main 
peculiarity of the Lucianic laugh with the multiplicity of 
characters and situations: their topical quality becomes 
the means through which the work of the rhetorician from 
Samosata is assembled and disassembled, and forms the 
perfect base to receive innumerable variations, in the form 
of rhetorical exercises. Thus Lucian’s moral usefulness, 
which is repeatedly emphasized by Erasmus and More,23 
is consistent with the fact that his work seems to be a 
mechanism for generating text and an inexhaustible con-
tainer of sources, i.e. a real palestra ingeniorum. Accord-
ing to Erasmus, Lucian’s laughter is the most appropriate 
instrument to guide pupils towards moral seriousness be-
cause it is the denial of every peremptory and dogmatic 
point of view and, therefore, the image of a joyful pietas 
(“true religion ought to be the most cheerful thing in the 
world”; De recta pronuntiatione, CWE 26, 38524). By 
teaching the relativity of communicative situations and 
the variability of temperaments, the laughter resulting 
from the art of rhetoric comes to resemble the most sin-
cere content of Christian morality, based on tolerance and 
loving persuasion.  
In Erasmus and More’s translations, the ever-present 
epigraph of Lucian’s work is Horace’ advice to miscere 
utile dulci and to coniungere voluptatem cum utilitate.25 
In this context, it should be clarified that laughter is the 
medium between pleasure and usefulness because it trans-
forms every representation into a kind of partial compo-
sition related to the concept of rhetorical exercitium. This 
means that, in Erasmus and More’s pedagogical approach, 
the ability to produce an effect on the mind has greater 
weight than absolute adherence to a worthless and useless 
truth. In  a rhetorical exercitium the three meanings of 
ludus (game, play and school) overlap. 
However, the art of persuading that Erasmus learned 
from Lucian is a paradoxical tool, which needs at the 
same time to be heeded and unpacked: it is precisely 
through the festivitas that it reveals its nature as artifice. 
In this context, it will be interesting to note that the works 
of Lucian that Erasmus chose to translate are, for the most 
part, rhetorical exercises in declamation (Abdicatus; Tox-
aris sive Amicitia; Tyrannicida) or texts where Lucian 
ironically condemns superstition as harmful gullibility, 
where the level of representation blends with the level of 
truth (Alexander seu Pseudomantis; De sacrificiis; De 
luctu; De astrologia). Reading Lucian means learning to 
recognize the fabula as a space of possibilities and as a 
fiction that serves as an antidote to superstition. This kind 
of Lucianism is especially evident in the group of Collo-
quia26 where Erasmus looks at trickery as a real phar-
makon, i.e. as a fabula staged with wit and irony to reveal 
the stupid stagnation of credulity with its ineptitude in de-
coding representations. 
If one shifts the focus specifically onto Erasmus’ 
pedagogical thought, the preceptor-rhetorician he envis-
aged, through the filter of Lucian, is not only someone 
who teaches by ridiculae fabulae. He is a true comedian 
who chooses Lucian’s rhetorical skill as a lifestyle: in this 
comic activity of  mimesis he goes so far as to play the 
role of his pupil and to take his weaknesses and his doubt 
as the cornerstone of all possible knowledge:  
 
I prefer a teacher who is of an age when his vigour is in its 
prime, an age which does not repel his pupils and allows him to 
assume any role. In guiding the intellectual development of his 
students, the instructor should abide by the same principles that 
are followed by parents and nurses in promoting physical 
growth. (De pueris instituendis, CWE 26, 334-335)27 
 
It is no coincidence if, in the dialogue Puerpera (CWE, 
39, 590-618; ASD I/3, 453-469), the two characters bear 
the descriptive names of Fabulla and Eutrapelo. By con-
versing about the most appropriate way to take care of a 
child’s physical and intellectual education, they mark out 
an educational space where fabula and iocus become the 
real protagonists. Indeed, the perfect pedagogue is one 
who has the rhetorical ability to play with representations 
and who is able to educate his pupil to make a constant 
hermeneutic effort. This training allows the pupil not only 
to be a passive spectator of the educational fabula, but 
also to enter into the fabula as a protagonist, through the 
mimetic game. The preceptor’s rhetorical skill lies in 
making the speech an instrument that functions as a path-
way for the imagination28. This means that Erasmus’ pre-
ceptor does not teach through a prescriptive moralism or 
an unreflective persuasion. On the contrary, he suggests 
an educational opportunity that the pupil may develop at 
his pleasure. Therefore, according to Erasmus, education 
is a beneficent deception: it is a playful fiction (“More-
over, I’m not sure anything is learned better than what is 
learned as a game. To confer a benefit through a trick is 
surely deception of the most innocent sort”; De utilitate 
colloquiorum, CWE 40, 109829), which suspends the 
categories of true and false (“Nor is truth always the op-
posite of falsehood” Ecclesiastes, CWE 68, 69130). 
At this point, to go back to the relationship established 
between Erasmus and More under the banner of Lucian, it 
is not surprising that in his letter to Ulrich Von Hutten of 
July 1519 Erasmus superimposed the image of the rhet-
orician from Samosata onto the lively portrait of his Eng-
lish friend and fellow scholar: 
 
The affection [...] that you feel for that gifted man Thomas 
More, fired of course as you are by reading his books, which 
you rightly call as brilliant as they are scholarly – all this, be-
lieve me my dear Hutten, you share with many of us [...] His 
expression shows the sort of men he is, always friendly and 
cheerful, with something of the air of one who smiles easily, and 
(to speak frankly) disposed to be merry rather than serious or 
solemn, but without a hint of the fool or the buffoon [...]. His 
language is remarkably clear and precise, without a trace of 
hurry and hesitation. (CWE 7, 16-18) 31 
 
More not only displays immense culture, outstanding elo-
quence and a great disposition to laugh, but he is also able 
to change his role depending on the context without aban-
doning his convivial levity. This iocunditas makes him 
look like the perfect Lucianic rhetorician and preceptor: 
 
In society he shows such rare courtesy and sweetness of disposi-
tion that there is no man so melancholy by nature that More 
does not enliven him, no disaster so great that he does not dissi-
pate its unpleasantness. From boyhood he has taken such pleas-
ure in jesting that he might seem born for it [...]. In his youth he 
both wrote brief comedies and acted in them. Any remark with 
more wit in it than ordinary always gave him pleasure, even if 
directed against himself; such is his delight in witty sayings that 
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betray a lively mind. Hence his trying his hand as a young man 
at epigrams, and his special devotion to Lucian; in fact it was he 
(yes, he can make the camel dance) who persuaded me to write 
my Moriae Encomium. 
In fact there is nothing in human life to which he cannot look for 
entertainment, even in most serious moments. If he has to do 
with educated and intelligent people, he enjoys their gifts; if 
they are ignorant and stupid, he is amused by their absurdity. 
(CWE 7, 18-19)32 
 
Significantly, the classic comedy and the particular soph-
istic aptitude of Lucian seem to be the literary instruments 
through which More formed his own character. Thus, it is 
obvious that he became the promoter of Erasmus’ Moriae 
Encomium. 
 
 
4. Muscarum Achilles 
 
After this brief survey of Erasmus’ Lucianic training, we 
can now focus on his discussion with Luther, in which his 
Lucianic identity became the symbol of a fundamental 
gnoseological opposition.  
When, in September 1524, Erasmus published his own 
Diatriba de libero arbitrio, he chose to view the entire 
work in the light of a disproportion: the decision to dis-
cuss with Luther one of the foundations of the theology of 
the German Hercules put Erasmus – Hercules senex and 
homuncio pygmaeus - in the position of a miserable fly 
faced with the majesty of the elephant of Wittenberg 
(“Does Erasmus dare to take on Luther as a fly might an 
elephant?”; CWE 76, 6 33). 
The apparent inanity of this confrontation was des-
tined, however, for a potential reversal, whose paradoxi-
cal nature originates in the rhetorical universe of Lucian. 
Indeed, in the immense workshop of the Adagia there is a 
brief comment on the proverbial saying Elephantum ex 
musca facis, through which Erasmus makes the comical 
outcome of this identity exchange explicit by referring to 
Lucian’s Muscae encomium: 
 
Έλέφας ἐκμυίας ποιεῑς, You make an elephant out of a fly, 
that is, you use big words about little things and exaggerate 
them. Lucian in his Panegyric on the Fly: «There is much more 
that I could say, but I will stop there, for fear of seeming, as the 
proverb has it, to make an elephant out of a fly. (CWE 32, 219)34 
 
The way in which Lucian’s paradoxical encomium works 
is concisely rendered by Erasmus’ quotation. The lack of 
correspondence between words and things creates a 
parodic effect, which changes the nature of words and 
things themselves through a sophistic process: the fly 
transmutes into an elephant by a skilful patchworking of 
the fragments of the elephant’s epic wisdom onto the 
laughable little body of the annoying insect. 
The ambiguity of the fly-elephant couple occurs once 
again, when it is observed that in Lucian’s Muscae Enco-
mium the fly gets the better of the elephant because of its 
small size: “So strong is the fly that when she bites she 
wounds the skin of the ox and the horse as well as that of 
man. She even torments the elephant by entering his 
wrinkles and lancing him with her proboscis as far as its 
length allows” (Luc. Musc. Enc., tr. Harmon, I, 89). The 
elephant’s trunk is of no avail against the fly - this is its 
ironic nemesis. 
To draw a genealogy sub specie muscae – i.e. under 
the sign of sophistic reversibility – of Erasmus’ interest in 
Lucian’s work, it will be useful to turn our attention to the 
rewriting of Lucian’s encomium made by Leon Battista 
Alberti between 1441 and 1443, as a reply to Guarino 
Veronese’s translation of the Muscae Encomium.35 
In the context of Alberti's rewriting, the results of the 
contest between fly and elephant become even clearer: 
“posterity handed down in literary monuments that the 
elephant saw himself defeated by the fly” (Musca, 50: 
“elephantum a musca prostratum se posteritas vidisse lit-
terarum monumentis tradidit”). Furthermore, Alberti’s 
Musca has a particular interest because it shows how the 
paradoxical praise responds to a real philosophical pro-
gramme, which is able to give new value to res domesti-
cae et familiares. In his Musca, Alberti rejects the human 
folly of investigating the forms of reality a conspectus 
abditae et in obscuro retrusae, thereby re-evaluating 
those things which are for the most part in medium ex-
positae et cognitu perfaciles (45-46). Therefore, if the 
reading of Lucian’s eulogy can cheer up Alberti and cure 
him of the inconvenience of fever by means of laughter 
(45), then this depends on the fact that the tiny praised 
animal is the bearer of a kind of knowledge that is able to 
deconstruct the seriousness of knotty philosophical specu-
lation, through the levity of play. This playful approach 
questions every established value. In the first proem of 
the Momus, Alberti distinguishes those who wear the 
static mask of sternness (severitatis persona), from those 
who attain seriousness through the changeability of fes-
tivitas (6-7). As we have seen, this festive quality is con-
nected to the ability to combine and vary different sources 
because “nothing is said which has not previously been 
said” (Momus, 4-5: “nihil dictum quin prius dictum”). 
The humble fly, minutus animans, hardly to be taken seri-
ously, dresses itself up in epic words and philosophical 
virtues, which take the form of a parodic exercise. 
Fully in keeping with this spirit, Erasmus took the 
identity of the buzzing insect and moved the discussion 
on free will from the systematic ground of the tractatus36 
to the rhetorical ground of the diatribe,37 whose literary 
form deals more with the rhetorical exercise of the dispu-
tatio in utramque partem than with the Cynic-Stoic dia-
logic tradition. Erasmus’ diatribe is characterized by the 
assumption of the concept of decorum personae as an ex-
pression of an unsystematic philosophy, which is struc-
tured on the basis of contextual needs. Therefore, Eras-
mus’ decisive rejection of Luther’s pervicacia asserendi 
plays a central role in the first part of De libero arbitrio 
because this rejection leads Erasmus to investigate the 
rhetorical field of the probable and plausible: 
 
Now for my part I was well aware how poorly suited I was for 
this wrestling-match – indeed there is hardly a man less prac-
tised in the art than I, for I have always preferred sporting in the 
spacious plains of the Muses to engaging in swordplay at close 
quarters. And I take so little pleasure in assertions that I will 
gladly seek refuge in Scepticism [...], and so I will act as disput-
ant, not as a judge; as inquirer, not as dogmatist; ready to learn 
from anyone, if any truer or more reliable arguments can be put 
forward. (CWE 76, 7-8)38 
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It is clear that the most appropriate context for Erasmus’ 
reflection is that of the ludus, of play, and the exercise of 
fictio: what is dubious, what is difficult to discern in the 
labyrinth of the Scriptures cannot take the form of per-
emptory assertion, but it may be explored through the 
practice of fiction: 
 
What you affirm, I wish; what you say you know, I desire to 
learn; nor is it enough for me that you firmly assert this – I de-
mand the certitude which you profess to have [...] For it often 
happens that when someone comes out of the dark, he does not 
see anything even in full sunlight unless he has focused his eyes 
for a while, and some things we do not see immediately through 
the darkness, but as we focus our eyes what was doubtful before 
gradually begins to be clear to us, and the same thing happens 
when things are far away from us. But out of courtesy I pre-
tended that the interpretations on both sides were ambiguous so 
that on a level playing field you might show something that 
would incline towards your side those of us who were vacillat-
ing in the middle. (Hyperaspites, CWE 76, 226-227)39 
 
Against this background, the letter that Erasmus wrote to 
John Extin in November 1499, about twenty years before 
the explosion of the Lutheran issue, is very significant. By 
relating the degeneration of a convivial discussion into a 
battle inter pocula, i.e. a kind of Lucianic anti-
symposium, Erasmus represents himself as a poet-orator 
in the midst of an assembly of theologians: he is able to 
take the banquet, which is corrupted by the harshness of 
controversy, back to a relaxed, cheerful and sociable 
mood through the narration of a festiva fabella: 
 
In the end, since the discussion had gone on rather long and had 
become too serious and too rigorous to suit a dinner party, I de-
cided to play  my part, that is, the part of the poet, with the ob-
ject of getting rid of this contentious argument and introducing 
some gaiety into the meal. (CWE 1, 230)40 
 
To return to the discussion on free will, Luther recognized 
and was severely critical of the sophistic and Lucianic 
disposition of Erasmus, who was able to transform things 
through words. According to Erasmus, the interchange-
ability of roles in the competition between fly and ele-
phant shed a playful light on the whole diatribe; accord-
ing to Luther, however, Erasmus’ art of transmutation 
took the form of a diabolic rhetorical fucus, of Odysseus’ 
malicious flexiloquus (On the Bondage of the Will, tr. H. 
Cole, 3-4; De servo arbitrio, WA 18, 601-602): Erasmus’ 
festivitas was decisively banned (On the Bondage of the 
Will, 8; WA, 18, 603), together with Lucian’s laugh: 
 
For, by so doing, you only  evince that you  hug in your heart a 
Lucian, or some other  of the  swinish  tribe of  Epicureans; 
who, because he does not  believe there is a God himself , sec-
retly laughs at all those who believe and confess it. (On the 
Bondage of the Will, 12)41 
 
What shall I say here, Erasmus? To me, you breathe out nothing 
but Lucian, and draw in the gorging surfeit of Epicurus. (On the 
Bondage of the Will, 17)42 
 
Furthermore, Luther did not leave any space for the 
possibilities of fiction, so relevant to Erasmus in the field 
of theological education: 
 
And moreover [I would shew you] what is it to run against di-
vine things and truths, when, in mere compliance with others 
and against our conscience, we assume a strange character and 
act upon a strange stage. It is neither a game nor a jest, to under-
take to teach the sacred truths and godliness: for it is very easy 
here to meet with the fall which James speaks of, “He that of-
fended in one point is guilty of all”. For when we begin to be, in 
the least degree, disposed to trifle, and not to hold the sacred 
truths in due reverence, we are soon involved  in impieties, and 
overwhelmed with blasphemies: as  it has happened to you here, 
Erasmus. (On the Bondage of the Will, 34)43 
 
Nugae and sacrae litterae should on no account be mixed 
(On the Bondage of the Will, 107; WA 18, 661): the in-
conceivable contaminations that systematically appear in 
Erasmus’ works seemed to Luther closer to the fictional 
inventions of Lucian’s Vera Historia than to serious theo-
logical engagement (“To teach, then, a something which 
is neither described by one word within the scriptures, nor 
evidenced by one fact without the scriptures, is that, 
which does not belong to the doctrines of Christians, but 
to the very fables of Lucian”; On the Bondage of the Will, 
10744). Thus, in the centre of his De servo arbitrio, Luther 
redeployed the image of Erasmus as a fly and portrayed 
the humanist from Rotterdam as leading a ridiculous army 
of insects and fighting against an impressive and solemn 
rank of fully armed men : “it is just thus, that the human 
dreams of the Diatribe are drawn up in battle against the 
hosts of  the words of God! ” (On the Bondage of the 
Will, 165).45 In this context the military virtues of the fly, 
ironically commended by Alberti (Musca, 47-49), prove 
to be only as a grotesque shadow and a poor substitute for 
the stern decorum of a warrior: according to Luther, the 
human comedy of the diatribe is clearly at variance with 
the tragic epic of Christianity. It was for this reason that, 
in a letter of 1524, Luther attempted to discourage Eras-
mus’ stance against the Protestant reformation by refer-
ring to his own theological battle as a real tragoedia, 
whose harshness did not suit the intelligence of the homo 
loquax: Erasmus should have remained simply a spectator 
of the Lutheran tragic drama (“I beg you [...] to be no 
more than a spectator of this trouble in which we are en-
gaged”; CWE 10, 24646). Erasmus’ reply was immediate 
and, by turning what Luther considers the imbecilitas of 
the man of letters into a judgment parameter, he insisted 
on the need to take part in the tragoedia lutherana in 
order to dissipate its tragic result (“let me not be a specta-
tor and watch the tragedy unfold- I only hope it does not 
have a tragic ending!” CWE 10, 25547). 
At this point, it should be borne in mind that the mus-
carum Achilles (On the Bondage of the Will, 165; WA 18, 
688) mask, which exploits the meaning potential of 
laughable realities, is not a novelty in Erasmus’ reper-
toire. In the Prolegomena to the Adagia, the proverbial 
form is compared to those minutissima animantia which 
reveal the expertise of nature more than the mighty ele-
phant because of the functionality of their anatomical 
structure (“And, as Pliny says, the miracle of nature is 
greater in the most minute creatures [...] than in the ele-
phant, if only one looks closely; and so, in the domain of 
literature, it is sometimes the smallest things which have 
the greatest intellectual value”; CWE 31, 1448). According 
to Erasmus, smallness, nugacitas, and a witty and lively 
mind are one and the same. They have an essential rela-
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tionship with the universe of rhetorical exercise (Apo-
phthegmata, CWE 37, 15-16; ASD IV/4, 45) and with the 
stutter of human speech (Ratio seu methodus, LB V, 124), 
whose fate it is to acquire meaning only through reformu-
lation and shift in perspective. It is no coincidence that, in 
the discussion with Guillaume Budé which started in 
1516, Erasmus focused on the definition of a poetics of 
leptologemata. While according to Budé, Erasmus’ elo-
quence should find more appropriate tones and subjects to 
display its grandeur, the humanist from Rotterdam in-
sisted on the nugatory nature of his light philosophy 
(CWE 4, 102-107; Allen II, 362-366), which could adapt 
itself to the world stage (CWE 4, 228-236; Allen II, 463-
469). 
Moriae Encomium is the best example of Erasmus’ 
paradoxical approach. Here, the aptitude of the tetrica 
philosophia  for dealing with serious things in a light and 
foolish manner (i.e. in specular terms, for changing trifles 
into serious things) is opposed to the aptitude of the mo-
rosophus in dealing with trivial things as such. In short, 
the most pleasant and useful thing is to achieve seria by 
means of nugae.49 Therefore, while the supercilious phi-
losophers reveal their silliness behind the appearance of 
graveness, Folly’s companions recognizes the festiva, 
lepida et iucunda surface of reality as the place for the 
production of meaning. Once again, the acknowledge-
ment of the nugacitas of nugae leads to the paradoxical 
reversibility of the fly-elephant’s rhetoric. 
 
 
5. Alcibiades’ Sileni 
 
There is another image in Erasmus’ work that certainly 
can be juxtaposed with the fly-elephant couple: the image 
of the scarab, which is described in the fabula that com-
ments on the adage Scarabaeus aquilam quaerit (CWE 
35, 178-214; ASD II/6, 395-424). Most of this fabella is 
taken up by the development of two epideictic compo-
sitions: the first consists of the condemnation of the 
eagle’s ferocity and arrogance, which is compared to the 
rapacity of contemporary tyrants; the second consists of 
the paradoxical praise of the hidden qualities of the hum-
ble scarab, which turn into symbols of divinity. The con-
demnation of the eagle affords an opportunity to stage a 
satirical tirade against the violence of power and to paint 
the portrait of the ideal sovereign; the praise for the sca-
rab, on the other hand, is characterized by the ironic trans-
formation of the scarab’s faults into physical, moral and 
intellectual qualities. In short, in Erasmus’ definition, the 
scarab is a true Alcibiades’ Silenus50 in whom a risible 
surface and rich inwardness coexist. 
Against this background, it will be useful to go back 
to the point in Erasmus’ Adagia where the proverbial 
phrase Sileni Alcibiadis is first mentioned. This will en-
able us to better understand the nature of Erasmus’ apo-
logue, which shows the poor scarab defeating the eagle, 
and to investigate more closely the peculiar qualities of 
this scarab-Silenus. 
The commentary of the adage Sileni Alcibiadis is one 
of the most extended in the whole corpus of Chiliades 
Adagiorum and develops into a sort of political-
theological essay where Erasmus condemns social hypoc-
risies and their inauspicious consequences. However, for 
my argument, the most interesting aspect of Alcibiades’ 
Silenus is his first description, which sheds light on the 
paradoxical relationship between amusing surface and 
serious inwardness, and between the playful artifice of the 
outward form and the numinous essence: 
 
The Sileni are said to have been a kind of small figure of carved 
wood, so made that they could be divided and opened. Thus, 
though when closed they looked like a caricature of a hideous 
flute-player, when opened they suddenly displayed a deity, so 
that this humorous surprise made the carver’s skill all the more 
admirable. Furthermore, the subject of these images was drawn 
from the well-known comic figure of Silenus, Bacchus’ tutor 
and the court buffoon of the gods of poetry. (CWE 34, 262)51 
 
First of all, in following Erasmus’ approach, it should not 
be forgotten that the metaphor of Silenus originates in 
Plato’s Symposium. Here Alcibiades, who is completely 
drunk, paradoxically praises an atopos Socrates, whose 
real nature can be understood only through the ridiculous 
medium of the image (Smp. 215a-222b).52 The paradox of 
the discrepancy between Socrates’ superficial foolery and 
his inner qualities is the result of the ambiguous speech of 
the drunk Alcibiades, whom Socrates himself describes as 
someone who lacks the ability to see properly (Smp. 
219a). The portrait of Socrates that emerges from what 
Alcibiades says is that of a man who deceives and dis-
guises himself while upsetting roles and identities and 
whose irony displays the attitude of the sophist. The 
contradictory identity of Socrates can be understood only 
through the dislocated perspective of the drunk and blind 
Alcibiades: by confusing Socrates with Eros-sophist 
(Smp. 203d), he is compelled to hold onto a man in whom 
comedy and tragedy coexist (Smp. 223d). 
In his commentary to the adage Sileni Alcibiadis, 
Erasmus fully exploited this substantial ambivalence of 
the Silenus metaphor, and insisted on Socrates’ ridiculous 
appearance, his zany behaviour, his inclination to play 
and trick, as well as on his open staging of a weak form of 
knowledge: 
 
Anyone who had valued him skin-deep (as they say) would not 
have given twopence for him. With his peasant face, glaring like 
a bull, and his snub nose always sniffling, he might have been 
taken for some blockheaded country bumpkin. The care of his 
person was neglected, his language simple and homely and 
smacking of common folk; for his talk was all of carters and 
cobblers, of fullers and smiths [...].  Last but not least, that un-
broken flow of humour gave him the air of a buffoon. While that 
was a period when the ambition to advertise one’s own clever-
ness reached manic heights among the foolish [...], Socrates was 
alone in declaring that there was only one thing he knew, which 
was that he knew nothing [...]. Small wonder then, though the 
world of those days was full of professional wits, if this buffoon 
was the only man declared wise by the oracle, and he who knew 
nothing was judged to know more than those who boasted there 
was nothing they did not know – was in fact judged to know 
more than the rest for that very reason, that he alone of them all 
said he knew nothing. (CWE 34, 262-263)53 
 
Therefore, the comic mask is part of Socrates as his sub-
lime soul or, better, the comic appearance seems to be the 
very foundation of his inner virtues. It is not by chance 
that Socrates’ silenic comedy is opposed to the tragedy of 
praeposteri Sileni, who are not able to recognize the the-
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atrical quality of their splendours and honours and who 
confuse this golden surface with their individual sub-
stance: 
 
A goodly number of men reproduce Silenus inside-out. Anyone 
who looked thoroughly into the driving force of things and their 
true nature would find none so far removed from real wisdom as 
those whose honorific title, learned bonnets, resplendent belts, 
and bejewelled rings advertise wisdom in perfection. So true is 
this that you may not seldom find more real and native wisdom 
in one single ordinary man [...], than in many of our pompous 
theologians. (CWE 34, 265-266)54 
 
At this point, according to Erasmus’ reappraisal of Al-
cibiades’ perspective, it is clear that any opportunity to 
grasp a truth must necessarily pass through the surface of 
the comic mask, which creates the condition for all inves-
tigation of truth: Erasmus’ silenic approach does not con-
sist in the mere unveiling of a more substantial reality55, 
but in the acknowledgement of the theatrical  nature of 
every persona. The nature of Erasmus’ paradox does not 
lie in the overturning of appearance, but in the aporia of 
coexistence56. Silenus’ comicality is related to the ability 
to recognize the contextual existence of each mask (per-
sona); the tragedy of the inverted Silenus consists in 
wearing the mask as a skin.  
Once again, examining Erasmus’ work in the light of 
Lucian’s paradoxes can be profitable: through the medi-
ation of Lucian, Erasmus seems to fully exploit the poten-
tial sophistic aptitude of Alcibiades’ speech. The image of 
Silenus that Lucian outlined in his Bacchus constitutes an 
intermediate step between the Silenus of Alcibiades and 
that of Erasmus. Lucian, with Alcibiades’ Socrates in 
mind, used the image of Silenus to justify the comic 
quality of his writings. He states that Bacchus’ pedagogue 
is able to produce his best speeches, and his most ornate 
and wise utterances when his inebriation and drollery 
reach their acme. In the same way Lucian’s work, which 
is a hybrid of philosophical dialogue and comedy, 
achieves its most significant results when it makes ex-
plicit use of the device of laughter (Luc. Bacch, tr. Har-
mon, I, 56-59). In this context the laughable appearance 
of Lucian’s work becomes the real mediator and the focal 
point of every hermeneutical activity. 
Against this background, it is not by chance that the 
image of Alcibiades’ Silenus became the emblem of the 
literary structure of Erasmus’ Moriae Encomium and the 
metaphor of the exegetical process required for its inter-
pretation (CWE 27, 102-103; ASD IV/3, 104). As a mat-
ter of fact, the Silenic approach excludes a simplified al-
legorical reading and exploits the playful nature of the 
rhetorical principles of decorum and aptum. 
Now that the qualities of the figure of Sileni Alcibiadis 
have been clarified, we can return to the Silenic image of 
the scarab. Our first impression is that the ability of the 
tiny despised animal to humiliate artfully the haughty 
eagle makes the humble insect next of kin to the fly, 
whose graceful levity is set against the massive structure 
of the elephant. On closer examination, however, the 
reader is disoriented by the fact that the praise of the sca-
rab takes on an increasingly satirical tone: through the 
exaltation of its skill as a warrior, Erasmus ridicules mili-
tary prowess and glory57 and, through the scarab’s mys-
terious sanctification, he makes fun of superstition58. 
Erasmus’ portrait of the scarab shows a small animal of 
shabby appearance, which is full of vainglory and greedy 
for power: 
 
Now the beetle was not a little pleased by the very fact that 
someone existed who, first, was willing to owe his life to him 
and believed that such a great thing was in his power; and who, 
second, found his hole [...] suitable as a place in which to hide 
for safety, like a sacred altar or the king’s statue. (CWE 35, 
207)59 
 
He was also tickled by a certain alluring hope that, if the act 
succeeded and the eagle were overthrown, he might himself take 
power. (CWE 35, 209)60  
 
Erasmus’ scarab is sure of its honour and authority (“per-
sonal dignity is no slight matter to anyone”; CWE 35, 
20861), and when this insignificant beast is offended by 
the eagle he begins to harbour a destructive hatred and to 
engage in such a cruel and malicious deception (“And so 
he pondered all sorts of arts and trick. It was no common 
punishment but extermination and “total destruction” he 
contemplated”; CWE 35, 20862). Therefore, the smallness 
of the scarab is at variance with the joyful and playful ap-
titude of the fly. Indeed, the scarab statically takes on the 
identity of a revealed allegory and, by forgetting and re-
jecting its comic mask and its laughable appearance, it 
does not look much different from the eagle in terms of its 
rapacity and thirst for glory.63 Thus, the Silenus-scarab 
turns into a tragic mask, into an inverted Silenus, which is 
unable to exploit the potential meaning of its ludic per-
sona and which projects outwards its own ridiculous 
gravity: taking a mysterium too seriously and effacing the 
comical ambages of its surface means eschewing the fic-
tion that produces truth and being content with a fictitious 
truth. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The materials analysed in this overview allow us to affirm 
that some of the best-known and recurring metaphors in 
Erasmus’ work (Hercules, Silenus and the fly) originated 
in the paradoxes of Lucian. 
In this article I have attempted not only to trace the 
genealogy of Erasmus’ ethics, by emphasizing the way in 
which its constitutive metaphors are rooted in Lucian’s 
work, but also to show that what is most serious and deep 
in Erasmus’ theological perspective (i.e the tolerance of 
pietas) is founded in the sophistic aptitude of Lucian’s 
laughter and in his ability to test and  experiment with the 
contingencies of every context. 
From this point of view, the Lucianism of Erasmus is 
no longer the playful dressing up of a more substantial 
moral commitment but becomes the rhetorical aesthetics 
which fostered the growth of his ethics.  
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Notes 
 
1 See, among others, Lauvergnat-Gagnière, Marsh and Geri. 
2 See, for example, M. A. Screech. For my purpose, the approach to the 
Moriae Encomium of Margolin 1983 and Fumaroli is more significant 
because of its focus on the rhetorical and sophistic nature of the para-
doxes of Folly. 
3 For the plurality of values of the recurrent image of Hercules in Eras-
mus’ work see Margolin 1996. 
4 For Hercules Germanicus’s identification with Arminius, the hero of 
the battle of the Teutoburg forest, see McDonald and Leitch. 
5 For the ascription of the engraving to Hans Holbein the Younger and 
for its anti-Lutheran interpretation see Burckhardt-Werthemann and 
Burckhardt-Biedermann.  
6 On the value of Erasmus’ portrait by Holbein see, in particular, among 
others, Heckscher. 
7 For an exhaustive exploration of the theme of physical weakness in 
Erasmus’ epistolary see Vanden Branden. 
8 Cf. CWE 34, 175-176: “Some people, I perceive, are of a disposition to 
measure books by their size, rather than by the learning they contain, 
and think a thing finished only if nothing can be added to it and much is 
superfluous, nothing adequate that is not greatly overdone, and fullness 
never achieved except where everything is repeated ad nauseam. Among 
this gentry, someone will say that there are points to which I might have 
given fuller and richer treatment [...] Who, I ask you to begin with, is so 
arrogant that he dare maintain such a thing? So unfair as to demand that 
in this literary kind work no passage shall ever be passed over? Suppose 
you have read everything, made notes of everything, have everything 
ready at hand: is it all, in this vast medley of materials, instantly avail-
able, just what you needed and where you needed it? Then think what 
tedious pedantry it would have been to collect from every quarter all that 
could in any way have been adapted to enrichment of a proverb!” (ASD 
II/5, 33: “Nam quosdam hoc animo esse video ut libros mole, non 
eruditione metiantur et id demum absolutum existiment, ubi nihil 
adiungi possit, supersint pleraque; quibus nihil satis nisi quod impendio 
nimium, atque ibi denique copiam esse iudicant, cum ad satietatem 
ubique dicuntur omnia. Horum igitur quispiam dicet quaedam a me 
copiosius locupletiusque tractari potuisse […]. Quis tam iniquus ut 
exigat in huiusmodi scripti genere ne quis omnino praetereatur locus? Ut 
nihil non legeris, nihil non annotaris, nihil non apparaveris, itane statim 
in tam immensa rerum turba succurrit quod oportuit quoque oportuit 
loco? Deinde quae tandem futura fuerat ista molesta diligentia 
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undecunque conquirere quicquid quocunque modo poterat ad proverbii 
locupletationem accomodari?”). 
9 See Grassi, 150-153 about the relationship between Hercules and Pro-
teus and, in general, about Hercules as protagonist of the humanization 
of the natural world through speech. 
10 For the literary and iconographic fortune of the image of Hercules 
Gallicus after Erasmus’ translation see Hallowell 1962, Hallowell 1966 
and, more recently, Carlini. 
11 ASD, I/1, 591-592: “siquidem Hercules ille senex ingentem admodum 
hominum multitudinem trahit, omnibus ab aure revinctis, porro vincula 
catenulae tenues auro electrove confectae pulcherrimis istis monilibus 
adsimiles. Atqui quum vinculis usqueadeo fragilibus ducantur, tamen 
neque de fugiendo cogitant, quum alioqui commode possint, neque 
prorsus obnituntur, aut pedibus adversus trahentem obtendunt, sese 
resupinantes: verum alacres ac laeti sequuntur, ducentem admirantes, 
ultro festinantes omnes, et laxatis funiculis etiam antevertere studentes, 
perinde quasi graviter laturi, si solverentur vinculis. Ne illud quidem 
pigebit referre, quod mihi videbatur omnium absurdissimum: etenim 
quum non inveniret pictor unde catenularum summas ansas necteret, 
videlicet dextera iam clavam, laeva arcum tenente, summam dei linguam 
perterebravit, atque ex hac religatis catenulis eos trahi fecit. Ipse 
nimirum ad eos qui ducebantur, vultum et oculos convertebat, arridens 
[...]. Quin de eodem hanc in summa habemus opinionem, ut quicquid 
egit, id oratione fecundiaque confecisse putemus, utpote virum 
sapientem, ac persuadendo pleraque sibi subegisse. Iam tela illius 
nimirum rationes sunt acutae, missiles, citae atque animam sauciantes”. 
12 Cf. The Table Talk, or Familiar Discourse of Martin Luther, tr. 
Hazlitt, 283: “[Erasmus is] a mere Momus, making his mows and mocks 
at everything and everybody, at God and man, at papist and protestant, 
but all the while using such shuffling and double-meaning terms, that no 
one can lay hold of him to any effectual purpose” (D. Martin Luthers 
Werke. Tischreden, I, 811, 390: “Erasmus verus est Momus. Omnia ridet 
ac ludit, totam religionem ac Christum, atque ut hoc melius praestet, 
dies noctesque excogitat vocabula amphibola et ambigua[...]. Omnia 
eius scripta quolibet trahi possunt, itaque neque a nobis, nec a papisti 
deprehendi potest, nisi prius ademeris illi amphibologiam”), and cf. D. 
Martin Luthers Werke. Briefwechsel, VII, 2093, 36: “Our king of ambi-
guity sits upon his ambiguous throne and destroys us, stupid Christians, 
with a double destruction. First, it is his will, and it is a great pleasure to 
him, to offend us by his ambiguous words [...] And next, when he sees 
that we are offended, and have run against his insidious figures of 
speech, and begin to exclaim against him, he then begin to triumph and 
rejoice that the desired prey has been caught in his snares” (“At noster 
rex amphibolus sedet in throno amphibologiae securus, et duplici 
contritione conterit nos stupidos christianos. Primo vult, et magna 
voluptas est, ambiguis suis dictis nos offendere […]. Deinde, ubi sensit 
nos offensos et impegisse in insidiosas figuras et clamare contra eum, ibi 
serio triumphat et gaudet incidisse in suos casses praedam petitam”). 
13 About the mockery of the image of Hercules Gallicus in Dürer's en-
graving see Wind. 
14 Erasmus carried on his translation of the works of Lucian until 1514, 
constantly adding new material to the subsequent editions of Lucian’s 
translations. The ten translated texts (four by More and six by Erasmus) 
of the first edition of 1506 became the thirty-six translations of the 1514 
edition. 
15 On this see Thompson, Delcourt, Rummel, 49-70 and Geri, 166-177. 
16 The role of Lucian in Erasmus’ pedagogical project is clarified in De 
ratione studii, CWE 24, 669: “For a true ability to speak correctly is best 
fostered both by conversing and consorting with those who speak cor-
rectly and by the habitual reading of the best stylists. Among the latter 
the first to be imbibed should be those whose diction, apart from its re-
finement, will also entice learners by a certain charm of subject-matter. 
In this category I would assign first place to Lucian” (ASD I/2, 115: 
“Nam vera emendate loquendi facultas optime paratur, cum ex castigate 
loquentium colloquio convictuque, tum ex eloquentium auctorum 
assidua lectione, e quibus ii primum sunt imbibendi, quorum oratio, 
praeterquam quod est castigatissima, argumenti quoque illecebra aliqua 
discentibus blandiatur. Quo quidem in genere primas tribuerim 
Luciano”). 
17 For a definition of the humanistic concept of festivitas see Dresden. 
18 Cf, De copia, CWE 24, 634: “Stories which are invented to raise a 
laugh are the more entertaining the further they are from truth [...] and 
can also win the ears of the educated by learned allusions. To this type 
belong Lucian’s True History and Apuleius’ Golden Ass which he 
copied from Lucian’s example, further the Icaromenippus and lots of 
other things by Lucian; also nearly all the plots of Old Comedy, which 
delight us not by presenting a picture of real life, but by allusion and 
hidden meaning” (ASD I/6, 257: “Porro, quae risus causa finguntur, quo 
 
 
longius absunt a vero, hoc magis demulcent animos […] et eruditis 
allusionibus doctas etiam auras capere possint. Quo de genere sunt 
Luciani Verae narrationes, et ad huius exemplum effictus Asinus 
Apulei; praeterea Icaromenippus, et reliqua Luciani pleraque. Item 
argumenta ferme omnia veteris comoediae, quae non imagine veri sed 
allusionibus et allegoriis delectant”). For the characterization of 
Lucian’s work as an exercise of topical assemblage (cultural mimesis) 
see Bompaire. 
19 Cf. the chapter Exercitatio et imitatio of the De conscribendis epis-
tolis, CWE 25, 25 (ASD I/2, 233) in which Erasmus regards Lucian as a 
rhetorician especially well-versed in the genre of declamation because 
of his ability to assume the fictitious identity of historical and mytho-
logical characters. For the relationship between the concept of festivitas 
and the mimetic ability see Lecointe, 441-445. 
20 ASD I/1, 423: “Neque minus tamen iucundus quam frugifer futurus 
est, si quis modo decorum observet, quod in personis situm est.” 
21 Ibid. 603: “Luciani dialogus […] plurimum habeat artis ob decorum 
mire servatum in personis tam multis tamque diversis”. 
22 Too often critics have pinned these disparaging labels on the work of 
Lucian, by accepting as a fact the opposition between rhetorical form 
and philosophical content.  
23 Cf. CWE 2, 114 “It is a dialogue by Lucian; and there is hardly any of 
them that is more useful or pleasant to read”; 116: “it secretes a juice of 
sovereign potency for health; [...] whether you look for pleasure or edi-
fication there is no comedy, or satire, that challenges comparison with 
his dialogues”; 122: “So you will, I hope, read him with a certain 
amount of profit – but also with a vast degree of pleasure” (ASD I/1, 
488: “Is est Luciani dialogus quo vix alius lectu vel utilior vel 
iucundior”; 470: “succo praesentaneo salubrem et efficacem. [...] Nulla 
comoedia, nulla satyra cum huius dialogis conferri debeat, seu 
voluptatem spectes”; 449: “Eum igitur leges (uti spero) non modo cum 
fructu aliquo, verum etiam summa cum voluptate”); Cf. “Translations of 
Lucian”. The Complete Works of St Thomas More III/1, 5: “Whether this 
dialogue is more amusing or more instructive is hard to say” (“dialogus 
nescio certe lepidior ne, an utilior”). 
24 ASD I/4, 28: “vera pietate nihil est hilarius.” 
25 Cf. CWE 2, 116: “as Horace has written He who mingles use with 
pleasure/ Every prize doth bear away. [...] By his mixture of fun and 
earnest, gaiety and accurate observation, he so effectively portrays the 
manners [...] of men” (ASD I/1, 470-471: “Omne tulit punctum, (ut 
scripsit Flaccus) qui miscuit utile dulci […]. Sic seria nugis, nugas seriis 
miscet; sic ridens vera dicit, vera dicendo ridet; sic homines mores [...] 
depingit”); Cf. “Translations of Lucian”. The Complete Works of St 
Thomas More III/1, 3: “ If, most learned Sir, there was ever anyone who 
fulfilled the Horatian maxim and combined delight with instruction, I 
think Lucian certainly ranked among the foremost in this respect” (“Si 
quisquam fuit unquam vir doctissime, qui Horatianum praeceptum 
impleverit, voluptatemque cum utilitate coniunxerit, hoc ego certe 
Lucianum in primis puto praestitisse”). 
26 Cf. CWE 39 (ASD I/3), Exorcismus sive Spectrum, 531-544 (417-
423); Alcumistica, 545-556 (424-429); Hippoplanus, 557-561 (430-
432); ΠΤΩΟΛΟΓΙΑ, 562-570 (433-437). 
27 ASD I/2, 65: “Optarim aetatem virentem, a qua non abhorreat puer, et 
quam non pigeat quamvis personam sumere. Hic idem aget in formando 
ingenio quod parentes et nutrices facere solent in fingendo corpore”. 
28 Cf. De pueris instituendis, CWE 26, 341: “Nausea, after all, often 
arises from pure imagination [...]. Do we not see small boys constantly 
on the go all day, incredibly active, yet not experiencing any weariness? 
The great Milo would soon tire if he attempted to keep up a similar pace. 
Why are children like this? The reason is that play and childhood go 
naturally together, and that children think of their activity as play rather 
than exertion. The fact is that whenever we feel dissatisfied about some-
thing it is largely due to our imagination, which is often responsible for 
creating such a mood even when there is nothing wrong. [...] it is then 
the teacher’s task to prevent these feelings from taking hold and to give 
the course of study the appearance of a game” (ASD, I/2, p. 73: 
“Nonnunquam enim horrorem adfert sola imaginatio […]. An non 
videmus pueros tenerellos mira agilitate totum cursitare diem, nec 
sentire lassitudinem? Idem si faciat Milo, fatigaretur. Quid in causa? 
Quia lusus aetati cognatus est, et lusum imaginantur, non laborem. Est 
autem in re quavis maxima molestiae pars imaginatio, quae mali sensum 
adfert interdum, etiam ubi nihil est mali. Proinde […] praeceptoris […] 
partes erunt, eandem multis rationibus excludere studioque lusus 
personam inducere”). 
29 ASD I/3, 742: “Et haud scio an quicquam discitur felicius, quam quod 
in ludendo discitur. Est hoc nimirum sanctissimum fallendi genus, per 
imposturam dare beneficium”.  
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30 ASD V/4, 442: “nec vero semper opponitur falsum”. For Erasmus’ 
concept of truth as human research see Margolin 1969, 45-69. 
31 Allen IV, 13-15: “Quod Tomae Mori ingenium sic deamas […] 
nimirum scriptis illius inflammatus, quibus, ut vere scribis, nihil esse 
potest neque doctius neque festivius, istuc, crede mihi, clarissime 
Huttene, tibi cum multis commune est […]. Vultus ingenio respondet, 
gratam et amicam festivitatem semper prae se ferens, ac nonnihil ad 
ridentis habitum compositus; atque, ut ingenue dicam, appositior ad 
iucunditatem quam ad gravitatem aut dignitatem, etiamsi longissime 
abest ab ineptia scurrilitateque […]. Lingua mire explanata 
articulataque, nihil habens nec praeceps nec haesitans.” 
32 Ibid. 16: “In convictu tam rara comitas ac morum suavitas, ut nemo 
tam tristi sit ingenio quem non exhilaret, nulla res tam atrox cuius 
taedium non discutiat. Iam inde a puero sic iocis est delectatus ut ad hos 
natus videri possit […]. Adolescens comoediolas et scripsit et egit. Si 
quod dictum esset salsius, etiam in ipsum tortum, tamen amabat; 
usqueadeo gaudet salibus argutis et ingenium redolentibus. Unde et 
epigrammatis lusit iuvenis, et Luciano cum primis est delectatus; quin et 
mihi ut Morias Encomium scriberem, hoc est camelus saltarem, fuit 
auctor. Nihil autem in rebus humanis obvium est unde ille non venetur 
voluptatem, etiam in rebus maxime seriis: Si cum eruditis et cordatis res 
est, delectatur ingenio; si cum indoctis ac stultis, fruitur illorum stulticia. 
Nec offenditur morionibus, mira dexteritate ad omnium affectus sese 
accomodans.” 
33 LB IX, 1215: “Erasmus audet cum Luthero congredi, hoc est, cum 
elephanto musca?”. On the importance of this incipit of De libero 
arbitrio in the work setting see Boyle, 1-4. 
34 ASD II/2, 388: “Έλέφα ςἐκ µυίας ποιεῑς, id est «Elephantum ex 
muscafacis», id est res exiguas verbis attollis atque amplificas. Lucianus 
in Muscae encomio: Πολλαδ' ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῑν καταπαύσω τὸν λόγον, µὴ 
καὶ δόξο κατὰ τὴν παροιµίαν ὲλέφαντα ἐκ µυίας ποιεῑν, id est “Multa 
adhuc commemorare possem, sed finem dicendi faciam, ne videar et 
ipse iuxtatritumproverbium ex musca elephantum facere.” 
35 On the translations of Lucian by Guarino and, in general, on Lucian’s 
legacy in the Renaissance see Mattioli and Marsh.  
36 Luther’s Tractatus de libertate Christiana discusses exactly of the 
issue of free will. 
37 On the formal features of the literary genre of the diatriba and the 
gnoseological consequences of Erasmus’ choice see Boyle, 5-42. 
38 LB IX, 1215-1216: “certe vix alius quisquam minus exercitatus, ut qui 
semper arcano quodam natura e sensu abhorruerim a pugnis: eoque 
semper habui prius in liberioribus Musarum campis ludere, quam ferro 
comminus congredi. Et adeo non delector assertionibus, ut facile in 
Scepticorum sententiam pedibus discessurus sim […], eoque 
disputatorem agam, non iudicem: inquisitorem, non dogmatisten, 
paratus a quocunque discere, si quid adferatur rectius aut compertius”. 
39 LB X, 1304: “Quod tu affirmas, ego opto, quod tu dicis te scire, ego 
discere cupio, nec mihi satis est hoc asseverari abs te, certitudinem 
efflagito quam tu profiteris […]. Fit enim frequenter, ut qui a tenebris 
prodeunt, nihil videant in media luce Solis, nisi aliquandiu intenderint 
oculos, et per tenebras quaedam non statim videmus, sed intendentibus 
oculis paulatim incipient nobis esse paecipua,quae prius erant ambigua: 
quod idem accidit in rebus quae procul absunt a nobis. Sed ita civilitatis 
causa finxi, interpretationem utriusque partis esse ambiguam, ut rebus 
aequatis, ostenderes aliquidquod nos in medio vacillantes in tuam 
partem inclinaret”. 
40 Allen, I, 269: “Tandem cum et longius processisset disputatio, et esset 
quam ut convivio conveniret gravior et severior, tum ego meis, hoc est 
poetae, partibus functurus, ut et eam contentionem discuterem et 
festiviore fabella prandium exhilararem”. 
41 WA 18, 605: “Nam hoc consilio aliud nihil facis, quam quod signficas 
te in corde, Lucianum aut aliumquendam de grege Epicuri porcum alere, 
qui cum ipse nihil credat esse Deum, rideat occulte omnes qui credunt et 
confitentur”. 
42 Ivi, 609: “Quid hic dicam Erasme? Totus Lucianus spiras, et inhalas 
mihi grandem Epicuri crapulam”. 
43 Ibid. 620: “Deinde [ostendo], quid sit in divinas res et literas 
impingere, dum aliorum obsequio, personam sumimus et invita 
conscientia alienae scenae servimus. Non est ludus neque iocus, sacras 
literas et pietatem docere, facillime enim hic contingit lapsus ille, de quo 
Iacobus dicit, Qui offendit in uno, fit omnium reus. Ita fit enim, ut cum 
modicum videamur velle nugari, nec satis reverenter sacras literas 
habemus, mox impietatibus involvamur, blasphemiisque immergamur, 
sicut hic tibi contigit Erasme.” 
44 Ibid. 661: “Docere igitur aliquid, quod intra scripturas non est ullo 
verbo praescriptum et extra scripturas non est ullo facto monstratum, 
hoc non pertinet ad dogmata Christianorum, sed ad narrationes veras 
Luciani.” 
 
 
45 Ibid. 688: “Sic pugnan thumana Diatribes somnia adversus divinorum 
verborum agmina.” 
46 Allen V, 447: “spectator tantum sit tragoediae nostrae.” 
47 Ibid. 452: “non licet esset spectatorem istius tragoedie, que utinam 
non habeat tragicum exitum!” 
48 ASD, II/1, 60: “Et ut auctore Plinio in minutissimis animantibus […] 
maius est naturae miraculum quam in elephanto, siquis modo proprius 
contempletur, itidem in re litteraria nonnumquam plurimum habent 
ingenii, quae minima sunt.” 
49 Cf. CWE 27, 84: “trifling may lead to something more serious” (ASD 
IV/3, 68: “nugae seria ducant”). It is particularly interesting to note that 
this statement originates in Horace’s Ars Poetica, where it takes on a 
completely different meaning from that of Erasmus. “Hae nugae seria 
ducent”, according to Horace, means that even the smallest negligence 
in style can lead to a disastrous outcome in the finished work. For his 
part, Erasmus has fun juxtaposing nugae as little mistakes in the field of 
grammatical propriety and nugae as poetic games, by superimposing the 
seriousness of the consequences of a poorly finished literary work on the 
seriousness of thought content. Cf. Gordon, 54. 
50 Cf. CWE 35, 200: “But in truth, if anyone will open up this Silenus 
and look more closely at this despised creature, in its own setting as it 
were, he will see it has so many uncommon gifts that, all things well 
considered, he will almost prefer to be a scarab rather than an eagle” 
(ASD II/6, 413: “Verum si quis hunc explicit Silenum et contemptum 
hoc animalculum proprius ac veluti domi contempletur, tam multas in eo 
dotes haud vulgares animadvertet, ut omnibus diligenter pensitatis 
propemodum scarabeum se malit esse quam aquilam”). 
51 ASD, II/5, p. 160: “Aiunt enim Silenos imagunculas quaspiam fuisse 
sectiles et ita factas, ut diduci et explicari possent, et quae clausae 
ridiculam ac monstrosam tibicinis speciem habebant, apertae subito 
numen ostendebant, ut artem scalptoris gratiorem iocosus faceret error. 
Porro statuarum argumentum sumptum est a ridiculo illo Sileno, Bacchi 
paedagogo numinumque poeticorum morione.” 
52 About the possibility to read Plato’s Symposium as a game with the 
sophistic literary genre of paradoxical praise, see Dandrey, 15-17. 
53 ASD II/5, 160-162: “Quem si de summa, quod dici solet, cute quis 
aestimasset non emisset asse. Facies erat rusticana, taurinus aspectus, 
nares simiae muccoque plenae. Sannionem quempiam bardum ac 
stupidum dixisses. Cultus neglectus, sermo simplex ac plebeius et 
humilis, ut qui semper aurigas, cerdones, fullones et fabros haberet in 
ore […]. Denique iocus ille perpetuus nonnullam habebat morionis 
speciem. Cum ea tempestate ad insaniam usque ferveret inter stultos 
profitendi sapientiam ambitio […] solus hic hoc unum scire se dictitabat 
quod nihil scire […]. Proinde non iniuria, cum id tempestatis plena 
sophis essent omnia, solus hic morio sapiens oraculo pronuntiatus est et 
plus iudicatus est scire qui nihil sciebat quam hi, qui nihil nescire se 
praedicabant, imo ob id ipsum iudicatus est plus caeteris scire, quod 
unus omnium nihil sciret.” 
54 Ibid. 166: “Bona pars hominum praeposterum Silenum exprimunt. Si 
quis rerum vim ac naturam penitus introspiciat, reperiet nullos a vera 
sapientia longius abesse quam istos, qui magnificis titulis, qui sapientibu 
spileis, qui splendidis cingulis, qui gemmatis anuli absolutam profitentur 
sapientiam. Adeo ut non raro plus verae germanaeque sapientiae 
deprehendas in uno quopiam homuncione […] quam in multis 
theologorum tragicis personis.” 
55 Too often critics have insisted on the truth value of the silenic over-
turning and they have applied, in a short-sighted way, a dualistic con-
ception deduced from Enchiridion militis christiani. They have not 
taken into account Erasmus’ reflection on the hermeneutic value of mask 
(persona) and fiction (fabula). Against this background, the develop-
ment of the playful aspects of Erasmus’ theology in Gordon is of great 
interest, though Gordon’s work tends to erase the rhetorical context of 
Erasmus’ reflection on ludus. Indeed, he accepts the thesis of Screech, 
which considers Erasmus’ irony in the univocal perspective of mystical 
ecstasy. For a critique of the reduction of the Praise of Folly to unidi-
mensional mystical ecstasy see Margolin 1983, who focuses on the fact 
that Erasmus’ Praise of Folly belongs to the aesthetic category of ioco-
seria. 
56 About the meaning of the Greek word paradoxa see Ivi, 27: “Mais 
pourquoi réduire le sens de la préposition grecque para a celui d’une 
opposition? Elle signifie tout aussi “à côte”, ou “contre”, mais à la 
condition de donner à ce mot le même sens qu’au premier”. Cf. Pavlo-
skis, 108-111, who has explicitly shed light on the paradoxical nature of 
Erasmian Silenus where the opposites coexist and where everything is a 
mask of its contrary, so that the very concept of identity disappears: it is 
impossible to perceive the real nature of anything at all. 
57 Cf. CWE 35, 203-204: “In ancient times it was given first place 
among sacred images and in sacred rites as the most apt symbol of the 
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eminent warrior [...]. There too, not like “blue pimpernel among vege-
tables” as the proverb says, but among sacred images, was the scarab, 
carved on a seal [...]. This too is in Plutarch, in case anyone thinks I 
have made it up, as some ignorant theologians sometimes contrive alle-
gories. But some uninformed person will ask, “What has a beetle to do 
with a military general?” In fact they have many points in common. In 
the first place you can see that the beetle is covered with gleaming ar-
mour and no part of its body is not carefully protected by scales and 
plates; Mars does not seem to be better armed when Homer equips him 
in his fullest panoply. Then there is its aggressive approach with terrify-
ing, unnerving thrum and truly warlike voice. For what is harsher than 
the blare of trumpets, what is more vulgar than the roll of drums? The 
sound of trumpets, which delights kings so much nowadays, was in-
tolerable to the Busiritae of old, because it seemed to them like the bray-
ing of an ass, and the ass was one of the things that nation considered 
detestable [...]. What, I ask, could be more apt for a strong leader? In-
deed it is also fitting, as Plutarch also reports, that they use those dainty 
balls I have described to give birth to, nurture, feed, and bring up their 
offspring; their birthplace is their food. Do not think this esoteric aptness 
is easy for me to explain” (ASD II/6, 415-416: “antiquitus inter sacras 
imagines et in vatum mysteriis cum primis habitus est scarabeus, egregii 
bellatori saptissimum symbolum […]. Aderat non corchorus inter olera, 
quod proverbio dicunt, sed inter sacras imagines scarabeus sigillo 
insculptus […]. Nam hoc quoque Plutarchus indicat, ne quis sic a me 
confictum existimet, quemadmodum allegorias aliquoties comminisci 
solent in docti theologi. At dixerit imperitior aliquis: “Quid scarabeo 
cum duce belli?” Permulta sane congruunt. Principio vides, vt totus 
armis luceat scarabeus nullaque pars corporis sit non diligenter crustis ac 
laminis communita, vt non melius armatus videatur Mauors Homericus, 
cum illum maxime sua instruit panoplia. Adde nunc militarem assultum 
cum horrendo ac Panico bombo cantuque vere militari. Quid enim in 
suavius classicorum sonitu? Quid ἀµουσότερον tympanorum strepitu? 
Nam tubarum vocem, qua nunc reges tantopere delectantur, olim 
Busiritae non ferebant, quod asino rudenti videatur adsimilis. At ei genti 
inter abominanda habebatur asinus […]. Quin et illud ad rem apte 
quadrat, vt idem indicat Plutarchus, quod in delicatis illis pilis, de quibus 
dictum est, foetus suos aedunt, fouent, alunt, educant, nec alius est locus 
nascendi quam cibi. Verum hoc mysterii mihi non facile sit 
interpretari”). 
58 Cf. CWE 35, 205: “I mean “that formidable type” of scarab that is 
carved on an emerald, for as the proverb says “you can’t carve a Mer-
cury out of any and every wood”; the scarab does not consider every 
gem worthy of itself, but if carved on the emerald, the brightest of all 
gems, and hung from the neck as I said (but only with the hair of an ape 
or at least a swallow’s feathers), it affords an immediate remedy against 
all poisons” (ASD II/6, 417: “Siquidem όδεινὸςἐκεῖνος scarabeus, 
smaragdo gemmae insculptus, nec enim e quovis lingo fingitur 
Mercurius iuxta proverbium, nec quamvis gemmam se dignatur 
scarabeus, sed smaragdo gemmarum omnium nitidissima expressus, ut 
dixi, si de collo suspendatur, at non nisi cynocephali capillis aut certe 
plumis hirundinis, adversus omnia veneficia adfert remedium”). 
59 ASD II/6, 418: “nonnihil placebat scarabeus, quod extitisset, qui ipsi 
suam vitam debere vellet quique rem tantam a se praestari posse 
crederet, denique cui suum antrum […] idoneum videretur, ad quod 
salutis causa velut ad sacram aram aut principis statuam confugeret.” 
60 Ibid. 420: “Titillabat et blanda quaedam spes, si facinus successisset, 
futurum ut profligata aquila ipse regno potiretur.” 
61 Ibid. 419: “nulli sua levis est auctoritas.” 
62 Ibid. 420: “Omnes igitur artes, omnes dolos in pectus advocat. Nec 
vulgare molitur poenam, internecionem ac plane πανολεθρίαν in animo 
volvit.” 
63 About it, see the significant conclusion of the adage (CWE 35, 214): 
“There are some little men, of the meanest sort but malicious neverthe-
less, no less black than scarab, no less evil-smelling, no less mean-
spirited, but by their obstinately malicious spirit (since they can do no 
good to any mortals) they often make trouble for great men. Their 
blackness is terrifying, their noise is disturbing, their stench is an annoy-
ance; they fly round and round, they cannot be shaken off, they wait in 
ambush. It is preferable by far sometimes to contend with powerful men 
than to provoke these beetles whom one may even be ashamed to beat. 
You cannot shake them off nor fight with them without coming away 
defiled” (ASD II/6, 424: “Sunt enim homunculi quidam, infimae quidem 
sortis, sed tamen malitiosi, non minus atri quam scarabei neque minus 
putidi neque minus abiecti, qui tamen pertinaci quadam ingenii malitia, 
cum nulli omnino mortalium prodesse possint, magnis etiam 
saepenumero viris facessant negocium. Territant nigrore, obstrepunt 
stridore, obturbant foetore, circumvolitant, haerent, insidiantur, ut non 
paulo satius sit cum magnis aliquando viris simultatem suscipere quam 
 
 
hos lacessere scarabeos, quos pudeat etiam vicisse quosque nec excutere 
possis neque conflictari cum illis queas, nisi discedas contaminatior”). 
 
